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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies how monetary policy should be conducted in emerging economies 
where the domestic currency has been partially replaced by a foreign currency, a 
phenomenon called ‘dollarisation’. The central question is how different forms of 
dollarisation affect both the transmission mechanism and the goals of the central 
bank.
A general overview and the motivation of these topics are discussed in 
the first and second chapters. The th ird  chapter, ‘Optimal M onetary Policy and 
Endogenous Price Dollarisation’, shows th a t having two units of account may be 
optim al for economies with large sector specific productivity shocks when prices are 
sticky. In this case, optimal monetary policy implies a certain degree of exchange 
rate  smoothing.
In the fourth chapter, ‘M onetary Policy and Currency Substitution’ we 
use a fully micro-founded general equilibrium model where currency substitution 
is endogenously determined to show how currency substitution can make inflation 
stabilisation more costly, thus inducing a higher degree of aggregate volatility. We 
also show th a t currency substitution does not affect the central banks capability to  
determine inflation and th a t in this case exchange rate smoothing is not optimal.
The effect of income distribution on price dollarisation is studied in the 
fifth chapter. This chapter shows th a t income inequality can generate an upper 
boundary for price dollarisation
In the final chapter, ‘Dollarisation Persistence and Individual Heterogene­
ity ’, we study how the limited capability to  process financial information of partic­
ipants in the dollar deposit market can induce very persistent degrees of financial 
dollarisation. We further provide empirical evidence supporting our claim.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A fundam ental question in monetary theory and one of practical importance for cen­
tra l banks is how monetary policy should be conducted. Recently, a great amount of 
research has been devoted to providing answers to  this question using New Keyne­
sian models1. This type of models have proven to  be useful tools for understanding 
how central banks should set interest rates under different types of shocks and for 
learning about the objectives they should pursue. Most of this literature, however, 
has studied these issues in single-currency economy models, a relevant case for de­
veloped economies but not for a large number of emerging economies th a t function 
as dual-currency economies.
This thesis contributes to the literature on m onetary policy in emerging 
market economies on three fronts: first it develops general equilibrium New Key­
nesian models where endogenously two currencies circulate as medium of payment 
and unit of account. Second, it shows what type of policies are optimal in this 
type of environments. Third, it provides insights on how two other key features of 
emerging market economies,income distribution and the limited ability to  process 
information of participants in the financial market, restrict the use of a foreign 
currency by domestic agents. W hilst the contribution of this thesis is theoretical, 
it also provides empirical evidence supporting some of its implications by using as 
case study Mexico, Peru, Poland and Uruguay.
1 See for instance, Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) for closed economies, and Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2004), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Benigno (2004) 
and De Paoli (2004), for open economies.
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Dual currency economies are known in the literature and amongst policy 
makers as dollarised economies. This term  is used to  describe economies where a 
foreign currency is widely used by its residents alongside or instead of the domestic 
currency. Distinct forms of dollarisation are recognised in the literature depending 
on the m onetary services provided by the foreign currency and on its legal tender 
status.
W hen the domestic currency is the only legal tender in the economy, but 
the foreign currency is widely accepted, dollarisation is denominated unofficial or 
partial This type of dollarisation, in turn, can be categorised as financial dollarisa- 
iion(FD ), when the foreign currency provides services of reserve of value, currency 
substitution  or payments dollarisation(CS), when the domestic economy has been 
partially replaced in its function of medium of payment, and price dollarisation, 
(PD) when the foreign currency also works as unit of account.
Dollarisation is significant and widespread in many emerging economies, in 
particular, in those countries with a history of high inflation, such as Bolivia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Peru, Russia and Uruguay. Yet, it is not exclusive to  those economies. Levy- 
Yeyati (2006) reports th a t by the end of 2000 more than  44 percent of the banking 
deposits in emerging market economies where denominated in foreign currency. 
By the end of 2005 FD, measured by participation of foreign-currency-denominated 
deposits in the banking system, reached 85 percent in Peru and 55 percent in Bolivia, 
the two Latin American countries with the longest history of dollarisation. For the 
same countries, CS, measured by the participation of foreign-currency denominated 
sight deposits was around 60 percent. These figures are remarkably high even for 
emerging economies. In transition economies, in particular in Russia, CS is even 
higher, reaching levels close to  80 percent.
Although not as large as FD or CS, PD is significant. The short-run level 
of the exchange rate  pass-through to  domestic prices can be used as an indirect
11
measure of PD 2. For Peru, Armas et al. (2001), Miller (2003) and Winkelried (2003) 
estim ate values for the short-run degree of pass-through between 15 to 30 percent. 
More recently, Castillo et al. (2006) estimate values of 40 and 30 percent for CS and 
PD respectively 3.
1.1 Dollarisation and Monetary Policy
This thesis contains five chapters in addition to  the introductory chapter. Chapter 
2  draws attention to the importance of dollarisation in emerging economies by pro­
viding a set of quantitative measures of its different forms for a wide set of these 
economies. Chapters 3 and 4 address the issue of how monetary policy should be 
conducted when agents choose endogenously their unit of account and their medium 
of payment. Chapter 5 analyses the implications of non-homothetic preferences and 
income distribution on the degree of PD, whereas C hapter 6  focuses on the impli­
cations of the heterogenous ability of the deposit market participants to process 
information in explaining the degree of persistence of FD.
A fundamental question in monetary theory is how an economy should 
choose its unit of account. Most of the recent literature in m onetary policy th a t 
relies on general equilibrium models takes, however, this choice as given 4. Instead, 
C hapter 3, explicitly considers the implications of this choice for monetary policy 
within a general equilibrium small open economy model. Our main result shows
2 This measure is particularly informative for those goods whose prices are not adjusted fre­
quently. Since, in those cases their prices reflect, at short-run frequencies, mainly exchange rate 
movements.
3 This estimation uses Bayesian methods and a stochastic general equilibrium model with Peru­
vian data.
4 The only exception to this trend is the literature on endogenous pass-through, which explicitly 
studies the determinants of exporting firm’s invoicing decisions and their implications for real 
exchange rate volatility, the transmission of foreign shocks and the benefits of international 
policy coordination See Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) for a general equilibrium static model 
of invoicing, and for dynamic frameworks, see Devereux et al. (2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti
(2004)
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th a t it is possible to  obtain welfare gains from using two units of accounts when: a) 
sector specific shocks are large enough and b) prices are not too sticky. In these cases 
having two units of accounts is instrum ental in producing less costly adjustm ent in 
relative prices across productive sectors. A key implication for monetary policy of 
this novel result is th a t zero domestic inflation is not optimal in economies with PD. 
Instead the central bank faces a trade-off between stabilising domestic inflation, the 
output gap and the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, this chapter shows th a t 
optim al monetary policy implies some degree of exchange rate smoothness. In th a t 
sense, the model shows th a t in economies with PD there is an optimal fear of floating
5
A key param eter in determining the m agnitude of the central bank’s re­
sponse to  domestic inflation, output gap and of fear of floating is the degree of 
price stickiness. W hen prices are more sticky the central bank puts a larger weight 
on domestic inflation and output gap stabilisation, since the welfare costs associ­
ated to  fluctuations in these two variables are larger in this case. Instead, when 
prices are not too sticky and sector specific shocks are large, the central banks puts 
more weight on exchange rate stabilisation since in this case, gains from stabilising 
relative prices through the exchange rate are larger.
Similarly to  Corsetti and Pesenti (2004), Loyo (2001) and Devereux et 
al. (2004), we also find th a t individual firm’s would choose to  invoice in a foreign 
currency when the volatility of exchange rate is high and firm’s marginal costs are 
positive correlated with the exchange rate. Interestingly then, we show th a t it is 
possible to  obtain multiple equilibriums in the model, particularly when sector spe­
cific shocks are not large enough. In this la tte r case, firm’s optimal invoicing choice 
would depend on what other firms do. We further provide a full characterisation of 
these equilibriums.
5 Terminology of Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
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This chapter further shows th a t optimal m onetary policy in economies with 
endogenous PD implies a positive correlation between the exchange rate and sector 
specific productivity shocks of firms th a t invoice in a foreign currency. By inducing 
this correlation, the central bank can achieve a larger reduction on the relative 
price distortions generated by sector specific productivity shocks and sticky prices, 
in comparison with the outcome under a pure inflation target regime. W hen a 
subset of firms sets prices in dollars, by altering the parity between the domestic 
and the foreign currency, the central bank can engineer a change in relative prices 
in the opposite direction to the one generated by sector specific productivity shocks 
stabilising relative prices. The model also implies th a t the larger the degree of price 
stickiness, the larger the response of the central bank should be to  sector specific 
productivity shocks. This potential behaviour of the central bank, in turn , generates 
the incentives to  some firms to  set prices in a foreign currency
Importantly, chapter 4 shows th a t CS not only affects the economy through 
different channels than  those of PD but more crucially it shows th a t CS has distinct 
implications for m onetary policy. As this chapter discuss in detail, by optimally 
choosing the composition of their medium of payments, households open a channel 
by which the foreign nominal interest rate affects consumption, savings and labour 
supply decisions, and consequently output gap and inflation dynamics. This new 
channel introduces a new source of volatility in developing small open economies, 
in particular in response to  foreign interest rate  shocks.
Moreover, this chapter shows th a t the central bank’s welfare-based loss 
function depends on the degree of CS in steady-state. In particular, a central bank 
operating in this type of environment faces a  trade-off between stabilising the out­
put gap, domestic inflation and the nominal interest rate. This trade-off, moreover, 
depends on the degree of steady-state CS. In particular, when the degree of CS is 
large, the central puts more weight on domestic inflation and output gap stabili­
sation than  in interest rate smoothing. Consequently, the central bank optimally
14
moves the domestic interest rate more strongly in response to  shocks. Also, it turns 
out to  be optimal for the central bank to  not smooth exchange rate fluctuations.
In term s of implementable rules, this chapter shows th a t CS increases the 
determinacy area of Taylor-type rules th a t react to  domestic inflation. This, though, 
comes at the cost of increasing the volatility of both the output gap and inflation. 
Interestingly then, this chapter shows tha t CS do not limit the central bank’s capa­
bility to  anchor inflation expectations, it only make more costly both domestic infla­
tion and output gap stabilisation. Indeed, the recent experience of highly dollarised 
Latin American economies, like Bolivia and Peru, is consistent with this result. 
These economies have successfully anchored inflation expectations and achieved 
price stability, regardless of their high degrees of both  FD and CS.
Developing economies differ from developed ones on several dimensions. 
Two of them  which are particularly relevant are income level differences and agent’s 
access to  financial markets. Chapters 5 and 6  we explore the implications of these 
two key emerging market features. On one hand, chapter 5 focuses on understanding 
how income distribution affects the choice of unit of account by firms and agent’s 
portfolio decisions. Using a simple overlapping generation m onetary model where 
agents have non-homothetic preferences, this chapter shows th a t income distribution 
can limit the extent to  which a foreign currency can be used as unit of account. In 
particular, it shows th a t even when firms producing necessity goods have marginal 
costs in foreign currency, they will choose to  set prices in domestic currency.
The mechanism th a t delivers this result is rooted in the link th a t non- 
homothetic preferences generate between the demand price elasticity and the income 
of firm’s customers. In this case, the demand price elasticity th a t firms face is 
positively correlated with their costum ers’ income. Hence, when custom er’s income 
covaries positively with the exchange rate, which is the case when customers have 
dollarised their savings, setting prices in foreign currency increases the volatility of
15
a firm’s profits, reducing their expected profits. This effect is larger for necessity 
goods than  for luxury goods, and, consequently, firms producing necessity goods are 
more likely to  set prices in domestic currency than  firms producing luxury goods. 
At the aggregate level, the heterogenous pricing behaviour of firms in turn  implies 
th a t the degree of pass-through of exchange rate to  prices would tend to  be smaller 
for low-income countries than  for medium-income countries.
On the other hand, Chapter 6  analyses how the limited capability to  process 
information of participants in the deposit market helps to explain the degree of per­
sistence of financial dollarisation. Persistence is the most salient feature of financial 
dollarisation, and the one th a t probably causes more concern to  policymakers. In 
this chapter we claim th a t this persistence is connected to  the fact th a t partici­
pants in the dollar deposit market are fairly heterogenous, and so is the way they 
form their optimal currency portfolio. This chapter develops a simple model where 
agents differ in their ability to  process information, which turns out to  be enough 
to  generate persistence upon aggregation. The chapter finds empirical support for 
this claim with da ta  from three Latin American countries and Poland.
All in all, this thesis provides several novel results on how monetary policy 
should be conducted in economies with PD and CS. In particular, it shows th a t in 
partially dollarised economies the weights of the exchange rate and th a t of interest 
rate on the central bank loss function depend on the extent of both  PD and CS. 
PD generates incentives to  smooth exchange rate  fluctuations, whereas CS reduces 
the incentives for interest rate smoothing. Importantly, CS also enlarges the area 
of determinacy for implementable Taylor-type rules, but at the cost of increasing 
aggregate volatility. Finally, this thesis also provides some novel explanations for 
two stylised facts on dollarisation: why FD is so persistent and why PD seems to 
be concentrated in relatively luxury goods. Some empirical evidence supporting the 
main implications of these two hypotheses is also provided.
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CHAPTER 2
QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF DOLLARISATION
This chapter provides quantitative measures of the three types of dollarisation stud­
ied in this thesis. For this purpose, we use d a ta  collected from different sources, 
in particular, the IMF Staff Reports, IMF International Financial Statistics pub­
lication and various Central Bank Bulletins. We also use information provided by 
Balino et al. (1999), De Nicolo et al. (2005) and A rteta  (2003) and Feige (2003).
2.1 Financial Dollarisation
Table 2.1 presents a list of countries where FD is above 10 percent . 1 We measure 
FD as the average ratio of deposits in foreign currency to  to ta l deposits issued by 
domestic banks for 33 countries for the period from 1991 to  2001.
As Table 2 . 1  shows, FD is quantitatively im portant in most of the countries 
in the sample. On average, it is above 50 percent. In Latin America, Bolivia and 
Uruguay are the economies with the highest FD measures, with values close to 90 
and 80 percent respectively. In the case of Eastern Europe, Armenia and Bulgaria 
are the economies th a t exhibit the highest dollarisation ratios, 71 and 51 percent, 
respectively, whereas in Asia and Africa, Cambodia and Angola exhibit FD levels 
of 94 and 65 percent respectively.
1 This table reports only figures of those countries where FD is above 10 percent. We have not 
considered economies with measures of FD below 10 percent since we are mainly interested 
in highly dollarised economies. Dollarisation levels below 10 may not be related directly to 
monetary policy but to other long-term factors such us financial integration.
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Table 2.1: Dollarisation Ratios for Se ected Countries
Financial Dollarisation Inflation
Average Max. Trend Average Max. Trend
Angola 65.1 84.0 up 214.0 5000.0 down
Argentina 61.3 74.0 up -0.3 171.7 down
Armenia 71.4 81.0 up 5.1 4940.8 down
Belarus 51.1 69.0 up 132.0 2 2 2 1 . 0 down
Bolivia 90.0 92.0 down 4.1 21.5 down
Bulgaria 50.5 57.0 up 219.4 1058.2 down
Cambodia 93.2 94.0 up 4.1 14.8 down
Costa Rica 41.4 48.0 up 11.4 28.7 down
Croatia 70.4 68.9 up 5.8 1509.4 down
Ecuador 26.9 53.0 up 50.5 96.1 up
Egypt 24.8 32.0 up 3.3 19.8 down
Estonia 19.1 24.0 up 6.4 89.8 down
Georgia 64.6 82.0 up 7.7 162.6 down
Guinea-Bissau 46.0 56.0 up 13.1 69.5 down
Israel 18.9 2 0 . 0 up 4.4 19.0 down
Kazakhstan 35.2 60.0 up 10.9 1884.7 down
Kyrgyz Republic 51.9 6 6 . 0 up 19.1 35.9 down
Lao People’s Dem.Rep 73.0 90.0 up 56.0 128.4 down
Latvia 47.5 52.0 down 4.1 243.0 down
Lithuania 40.6 44.0 up 3.4 410.3 down
Macedonia, FYR 55.4 65.0 up 2.5 126.6 up
Mozambique 48.3 55.0 up 6.7 63.2 up
Nicaragua 67.4 71.0 up 10.5 2944.0 down
Paraguay 55.4 67.0 up 8.3 24.2 up
Peru 65.7 6 8 . 0 up 5.0 409.6 down
Poland 2 1 . 0 27.0 down 9.9 76.7 down
Romania 37.7 49.0 up 67.9 256.0 down
Russia 34.0 44.0 up 34.1 900.0 up
Turkey 49.0 58.0 up 68.9 106.7 down
Uruguay 80.0 84.0 up 9.1 1 0 2 . 0 down
Vanuatu 67.8 70.0 up 2 . 8 6.5 up
Vietnam 37.5 43.0 up 2.5 7.3 down
Yemen 49.6 53.0 up 6.7 55.1 up
Note: The average values for dollarisation ratios and inflation correspond to the period 2001-1997, 
whereas the maximum values to the period 1990-2001. The measure of FD is defined as foreign 
currency deposits over total deposits.
Sources: IMF Staff Reports, Central Bank bulletins (various issues), Balino et al. (1999), De 
Nicolo et al. (2005) and Arteta (2003).
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Interestingly, the levels of FD presented in Table 2.1 seem to be more 
correlated with the history of inflation than  the contemporaneous levels of inflation. 
The correlation coefficient between our measure of FD and the average inflation 
level for the 33 countries considered in the sample is less than  0.1 percent. This 
correlation, however, increases up to 2 0  percent when considering the maximum level 
of past inflation instead of the average level of inflation. FD, then, seems to  persist 
even many years after an economy has reached low inflation levels. Indeed, this has 
been the case of economies like Bolivia and Peru, which experimented periods of 
hyperinflation before the 90’s, but still now have levels of FD above 60 percent. The 
figures presented in Table 2.1, therefore, indicate th a t financial dollarisation is not 
only quantitatively im portant for a large set of emerging economies but also a very 
persistent phenomenon. Chapter 6  provides a novel explanation of this stylised fact 
of FD.
2.2 Currency Substitution
Since there is no a direct measure of the amount of foreign currency circulating in 
dollarised economies, we use indirect measures of CS. For Bolivia and Peru we use 
as an indirect measure of CS the proportion of dollar-denominated sight deposits 
in the domestic banking system2.
For the remaining countries in the sample, we use measures of CS con­
structed using survey information gathered and organised by the United States of 
America Customs, on cross border flows of US currency 3. We complement this 
information with the figures produced by Feige (2003), who uses survey infor­
mation on holdings of European currencies in transition economies4. The values
2 Sight deposits are highly correlated with the level of transactions in the economy and hence 
they contain information on the degree of CS.
3 Every person that imports or exports currency or monetary instruments for an amount over 
US 10000, has to fill the report.
4 These surveys were conducted by the Austrian Central Bank.
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Table 2 .2 : Currency Substitution and Financial Dollarisation Selected Countries 
2001
Currency Substitution Financial Dollarisation
Bolivia 65 88
Peru 51 66
Poland 27 19
Latvia 79 44
Russia 87 34
Armenia 62 80
Georgia 79 82
Croatia 46 71
Romania 55 49
Note: For Bolivia and Peru measures of CS corresponds to the participation of sight deposits 
denominated in foreign currency. For the remaining countries the figures correspond to the ratio 
of foreign currency in circulation over total currency in circulation. Sources: IMF Staff Reports, 
Central Bank bulletins (various issues), and Feige (2003).
corresponding to  this measure of CS are presented in Table 2 . 2  for a selected group 
of countries. All figures correspond to  2001. For comparison Table 2.2 also reports 
the corresponding measures of FD for each country th a t we included in Table 2 .1 .
Figures presented in Table 2 . 2  show th a t CS is indeed quantitatively large. 
For some countries it is even larger than FD. The leading examples of this case are 
Russia and Latvia where CS reaches 81 and 79 percent. This pattern, however, 
is not uniform across countries. For other economies, like Bolivia and Peru the 
opposite is observed, FD is higher than  CS.
2.3 Price Dollarisation
Although a link may exist between CS and PD in dollarised economies, for a large 
set of transactions agents pay with a different currency than  the one used as unit 
of account, therefore, these two types of dollarisation may not be quantitatively 
equivalent.
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Table 2.3: Measures of Price Dollarisation Peru 1995-2003
Average Maximum Lima
Consumer Price Index 6% 16% 3%
Food and Beverages 4% 17% -4%
Clothes and shoes 15% 36% 23%
Housing Rent fuel and electricity 1% 20% 7%
Furniture and house conservation 23% 39% 25%
Health Care 15% 36% 19%
Education Services -2% 16% -6%
Other Services 14% 30% 16%
Note: Measures of PD corresponds to contemporaneous correlation between the exchange rate 
depreciation and inflation rates for each component of the CPI. For the average, CPI’s information 
of 25 Peruvian cities were considered. Source: National Institute of Statistics, INE,
Direct measures of PD are not available for most of the countries included 
in the sample. However, some indirect measures can be obtained. For instance, 
the very short-run pass-through of exchange rate movements into domestic prices. 
This indicator is informative about the degree of PD only when prices are relatively 
sticky. In this case, within the period th a t firms do not change their prices, the 
observed change in the aggregate price index relative to  the change in the exchange 
rate would be proportional to  the degree of PD. Using this indirect measures of PD 
for a series of Latin American countries, Gonzalez-Anaya (2002) finds th a t FD and 
PD are not correlated. In particular, economies where the degree of FD is large, 
like Bolivia and Peru, exhibit relatively low degree of PD.
We further provide evidence th a t PD  is relatively low in economies with 
large degrees of FD using Peruvian data. In particular, we use monthly data  of the 
Consumer Price index and its components for the period 1995-2003 for 25 Peruvian 
cities. For each price index we calculate short-run pass-through of exchange ra te  
movements into domestic prices.
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Table 2.3 presents the estimated measures of PD for the Peruvian econ­
omy. The first column of this table shows the average value of PD for the 25 most 
im portant cities in Peru; in the second column, its maximum value and finally in 
the third column the corresponding value for capital city, Lima. Although the mea­
sures presented in Table 2.3 indicate th a t PD is lower than  CS and FD, PD is still 
significant, particularly for some of the components of the CPI index. The average 
value of PD is around 6  percent, with a maximum of 16 percent5. In term s of com­
ponents, furniture and Housing conservation, clothes and shoes,and health care are 
amongst those with the highest degrees of PD, with average values of 23, 15 and 
15, respectively. For Lima, the largest city in the country, the same indicators take 
values above their averages, 25, 19 and 23 respectively.
Interestingly, the pattern  of PD across type of goods seems to  be related 
with the average income-level across countries and regions. To illustrate this feature 
we estimate the correlation between the previously described measures of PD and 
indirect indicators of the average income-level for the 25 main cities of Peru. In 
particular, we use four different indicators for the average income level: the per- 
capita expenditure of families within each city, the number of phones per each 1 0 0  
people, the number of people at each city th a t has phone, and the number of public 
phones per each 100 people. The sample period spans the period from January  1995 
to December 2003.
As Table 2.4 shows, there is an statistically significantly positive correlation 
between the average income level and the degree of PD. The correlation is higher 
for housing rent and for domestic appliances, and relatively weaker for transport 
service. This correlation suggest th a t in poorer cities the degree of PD is much 
lower than  in cities where the average income is higher even for relatively tradable 
goods as domestic appliances.
5 Using a time horizon of one and two quarters, Miller (2003) and Winkelried (2003) show that 
the degree of pass-through ranges between 15 and 30 percent.
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Table 2.4: Price Dollarisation and Income Distribution Peru 1995-2003
Selected CPI Components I N D i I N D 2 IND 3 IND4
Housing Rent 0.24* 0.25* 0.17 0.19
Domestic Appliances 0.48** 0.58** 0.57** 0.55
Transport Services 0 . 1 0 0.13 0.17 0.13
* [**] denotes significance at a 5% [10%] level. I N D \  corresponds to the per-capita expenditure 
of families within each city, I N D 2  to the number of phones per each 100 people, I N D 3  number of 
people at each city that have phone, and I N D 4 , number of public phones per each 100 people.
Overall, the figures presented in this chapter show th a t dollarisation is not 
only quantitatively im portant for a large number of emerging markets but also a 
very persistent phenomenon. Consequently, central banks in partially dollarised 
economies need to  take into account explicitly the constraints th a t dollarisation 
imposes when designing monetary policy. C hapter 3 and 4 study this issue in 
detail.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AN D ENDOGENOUS PRICE  
DOLLARISATION
As chapter 2 has documented there exists a large number of developing economies 
where two currencies share the basic m onetary functions. Amongst these, the func­
tion of unit of account is perhaps the one th a t has been given more attention in the 
recent new Keynesian literature as a key ingredient for transmission mechanism of 
m onetary policy. This is evident, since in most of the recent models for analysing 
the design of m onetary policy in close and open economies the fundamental, albeit 
the only function th a t money plays is the one of unit of account l . These models, 
however, usually assume th a t domestic firms set prices only in domestic currency, 
an assumption th a t is less suitable for developing economies where a large set of 
domestic prices are denominated in a foreign currency.
The only exception to this trend is the literature on endogenous pass­
through, which explicitly studies the determ inants of exporting firm’s invoicing 
decisions and their implications for real exchange rate  volatility, the transmission 
of foreign shocks and the benefits of international policy coordination 2. However, 
in contrast to  develop economies where a foreign currency may be used as unit 
of account but exclusively for imported goods, in developing economies with PD 
also a large set of domestically produced goods are invoiced in a foreign currency
1 See Aoki (2001), Woodford (2003) for close economies and Benigno and Benigno (2003), Be- 
nigno (2004), De Paoli (2004) and Gall and Monacelli (2005)for open economies
2 See Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) for a general equilibrium static model of invoicing, and for 
dynamic frameworks, see Devereux et al. (2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004)
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for domestic transactions. This distinction generates im portant differences on how 
m onetary policy should be implemented in develop versus developing economies 
with PD.
Our goal in this chapter is to  twofold: first, to  derive a micro-founded 
welfare-based loss function for the central bank in an economy with PD to account 
for the distinct implications of PD on monetary policy. Second, to  fully characterise 
the general equilibrium determ inants of PD. These are fundamental issues for mon­
etary policy in developing economies for which there are not yet clear-cut answers. 
For instance, it is usually argued th a t PD is an endogenous response of firms to bad 
monetary policy; however, the recent performance of m onetary policy in economies 
with PD like Peru and Bolivia, with annual inflation rates below 3 percent, casts 
some doubts on the role th a t bad m onetary policy may have as the most im portant 
determ inant of PD.
Similarly, a usual argument, especially amongst policy makers, is th a t dol­
larisation induces central banks to smooth exchange rate fluctuations. Some recent 
papers as Cespedes et al. (2004) and Chang and Velasco (2001) th a t study the 
implications of financial dollarisation on the performance of different exchange rate 
regimes, however, do not support this view. In those papers, a flexible exchange rate 
regime still outperforms a fixed exchange rate regime, even when financial frictions 
are considered. These papers however, do not take into account PD. Instead, this 
chapter explicitly considers the implications of PD for central bank’s exchange rate  
policy.
The model we use to  address these issues belongs to  the generation of New
Keynesian Small Open Economies models (SOE from now on) developed to study
the design of monetary policy3. Two particular features, though, distinguish our
3 Amongst the recent papers that analyse optimal monetary policy in SOE, the closest ones to 
our model are Sutherland (2000), Gall and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2004).
25
model from the rest of the literature. First, firms are heterogeneous in their tech­
nology -in particular; they face sector-specific productivity shocks- which induce 
relative price dispersion across firms4. Second, as in the endogenous pass-through 
literature, firms can freely choose either a domestic or a foreign currency for invoic­
ing.
We proceed as follows; first we develop a SOE new Keynesian model, which 
is derived as the limiting case of a two-country world. We use this model to  obtain 
an aggregated demand and supply relationship conditioned on the degree of PD, 
which we use later to characterise the optimal firm’s invoicing decision and the 
central bank m onetary policy. A novel key implication of PD for the dynamics 
of the economy is th a t unexpected fluctuations on the devaluation rate shift the 
Phillips curve, further complicating inflation stabilisation.
Then, we follow the work of Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005), Devereux 
et al. (2004), Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) and Loyo (2001) in characterising the 
firm’s invoicing decision using a second-order approximation of the relative expected 
discounted firm’s profits under domestic and foreign currency invoicing. In this 
dimension our results are similar to  those of Devereux et al. (2004) and of Loyo 
(2001). In particular, we find th a t firm’s are more likely to invoice in a foreign 
currency when: a) domestic inflation is more volatile than  the depreciation rate  
of the nominal exchange rate, b) the covariance between the domestic price and 
the nominal exchange rate is high, and c) the nominal exchange rate is positively 
correlated with a firm’s marginal costs.
4 Several recent papers analyse optimal monetary policy in economies with more than one sector. 
Aoki (2001) analyses optimal monetary policy for a two-sector close economy model; Benigno 
(2004) characterises optimal monetary policy in a currency area; Erceg and Levin (2000) 
consider the case of stickiness in wages and prices, and Huang et al. (2005) analyse the case 
of price stickiness in the final and intermediate production sectors. Unlike the previous papers, 
we focus on the optimal choice of unit of account besides optimal monetary policy.
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Intuitively, when firms’ prices axe sticky in both  domestic and foreign cur­
rency, aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks deviate firms’ relative prices from their 
optim al values generating profit losses. However, firms can mitigate these costs by 
invoicing in a foreign currency. For instance, when there is a positive correlation 
between aggregate prices and exchange rates, a firm th a t invoices in a foreign cur­
rency would partially isolate their relative price from domestic inflation, since its 
relative price would increases in those states of nature where inflation also increase. 
Similarly, when the nominal exchange rate is positively correlated with the firm’s 
marginal cost, by setting prices in the foreign currency, firms induce a positive cor­
relation between marginal revenues and marginal costs th a t stabilise firms’ profits 
and increase their expected profits.
Then, we analyse the implications of PD for m onetary policy. As we dis­
cussed previously PD has first-order effects on domestic inflation through its impact 
on the Phillips curve. Through this channel, PD generates an endogenous trade-off 
between stabilising domestic inflation and the output gap making more costly for 
the central bank to stabilise domestic inflation. Even more importantly, we show 
th a t PD also generates second-order welfare effects by contributing to  create ag­
gregate relative price dispersion across domestic producers. As Woodford (2003) 
highlights, the relative price dispersion’s determ inants are related to  the particu­
larities of the price setting structure. In our case, since some firms choose to set 
prices in a foreign currency, fluctuations in the exchange rate also generate relative 
price distortions, thereby welfare losses. To properly account for the implications 
of PD on m onetary policy we obtain a welfare-based loss function for the central 
by taking a second-order approximation of the representative domestic household’s 
utility function around a constrain efficient steady-state as in Woodford (2003) and 
Benigno and Woodford (2003).
We show th a t the relevant central bank’s loss function in an economy with 
PD has several distinct features. First, besides domestic inflation and the output
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gap, the central bank’s loss function in an economy with PD depends on the volatil­
ity of the nominal exchange rate, its covariance with domestic inflation and and its 
covariances with the average productivity shock of dollar-price firms. Consequently, 
in an economy with PD the central bank has incentives to reduce the volatility of the 
nominal exchange rate and to  generate a positive correlation between the domestic 
exchange rate, domestic prices and dollar-price firm’s sector specific productivity 
shocks. Intuitively, by behaving in this way the central bank minimises the relative 
price dispersion th a t aggregate and sector specific shocks generate in an economy 
with PD when prices are sticky.
Furthermore, we show th a t there exists a large set of param eter values for 
which the equilibrium with PD is unique. In particular, for a given degree of price 
stickiness and labour supply elasticity, equilibrium with PD emerges when sector 
specific productivity shocks are large enough relative to  real exchange rate shocks. 
Also, for a given size of sector specific productivity shocks, a unique equilibrium with 
PD exists when the degree of price stickiness is not too large. Intuitively, in general 
equilibrium two units of account coexist when its benefits, given by the reduction 
in relative price distortions, are larger than  its costs, given by the extra volatility 
on output gap th a t the use of the exchange rate  by the central bank generates.
Since the benefits of having PD are related to  the size of sector-specific 
productivity shocks, and its costs to the degree of price stickiness, it would be more 
likely to observe an equilibrium with partial PD when prices are not too sticky 
(costs are lower) and when domestic sector productivity shocks are larger (benefits 
are larger). In this sense, our results can be rationalised in terms of Mundell (1961) 
optimal currency areas theory. As Mundell (1961) proposed, an optimal currency 
area is a geographical zone where shocks are common. In our model, when sector 
specific shocks are large enough, indeed there exist two currency areas within the 
same economy. Thereby, using two units of account become optimal. Furthermore, 
we also show th a t it is possible to observe multiple equilibriums, particularly when
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the degree of price stickiness is too high or when the size of sector specific shocks 
is two small.
Our results also show th a t a central bank th a t aims at anchoring domes­
tic inflation, as for instance in the case of adopting an explicit inflation-targeting 
regime, generates equilibrium where PD is sub optimally low. On the contrary, a 
central bank tha t exhibits an excess of ‘fear of floating’ would generate a degree of 
PD th a t is sub-optimally high. The latter results suggest th a t there is an optimal 
degree of ‘fear of floating’ associated to the optimal degree of PD.
The model used in this chapter is related to  Loyo (2001), Devereux et al. 
(2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004). In those papers, firms also have to decide 
optimally amongst different units of account. In Loyo (2001) firms have to  decide 
between a real and an imaginary currency to  set prices and the central bank can 
control directly the parity between these two types of currency. In Devereux et 
al. (2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004), importing and exporting firms have to 
choose between domestic and foreign currency for invoicing and monetary policy 
is implemented through money growth rate targes5. In contrast to  Loyo (2001), 
in our set up, the central bank does not perfectly control the parity between the 
domestic and foreign currency but this is determined as an equilibrium outcome 
in the economy. Also differently from Devereux et al. (2004) and Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2004) in this chapter we focus on an equilibrium where monetary policy 
is implemented optimally and where domestic firms can invoice in a foreign for the 
domestic market.
To set up the model, a number of simplifying assumptions have been made
in order to gain clarity. First, although our framework is one of a SOE where term s
of trade surely play an im portant role, we follow Galf and Monacelli (2005) in
5 A series of other papers study invoicing decisions in different contexts; for instance, Bacchetta 
and Wincoop (2005), Donnefeld and Zilcha (1991), Giovannini (1988), Johnson and Pick 
(1997) and Klemperer and Meyer (1986).
29
choosing a particular type of preferences th a t eliminate the effects of terms of trade 
on the economy. This simplification helps to  highlight the interplay between the 
exchange rate and PD 6.
Second, we used a very simple structure of correlations amongst sector 
specific productivity shocks, which, however, are enough to  qualitatively show the 
implications of the model. Yet, a more complex assumption about this correlation 
can be made, as in Loyo (2001)7. Finally, we choose not to  consider any type of 
financial frictions by using a set up with complete asset markets. This latter choice 
is made to keep the tractability  of the model since it greatly simplifies the char­
acterisation of the micro-founded central bank’s loss function 8. Moreover, adding 
financial frictions does not alter the invoicing decision of firms in a fundamental 
way but it highly complicates the determ ination of the equilibrium 9
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 describes 
a simple general equilibrium model of an small open economy where firms face 
sector specific productivity shocks and price stickiness. Section 3.2 discusses the 
implications of PD for the dynamic equilibrium of the economy, section 3.3 analyses 
the relevant loss function for the central bank and the design of optimal monetary 
policy under PD. Section 3.4 discusses the interplay between the equilibrium level 
of PD and monetary policy. The final section presents some concluding remarks.
6 Galf and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2004) show that the effects of terms of trade are 
eliminated from the economy when both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods are equal to 1. These assumptions 
are chosen in this chapter.
7 The assumptions of Loyo (2001) on the correlations of shocks, although more complex, are less 
realistic since they are held under a very particular set of assumptions.
8 A interesting paper that addresses the issue of optimal monetary policy using a welfare-based 
central bank’s loss function in a two-country world with incomplete markets is Benigno (2001).
9 It is important to highlight that the complete market assumption is not redundant even when the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the intertemporal elasticity between domestic and 
foreign goods are unity. When markets are incomplete the dynamics of the economy depends 
on the overall stock of foreign debt, which alters the response of the economy to domestic and 
foreign shocks. Moreover, the central bank’s loss function also depends on domestic consumption 
volatility as Benigno (2001) shows.
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3.1 The Model
In this section we outline the model used later in this chapter to  study the determi­
nants of PD and its implications for the design of monetary policy. In the model, the 
world’s population is allocated in two economies, a domestic economy of size n  and 
the foreign economy of size (1 — n ) . We focus on the limiting case of a small open 
economy where domestic shocks do not affect the behaviour of the foreign economy. 
This case is obtained by making n  arbitrary small. In each economy households re­
ceive utility from consuming a continuum of differentiated consumption goods and 
disutility from working. Furthermore, households can smooth consumption using a 
complete set of stage contingent bonds denominated in domestic currency10.
On the other hand, monopolistic competitive firms produce consumption 
goods using labour and a constant return to  scale technology. We introduce nominal 
rigidities in the model by assuming th a t a fraction of firms, chosen randomly, set 
prices on period in advance. However, differently from standard SOE models, we 
further allow firms to  use either a foreign or a domestic currency for setting prices11. 
At every period t, there are three types of firms according to their pricing stra te­
gies: a) a set of firms with flexible prices, which can respond to  contemporaneous 
shocks, b) firms th a t set prices one period in advance in pesos, and c) firms th a t 
set prices one period in advance but in dollars. The fraction of firms th a t optimally 
pre-set prices in the domestic market in foreign currency, our measure of PD, is 
endogenously determined in equilibrium, whereas the fraction of firms with flexible 
prices is exogenously given.
We further assume th a t firms are heterogeneous in their cost structure.
10 We omit financial frictions in the model for tractability since our main objective is to analyse 
the implications of nominal frictions for the relationship between PD and monetary policy.
11 See Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) for a general equilibrium static model with endogenous 
invoicing decisions and Devereux et al. (2004) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) for dynamic 
frameworks.
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In particular, we assume th a t firms face sector specific productivity shocks. This 
assumption together with the one of price stickiness imply th a t firm’s will have 
different incentives to  invoice in a foreign currency depending on the correlation of
implement monetary policy optimally by minimizing a welfare-based loss function.
3.1.1 Preferences
We assume the following utility function on consumption and labour
labour supply elasticity, N t represents labour hours, and Ct, a consumption basket 
index. The log preferences on consumption is chosen because it allows to eliminate 
the effects of term s of trade on SOE models making much easier to understand the
where 77 represents the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign con­
sumption goods, Cfj,t and Cp,t respectively. On the other hand, a  is a preference 
param eter th a t measures the fraction of consumption allocated in foreign goods. 
In turn , the domestic consumption basket is as a composite of a continuum of 
differentiated consumption goods defined by following CES aggregator function:
the  exchange rate with the shocks they face. On the other hand, the central bank
(3.1)
W here 0 <  f3 <  1 represents the subjective discount factor, v the inverse of the Frish
interplay between PD and optimal monetary policy12. The domestic consumption 
index is defined by:
Ct =  [ ( 1  -  a)* (C „,t)*r + a i  ( O , , ) ^ ! (3.2)
(3.3)
12 See Gall and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2004)
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where e > 1  represents the elasticity of substitution between differentiated domestic 
consumption goods. Associated to  this set of preferences there exists a consumption 
based price index, Pt and corresponding domestic and foreign price indices, Pn,t and 
p F,t , respectively, which are defined as follows:
P t =  ( ( 1  -  a )  P $  +  a P £ ” )  *  ( 3 .4 )
and
P H ,t =  U J  P lH ~i ( Z )  d z  +  J  P l„ 7  (Z ) d z +  J  P ]p t£ ( z )  d z +  ( 3 .5 )
\  © S [0,n]\EU© /
where, Pp)t =  etP p t represents the price index of foreign goods expressed in domestic 
currency, et, the nominal exchange rate, the price of the foreign currency in term s of 
the domestic currency, and P p t the price index of foreign goods in foreign currency, 
defined by a similar aggregator as equation (3.5). Also, © represents the set of firms 
with flexible prices and E the set of firms th a t pre-set prices in dollars. This la tter 
set is endogenously determined as part of the rational expectations equilibrium. 
Prom now on we adopt the convention of denoting with an asterisk (*), foreign 
variables.
3.1.2 Asset Market Structure
We follow Chari et al. (2 0 0 2 ) by assuming th a t markets are complete domestically 
and internationally. At each period of time, the world economy faces one of the 
possible events x t , drawn from a finitely set $  th a t contains all possible events. 
History of events up to period t is denoted by Q and the conditional probability 
of occurrence of state x t+i on the history Q is given by T  (x t+i | f t ). The asset 
market structure consists of a set of state  contingent bonds denominated in domestic 
currency. Households holdings of these bonds are denote by B  (x t+\ \ x t) ; and 
bond’s prices in period t  and in state x t are denoted by £ (x t+i \ Q). One unit of
33
each of these bonds pays one unit domestic currency in period t + 1  if the particular 
state, x t+i occurs, zero otherwise. Therefore, the household’s sequence of budget 
constraints are given by,
P  (xt) Ct (xt) +  +  £ (x*+i | Ct) B  (xt+i | x t) = W  (xt) N  (xt) +  B  (xt) +  E {xt)
where S (x t) accounts for firm’s profits.
3.1.3 Optimal Conditions for Households Decisions
Each household in the domestic economy maximises her utility function given by 
equation (3.1), subject to  their flow budget constraint, equation (3.6). The corre­
sponding household’s first order conditions are given by the following set of equa­
tions,
consumption and savings. W hen markets are complete, the free risk interest rate 
is equal to  the inverse of the conditional expectation of the state  contingent bond 
prices across all states of nature. Using this equality, the Euler equation can be 
alternatively w ritten in terms of the free risk nominal interest rate, as follows,
Furthermore, by combining the domestic and foreign Euler conditions, we can obtain 
the following condition,
Xt+iG i?
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
CH,t = ( l - a ) ( ^ f - y VCt CF,t = a ( y g )  VCt
(3.9)
Equation (3.7), is the standard Euler condition th a t defines the optimal path  of
(3.10)
(3.11)
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Denoting by Qt the real exchange rate, which is defined as the relative price of
EsPtforeign goods in term s of domestic goods, i.e Qt = ^ r -  equation (3.11) can be
rearranged to obtain the following recursive equation,
\ (c.
( < # J  a  (3 1 2 )
By iterating backwards equation (3.12) we obtain the following risk sharing con­
dition tha t relates the real exchange rate to  the dynamics of domestic and foreign 
consumption,
Qt =  ft ( ^ )  (3.13)
c — ^where is a constant defined as follows, <ro =  ( °._iQo. Equation (3.12) shows
(c o)
th a t under the complete asset market assumption, the real exchange ra te  satisfies 
a simple relationship in term s of foreign and domestic consumption.
On the other hand, equation (3.8) determines households’ labour supply. 
This equation shows th a t households optimally supply labour up to  the point where 
the marginal disutility of working equalises its marginal benefit, given by the real 
wage expressed in units of utility. The intratem poral allocation of consumption 
across different good’s varieties is determined by equation (3.9). At the optimal, 
households demand for each variety of consumption good is increasing on to ta l 
consumption, Ct and decreasing in their corresponding relative prices. In the rest 
of the world, households solve an identical problem to  the one detailed above for 
domestic households. Therefore, a set of similar optimality conditions describes 
their behaviour.
3.1.4 Firms
Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive 
firms. Each of them  has a constant returns to  scale technology to  transform labour
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services N t (z) into a particular variety of final consumption goods, as follows:
A t(z)YH,t (z) = N t (z) (3.14)
where A t (z) represents a negative technology shock, since for higher values of A t (z), 
the am ount of labour required to produce the same amount output is also higher. 
We further assume th a t A t (z) evolves according the following stochastic process,
ln(At (*)) =  (3.15)
w ith et ~  N  (0 , of2) . and E  (eZ}t€j}t) ^  0 We further define as A t the aggregate 
domestic productivity shock, which is obtained by aggregating A t (z) over z  using 
the following CES aggregator function, 13
A t = U j A l - ‘ ( z ) d z \  (3.16)
This definition of aggregate productivity is convenient since allow us to  define ag­
gregate output in terms of aggregate employment and productivity in a simple way,
as follows,
A tYH<t =  N t (3.17)
where,
Y a t  =  ( j  /  Y a t  (*) & )  N t =  ( i  /  N t (z) dz^j
Furthermore, each domestic producer faces a downward sloping demand function, 
which is obtained by aggregating both the domestic and foreign households demand
for each good z. After aggregation, the domestic producer’s demand function is
given by,
n 1
Y a M  =  J  +  /  { C h Y  (ZW )  (3-18)
13 See appendix A.2 for the details of this derivation.
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Using equation(3.9) we can write the previous equation as follows:
Y h M  =  ( ^ ~ )  (3-19)
W here, Y#)f represents the to tal demand for domestic goods, which is determined 
by the following condition:
Y„,t =  " ((1  - a ) C t +  ( 1 ~ a ^ (1 ~ n ) Q?Ct») (3.20)
Similarly, foreign firms face a downward demand function given by,
>w«> - (^r)'" ( % ) "  + “'««)
W here, a* represents the participation of foreign goods in the consumption basket 
of foreign households.
Price Setting
A fraction 6  of firms in the domestic economy set prices observing the realization of 
all shocks, whereas the remaining fraction, ( 1  — 6 ) set prices one period in advance. 
Amongst these la tter subset of firms a smaller group of them, of mass s, choose to 
set their prices in foreign currency. Notice th a t for flexible-price firms the choice of 
unit of account is irrelevant. These firms can always choose an equivalent price in 
dollars for the corresponding optimal price in pesos by simply dividing the optimal 
price in pesos by the current nominal exchange rate. Pricing in foreign currency 
becomes relevant only when firms face uncertainty about the realization of shocks14.
A typical firm, 2 , choose its optimal price P n t ( z ) t °  maximises the expected 
value of its profit’s flow discounted by the relevant household’s discount factor, 
which is defined by At =  Thus, firms’ expected profit function under
14 This irrelevance result is similar to the one discussed by Klemperer and Meyer (1986), who show 
that the strategy of setting prices or quantities is irrelevant when firms do not face uncertainty
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peso invoicing is given by:
Q(z) = E t_! [((P„,t (z) -  WtA t (z)) r,(^ )A t] 
where the demand for good z  is defined as follows,
(3.21)
Yt{z) =
H,t
Y,H,t (3.22)
The first order condition th a t determines the optimal firm’s price under peso in­
voicing is given by
E t -1 PhA z ) Y £ =  0 (3.23)
P H ,t J  P H ,t
After simplifying the previous expression and defining Ft — YH,t^tPH,t, we obtain,
E t - ^ W t A t t f P ^ ' F t )
PhA z ) = M- (3.24)
E t -1 ( P S ? F t )
As we highlighted before firms choose optimally their unit of account, therefore, if 
the expected discounted profits under dollar invoicing are larger th a t under peso 
invoicing firm’s would choose to invoice in dollars. Let’s define the price of an indi­
vidual domestic consumption good in dollars by d n A z ) an(  ^the aggregate domestic 
price level expressed in dollars by, dn,t- Using these two prices, firm’s discounted 
expected profit function under dollar invoicing is given by,
W t
dH,t(z ) _  — M z  ) ) Yt(z)AtetV ( Z )  =  E t - !
and the corresponding firm’s demand by the following condition,
d iiA z )
(3.25)
YhA*) = d Y iH,t
H,t (3.26)
In this case, the optimal price under dollar invoicing is given by the following equa­
tion,
E t-!  ( ^ A t ( z ) d ^ F t )
dH,t(z ) =  F'
E t - i  ( d & F . )
38
(3.27)
On the other hand, the optimal price of flexible-price firms, those th a t belong to  
the set O, is given by a mark-up over their corresponding marginal costs,
pg,t (*) =  M M * )
Individual domestic firms pricing decision are therefore summarised as follows,
fiWtA t (z) if 2  £ ©
etEt—i ~^At(z)d£fj }Ft
p « ^ = \  *  i f z e E  (3 .2 8 )
. ** f t - . f e 1* )  ° therW1Se
Firms’ Invoicing Decisions
Each firm decides which currency to  use for setting prices by comparing their ex­
pected profits under dollar and peso invoicing. Firm  z will set prices in dollar if and 
only if the expected profits under this strategy exceeds the corresponding profits 
under invoicing in pesos. Plugging the optimal pricing rules into their corresponding 
profit functions, equations (3.21), (3.25) the condition for setting prices in dollars 
is given by
n  (*) (E t- ! (wtA t ( z ) P ^ ) l ~c ( £ U  ( p £ ) Y
*  (*) ( £ U  (WtA t (z)dk t )y -<  ( £ i - i  (d‘H: » y <
Therefore, a firm’s z optimal invoicing decision, at (z) can be defined as follows,
at (z) = <
i if <  1
1 11 t f ( z )  ^  1
0  otherwise 
and the set of firm’s invoicing in dollars, E, as follows:
E =  {z  | at (z) =  1} (3.30)
3.1.5 The Small Open Economy
Following Sutherland (2002) and De Paoli (2004) we parameterise the foreign goods 
participation in the domestic household’s consumption basket, a , in term s of the size
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of the economy, n  and its degree of openness, 7 , as follows, a  =  ( 1  — 72)7 . Similarly, 
for the case of the foreign economy, 1 — a* = 7 1 7 . W ith this parameterisation, 
domestic households consume more imported goods when the economy is more 
open, this is when 7  is larger, or when the size of domestic economy, n, is relatively 
small.
The SOE is obtained making ri —► 0. In this case, the foreign-good’s par­
ticipation in the domestic households consumption bundle is determined only by 7 , 
the degree of openness. Furthermore, foreign households consume only foreign pro­
duced goods, a* =  1  , consequently, changes on domestic aggregated demand have 
no effects on the foreign economy and its consumer price index coincides w ith its 
producer price index P* = Pp. In the case of a SOE then, the domestic and foreign 
demand functions of consumption goods, equations (3.20) and (3.1.4) become:
Y„,t =  0 a )  " ( ( 1  -  7 ) Ct +  7 <3 ?Ct*) (3.31)
»,*(*) =  ( ^ 7 )  ' 0 f )  * W?c?) (3-32)
In w hat follows we restrict our analysis to  the particular case of 77 =  1 . W ith this 
param eterisation, in the limiting case of s = 0, no PD, our SOE is isomorphic to 
a close economy where domestic inflation, the output gap and the nominal interest 
rates can be determined independently of foreign shocks. In this way, we focus 
on the interaction between PD and m onetary policy isolating the terms of trade 
role on m onetary policy15. Furthermore, this param eterisation simplifies several 
key equations of the model in a very convenient way. For instance, equation (3.4) 
becomes,
Pt = P n . t 'P h  (3-33)
Let’s define by Ilf, the gross rate of inflation, lit =  ^ 7 , and by I l^ t  =  , the
gross rate of domestic inflation. Transforming appropriately equation (3.33), the
15 See De Paoli (2004)and Gall and Monacelli (2005) for a detailed discussion of the role of terms 
of trade in SOE and the isomorphic close economy representation of open economies
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link between ITt and 11#  ^ can be written as follows,
(&) - (&)’
where Tt denotes the terms of trade, defined as the foreign goods’ price in term s of 
domestic goods,
Tt = (3.35)
* H, t
Also, equation (3.31) become,
YH,t = T?Ct (3.36)
This la tter equation in tu rn  imply th a t Ft = 1. Furthermore, using equations (3.8),
(3.17) and (3.36) the real wage in term s of domestic prices is determined by the
following condition,
(3-37)
Similarly, using equations (3.36) and (3.34) to  eliminate consumption and the CPI 
inflation from the Euler condition, it can be rew ritten as follows,
Finally, the value of the nominal exchange ra te  can be readily obtained from the 
definition of the terms of trade, as follows,
et =  (3-39)
3.2 The Dynamic Equilibrium
Given a sequence for the nominal interest rate, {if}, foreign productivity shocks, 
{aj} and domestic sector specific productivity shocks, {at (z)}. The dynamic equi­
librium of domestic SOE is defined as an allocation for {Yh j }, {Ct} , relative prices, 
{w*}, {Qt}, {T^}, {et}, {1 1*} and {Ilj^t+i} and firm’s invoicing rules such tha t con­
ditions (4.42), (4.41), (4.43), (3.36), (3.34), (3.35), (3.28) and (3.30) hold. In what
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follows, we use lower-case letters to  denote variables in deviations respect to  their 
steady-state levels, i.e, x t = log ( ^ ) .
3.2.1 The Flexible Price Equilibrium
W hen prices are flexible, firms can set prices every period observing the realisations 
of all shocks. In this case, the firm’s pricing strategy is irrelevant for the equilibrium 
allocation. In order to  show this point, le t’s look at the optimal prices of firm z 
under pesos and dollar invoicing, given by,
P £ ((z) =  p W tA ' t  <$,«(*) = u ^ A Zit (3.40)
Since firms can perfectly observe their productivity shocks, A Zjt and the nominal 
exchange rate, the corresponding optimal prices under pesos and dollars invoicing 
are related through,
P & jM  =  G i M e t  (3-41)
W ith these optimal prices, the amount of good z  produced is exactly the same under 
both  pricing strategies. Importantly, under the flexible prices allocation, the rela­
tive price between two different varieties of goods reaches its optimal value. From 
equation (3.40), this optimal relative price is given by firms relatively productivity,
P H ,t iz ) A z,t
P k * W  ( }
This also implies th a t the usage of labour in the economy reaches its optimal value, 
given by
ft? = A tY l t (3.43)
Also, as appendix A . 2  shows, the flexible price equilibrium of this economy, up to 
a log linear approximation around the steady-state can be nicely characterised by 
the following three equations th a t determine the natural interest rate, the potential
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output and the real exchange ra te16,
VH,t ~  at (3-44)
rt = ~ E t (ot+i ~  at) (3.45)
ft =  - ( l - 7 ) ( o t - o ? )  (3.46)
The previous equations show th a t both the natural level of output and the natural 
interest rate do not depend on foreign shocks. We obtain this result only because 
we have chosen a very special type of preferences, ones th a t exhibit both unitary in­
tertem poral elasticity of substitution and unitary elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods. Under this type of preferences, the substitution and 
income effect th a t movements in terms of trade generate cancel out each other elim­
inating any trade balance deficit17. In a more general setup, both domestic output
and real interest rate would respond to foreign shocks.
3.2.2 Aggregate Demand
We derive the aggregate demand by taking a log-linear approximation of equation 
(4.41) around the deterministic steady-state
VH,t = E tyH,t+1 ~  {it ~  E t^H,t+i) (3-47)
As we show in appendix A.2 , the aggregate demand equation in term s of output 
gap consistent with the previous equation is given by,
x t = E tx t+1 -  (it -  E tirH,t+i ~  r^) (3.48)
16 We use lower case variables to denote log linear approximation of the original ones with respect 
to their steady-state.
17 See Galf and Monacelli (2005) for a detailed discussion of a canonical representation of an small 
open economy, and De Paoli (2004) for its implications in optimal monetary policy.
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The other relevant condition th a t comes from the aggregate demand side is the one 
th a t determines the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate. The nominal exchange 
rate  in this simple economy depends on domestic prices, the output gap and a real 
exchange rate  shock, as follows,
et = PH,t ~  vX + x t -  xX +  T]t (3.49)
Where rjt , the composite real exchange rate shock, is defined as follows,
Vt = a* -  a, (3.50)
Equation (3.49) is obtained from the log-linear approximation of equation (4.42), 
where at =  / Qn at (z)dz  and a j is the foreign productivity shock, which is assumed 
to be independent of at . Interestingly, under the assumption of complete markets, 
equation (3.49) is equivalent to the uncover interest parity condition (UIP) . To 
illustrate this la tte r point, le t’s obtain EtA e t+i using equation (3.49).
E tAe*+i =  Et7TH,t+i ~  Etftt+i +  EtAxt+i — E tA x ^+1 +  E tAr)t+i
and then express E tArjt+i in terms of the domestic and foreign natural interest 
rales, as follows
EtArjt+i = E tAaX+i — E tA a t+i = —v™* +  r”
finally, using the domestic and the foreign Euler equations we obtain the UIP con­
dition,
EtAct+1 = it it
3.2.3 Aggregate Supply
W« derive the aggregate supply equation of this economy by aggregating the log lin­
eal approximated optimal pricing rules of domestic firms given by equation (3.28).
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At each point in time there exist three type of firms differentiated by their pric­
ing strategy. A first type, of mass 9, set prices flexibly observing the realisation 
of all shocks in the economy The remaining fraction, 1 — 6, set prices one period 
in advance using information up to  period, t  — 1. From this second group, a frac­
tion ( 1  — 9) s of firms sets prices in foreign currency, whereas the remaining one, 
(1 — 9) (1 — s ) does it in pesos. The value of s is endogenously determined as an 
equilibrium feature in section 3.4.
Firms th a t set prices in advance are chosen randomly. Up to  a first-order 
approximation the aggregate domestic price index, defined in equation (3.5), is given 
by,
n
PH,t =  ~ j  PH, t (Z) d (Z) (3 -5 1 )
0
whereas firm’s optimal pricing rules by
PH, t i z ) ~PH, t  =  <
wt +  at(z) if z G ©
E t- 1 (wt +  at(z)) — (PH,t ~  Et-ipn,t) +  (et ~  Et~iet) if z E E 
 ^ Et- i  (wt +  at{z)) -  (pHtt -  E t- ip H,t) otherwise
where, wt represents the log-linear approximation of real wages in terms of domestic 
prices18. Aggregating the previous optimal pricing rules across firms, we obtain the 
following condition for the aggregate supply,
q
PH,t ~  E t-iPH,t =  YIT(j (Wt +  + (E t~l (Wt +  (3’52)
+s (E t-1 (et) — et )
Taking conditional expectations in period t  — 1 to  (3.52) we can easily show that, 
Et- 1 (wt +  at) = 0 , thus, this equation can be w ritten as,
Q
pH,t ~  E t-iPH,t = (Wt +  +  s {E t - 1 (et ) -  et) (3.53)
18 A novel feature of the previous pricing rules is that not only unexpected movements in domestic 
prices generate changes in firm’s relative prices but also unexpected movements on the exchange 
rate. Hence, price stability not only implies stability of marginal costs but also stability of the 
nominal exchange rate.
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Furthermore, from the log linear approximation of equation (4.43) we obtain,
wt = vat +  (1 +  v) yH,t (3.54)
By using equations (3.54) to  eliminate real wages and the aggregate productivity 
shock from equation (3.53), we obtain the following aggregate supply equation in 
term s of output gap, unexpected changes in prices and in the nominal exchange 
rate,
PH,t = E t- i  (pH,t) + Kxt + s (et -  E t - 1  (et)) (3.55)
Where, x t = yt — y? , y™ = —at and « =  (1 +  v) represents the slope of the 
Phillips curve. Notice th a t when, s = 0, the aggregate supply curve converges to 
the standard case of small open economy without price dollarisation. Differently, 
when a positive mass of firms sets prices in dollar, s ^  0 , unexpected changes in the 
nominal exchange rate become a determinant of domestic inflation. Using a simple 
transform ation of equation (3.55), we obtain the Phillips curve in this economy,
flj/.t =  E t-i7rH,t +  Kxt +  s (A e t -  E t - 1  (Aet)) (3.56)
As equation (3.49) reveals, the output gap and unexpected changes in the depreci­
ation rate  are not proportional. Consequently, the central bank cannot induce an 
equilibrium where simultaneously the domestic inflation, the output gap, and the 
unexpected change in the exchange rate are all equal to zero. This implies th a t 
the central bank will have to accept a higher volatility on output gap in order to 
stabilise domestic inflation when there exists PD. Consequently, in an economy with 
PD a monetary policy aiming at 7Tn,t ~  E t-\^H,t — will t>e costly. This result 
differs from the one obtained by Gall and Monacelli (2005), who show th a t an SOE 
economy is isomorphic to  a close economy under the same type of preferences th a t 
we consider in this chapter. Hence, the central bank can stabilise domestic inflation 
at zero cost. This is true in our model only when s =  0 .
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3.3 Monetary Policy
This section follows Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) in deriving 
a central bank welfare-based loss function. Differently from them, however, we focus 
in an economy with PD. The loss function is obtained from a second-order Taylor 
expansion of the utility function of the representative household taken around the 
efficient deterministic steady-state.
By focusing on an efficient steady-state we gain in tractability. In this 
case a log-linear, instead of a quadratic approximation, of the rational expectations 
equilibrium is sufficient to obtain an accurate measure of welfare.
In this section we proceed as follows, first we solve for the social planner 
problem to  fully characterise the efficient steady-state allocation. Then, we approx­
im ate the household’s welfare function around this efficient steady-state. Finally, 
we derive the optimal central bank’s reaction function based on this loss function.
3.3.1 Optimal Allocation
The optimal allocation is obtained by solving the social planner’s problem. The
social planner chooses an allocation for consumption and labour th a t maximises 
the welfare of the representative household given by:
f  N 1+v\
n )  <3'57)
subject to  the technology constraint, a) N  = Yh A , b) the link between consumption
and output implied by the risk sharing condition, equation (3.13), and c) the ag­
gregate resource constraint, equation (3.36). Notice, however, th a t these two latter 
constraints can be combined in just one th a t relates consumption and output as 
follows,
C  = Y ^ Y ""1 (3.58)
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The efficient allocation then must satisfy,
-  ^  =  T ( i  _  7 ) (3 .5 9 )
VC
From the previous condition, it turns out th a t the efficient output level must be 
Yh  = (1 — 7 ) t+« 19. Importantly, this output level differs from the one obtained in 
the decentralised equilibrium, which is given by,
=  (3.60)
where: ( 1  — <I>) =  represents the distortion associated to  monopolistic compe­
tition and r  stands for a government subsidy. If this monopolistic distortion is not 
eliminated it generates an inflationary bias since the central banks finds optimal 
to target a positive output gap. Besides this distortion, in open economy models, 
as Benigno and Benigno (2003) show, there exist a deflationary bias given th a t do­
mestic authorities have incentives to  generate a deflationary surprise to  appreciate 
term s of trade. By doing so, the policy makers try  to  generate a positive wel­
fare effect through a reduction in the disutility of producing goods th a t more than
compensates the reduction in consumption generated by the expenditure switching 
effect20. We set r  =  1  — ( 1  — 7 )/x. W ith this subsidy the inflationary bias gen­
erated by monopolistic competition and the deflationary bias from term s of trade 
balance each other, making possible to replicate the efficient output allocation in 
the decentralised equilibrium.
3.3.2 The Central Bank Loss Function under Price Dollarisation
In order to  obtain the central bank loss function we approximate the representative 
household’s utility, equation (3.57), around the efficient steady-state. It turns out
19 Importantly, this condition characterises optimal monetary policy only under a complete market 
structure. When markets are incomplete, the risk sharign condition, equation (3.13) does not 
hold, consequently , equation (3.58) also does not hold. See Benigno (2001) for an analysis of 
optimal monetary policy with incomplete financial markets in a two country world model
20 See De Paoli (2004) for a deep discussion of the terms of trade bias in small open economies.
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th a t in an economy with PD the central bank loss function depends on the output 
gap, x t , unexpected changes in domestic inflation, 7xh,u unexpected changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, et the correlation between 7Tn,t and e*; and the correlation 
between et and aSjt 21. Where this last term  represents the average productivity 
dispersion of firms th a t have set prices in dollars. The loss function is presented in 
the next equation,
Q 1=°°
L  = ^ 2  /?* (Ax2 +  7T2Ht +  AgAe? -  2 sirHttA e t -  2 AeaA e taSjt) (3.61)
t= 0
where, ft  = ucY  ( 1  -  7 ) A e = s ( l  + , A =  (1 +  v) , Aea =
> a*,t = f  (<k(z) ~  at) d{z), ttHj  = (7rHtt -  Et-i7rH,t), and et = (et -  E t^ e t) 
s
Several remarks are in order to  qualify this loss function. First, since the 
monopolistic competition distortion is eliminated by the government subsidy, the 
optimal target for the output gap is zero. Second, fluctuations in term s of trade do 
not generate welfare losses. This implication comes from the assumptions of uni­
tary  elasticity of intertemporal substitution and of unitary elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign goods under complete markets.
Third, exchange rate volatility generates welfare losses. This is so because 
when some firms set prices in foreign currency, fluctuations in the nominal exchange 
rate distort their relative prices increasing the overall relative price dispersion in the 
economy. Fourth, a positive correlation between the productivity shocks of firms 
th a t invoice in foreign currency and the nominal exchange rate  increase welfare. 
In this la tter case, this correlation offsets the distortions in relative prices tha t 
productivity shocks generate when prices are sticky.
Finally, a positive correlation between the nominal exchange rate and do­
mestic inflation generates welfare gains. This result follows from the fact th a t for 
firms with dollar prices, the change in the exchange rate th a t follows a movement in
21 The appendix A.5 shows the details of this derivation
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domestic inflation reduces the impact of domestic inflation in their relative prices. 
Importantly, the impact of the exchange ra te ’s second moments on the central 
bank’s loss function crucially depend on the degree of PD, s. W hen s = 0, only 
domestic inflation and output gap fluctuations generate welfare losses.
PD constraints central bank’s objective function mainly because it affects 
the overall efficiency loss generated by relative price dispersion in the economy. As 
Woodford (2003) discusses, the determ inants of the economy’s relative price dis­
persion depend on the particularities of firm’s price setting. In our case, since some 
firms invoice using a foreign currency, as the above discussion suggest, exchange 
rate second moments generate welfare losses. In order to  illustrate this point le t’s 
define the aggregate usage of labour by,
N t = YHitA t A t (3.62)
where A* captures the overall relative price dispersion in the economy and it is 
defined below
a ' - ; / ( ^ r ) " T r ' , w  <“ >
0
Up to a second-order approximation A* is determined by22
n
A* =  -  /  [{PH,tiz ) -  p H,t) -  (a>t(z) -  at ) }2 d(z) (3.64)
n Jo
Clearly, to  minimise the overall relative price distortions, relative prices need to 
move in the same direction as relative productivity shocks. Since prices are sticky 
and a fraction of firms set prices in a foreign currency this cannot be achieved by 
keeping the domestic price level constant. In this case, the first best allocation is not 
attainable because the central bank has a limited set of instrum ents but multiple 
objectives, keep a continuum of relative prices aligned. However, if some firms set
prices in dollars, the central bank can implement a policy superior to  zero inflation
22 See appendix A .l for the derivation of the economy’s overall relative price distortion. A t
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by using actively the nominal exchange rate to offset the price misalignments of 
dollar-price firms.
This is possible because relative prices of dollar-price firms respond to  unex­
pected movements on the exchange rate. Therefore, by inducing a positive correla­
tion between exchange rate movements and domestic inflation the central bank can 
effectively reduces welfare losses generate by domestic inflation. Furthermore, it can 
also partially offset the relative price dispersion created by sector specific shocks to 
dollar-price firms. Im portantly then, in an economy with PD the first best alloca­
tion is unattainable since the central bank has just one instrum ent, either inflation, 
or the nominal exchange rate but more than  one objective, 7T^jt =  et = x t = 0 . 
Therefore, optimal monetary policy can achieve only a second best.
The optimal central bank reaction function th a t implements this second 
best is then obtained by minimising the central bank loss function, equation (3.61) 
subject to  the Phillips curve and the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, equa­
tions (3.56) and (3.49) respectively23. The first order condition of this problem is 
given next,
(Ae -  s) A e t -  Aeaas,t +  ( 1  -  s) nHtt =  0  (3.65)
This condition describes the optimal central bank’s reaction function. Differently 
from economies w ithout PD, when there exist PD, domestic inflation is not always 
optimal. As the previous condition shows, a  positive level of inflation is optimal 
either when an unexpected increase in the nominal exchange rate or a negative 
productivity shock of dollar-pricing firms hit the economy. In those cases, higher 
domestic inflation helps to mitigate the effects of these shocks on firm’s relative 
prices. Notice th a t the optimal increase in the domestic inflation rate  in response 
to these shocks is increasing on the degree of PD, s. This is so because when the 
degree of PD is higher, exchange ra te  fluctuations generate larger relative price
23 The details of the central bank problem under commitment are presented in appendix A.4
51
distortions.
3.3.3 Equilibrium under Optimal Monetary Policy
In order to  analyse the equilibrium responses of domestic inflation, the output gap 
and the exchange rate, next, we use the central bank’s optimal reaction function, 
equation (3.65), the Phillips curve, equation (3.56) and the exchange rate dynamics, 
equation (3.49) to fully describe the rational expectations equilibrium under optimal 
policy. Furthermore, we assume th a t m onetary policy in the foreign economy is also 
optimal, which implies th a t pi = x* =  0, and then equation (3.49) becomes,
et =  PH,t + x t + r)t (3.66)
Likewise, we use variables with Q to  denote variable’s deviations with respect to 
its expected value, i.e. et = et — E t_i (et). Thus, equation (3.66) can be w ritten as 
follows,
A e t =  AixH,t + x t + r)t
In equilibrium, the nominal exchange rate, domestic prices and the output gap 
evolve in terms of two structural shocks, a real exchange shock, rjt and the average 
dollar-pricing firms’ productivity shock, a S)t, according to  the following conditions,
A e t = wirjt +  w 2 aS)t (3.67)
71"h,t — ^3^71 T  TU4.CLstt (3.68)
(Z Z 73  +  S Z U \ )  —  ( W 4  —  S U 72 ) ~  .  v
Xt =  T]t H------------------aStt (3.69)At K
Where the parameters, w  1 , and are defined as follows,
® 1  =  ^ > 0  - 2  =  ^ > 0  
W 3  = ^ A > 0  m  = L^ > 0
and,
dd = ( 1  — s) [k ( 1  — s ( 1  — 6)) +  s 0 ] >  0  
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Interestingly, as equation (3.67) shows, in equilibrium the nominal exchange rate 
increases when negative productivity shocks hit firms th a t invoice in dollars. The 
impact of these la tter shocks on the exchange rate  reflects the central bank’s optimal 
reaction function. As we discussed previously, the central bank induces a positive 
correlation between these shocks and the exchange rate to  mitigate their impact on 
firm’s relative prices.
Similarly, the inflation dynamics in an economy with PD exhibits distinct 
features. As equation (3.68) shows, domestic inflation increases in response to 
dollar-price firms’ negative productivity shocks. By letting domestic inflation to  be 
higher the central bank induces an adjustm ent on the relative price of firms th a t 
invoice in domestic currency, which in tu rn  reduces the gap between dollar and peso 
goods relative prices.
Also, to compensate the weaker response of the nominal exchange to  a 
positive real exchange shock, the output gap falls in response to  this shock. On the 
contrary, when there is no PD, the equilibrium levels of both  inflation and output 
gap are zero and the nominal exchange rate  absorbs the impact of real exchange 
shocks on the economy, in this case we have,
7Th,t =  0 A e t = rjt 
x t =  0
To illustrate how the volatility of domestic inflation, the nominal exchange 
rate and the output gap evolves for different values of PD, we use a calibrated 
version of the model with the following param eter values 6  =  0.5, v = 1.5 and 
e =  10 and conditions (3.67), (3.68 ) and (3.69). The results are depicted in figure 
3.1.
As figure 3.1 illustrates, when the degree of PD increases, the volatility 
of both the nominal exchange rate and inflation falls, whereas the corresponding 
one for the output gap increases. This pa ttern  on volatilities reflects the change
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Figure 3.1: Volatility under Optimal Monetary Policy and Price Dollarisation
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in the central bank’s reaction function in response to different levels of PD. For 
instance, when the degree of PD is large, fluctuations on the exchange rate become 
more costly, therefore the central bank has more incentives to smooth exchange rate 
fluctuations. However, since the central bank has a limited set of policy instruments, 
a more stable exchange rate come at the cost of a more volatile output gap.
Up to this section we have derived results for optimal monetary policy 
assuming that the degree of PD is given. However, this variable is not exogenous to 
monetary policy, on the contrary, it is determined by monetary policy. In the next 
section we show how firms decide which currency to use for setting its prices and 
the interaction of this decision with optimal monetary policy.
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3.4 Price Dollarisation in General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium level of PD is determined by the dimension of E, the set 
containing all the firms th a t have optimally chosen to invoice in dollars, :
E =  {z  | ot (z) =  1}
where,
1 if <  i
<Tt(z)=l  *(2)
0  otherwise
To provide more intuition on what factors induce firms to  invoicing in dollars we 
take a second-order approximation to the relative expected profits of invoicing in 
dollars versus invoicing in pesos, around the deterministic steady state. The details 
of this derivation are provided in appendix A.5. This approximation shows th a t a 
firm’s expected profits are larger under dollar invoicing than  under peso invoicing 
if the following condition holds,
(I+  Et~l A % -  E t - 1 [AS(’ ~  a , ) 1  “  \ E t~l <  0  (3-70)
Condition (3.70) has a very intuitive interpretation. On one hand, it shows tha t 
when the expected volatility of the exchange rate is high, firms’ expected profits 
under dollar invoicing are smaller than  under peso invoicing. This is so because 
when firms pre-set prices in dollars, their relative price is more sensitive to exchange 
rate movements, and therefore a very volatile exchange rate generates large relative 
price misalignments, reducing firms’ expected profits.
The opposite happens when the correlation between domestic prices and 
the nominal exchange rate is high. In this second case, when firms invoice in dollars 
their relative price moves in the same direction as domestic inflation, isolating them 
from unexpected movements on expected inflation, and therefore increasing firms’ 
expected profits. A similar effect has a high correlation between the nominal ex­
change rate and firms’ productivity shock, at (z) on the firms’ incentives to  invoice
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in dollars.
Interestingly, condition (3.70) is similar to  the one obtained by Devereux 
et al. (2004) and by Loyo (2001) but using different macroeconomic frameworks. 
Devereux et al. (2004) use a two-country world economy to analyse endogenous pass­
through, whereas Loyo (2001) employs a close economy model to  analyse the welfare 
gains of having multiple units of account24. Although our macroeconomic framework 
differs from those of the aforementioned authors in several dimensions, we find 
similar results on the partial equilibrium determ inants of firm’s invoicing decisions. 
As Devereux et al. (2004) highlight, this is so because for small deviations of the 
exchange rate around the steady state, firms’ invoicing decisions are independent on 
second m om ent’s of aggregate demand, other firm’s prices, the household stochastic 
discount factor and on the financial market structure25. However, as we show later, 
our results are different of the aforementioned authors on two im portant dimensions: 
a) the general equilibrium determ inants of PD and b) the role of monetary policy.
Using the rational expectations equilibrium solution for the nominal ex­
change rate  and for the domestic price level, given by equations (3.67) and (3.68) 
we calculate the second moments involved in equation(3.70) in terms of shocks’ sec­
ond moments. Using these second moments, the condition th a t determines whether 
a firm set prices in dollars is given by,
cov [{at (z) -  at) , aSjt] > Xivar  (aS)t) +  Xzvar (r}t) -  X3cov (aS)t, rjt) (3.71)
24 As appendix A.5 shows, equation (3.70) can be alternative written as,
-  E t [(Wt + 2,(2)) ei] < 0
which is similar to the condition in proposition 1 on Devereux et al. (2004).
25 However, it is important to highlight that our framework differ from those of Devereux et al. 
(2004) and Loyo (2001) in several dimensions. Different from Devereux et al. (2004) we focus 
on a SOE and optimal monetary policy, whereas the aforementioned authors focus in a two 
country model economy where monetary policy is not optimally implemented. Also in contrast 
with Loyo (2001) who focus in a close economy where the parity between units of account is not 
constrained by the economic structure. In our model instead, the exchange rate is determined 
endogenously within the rational expectations equilibrium of the economy.
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where the parameters xi> X2 and X3 are defined as follows,
[(0 ,4  —^ 2 ) (U,3 + ^ 2 - " 3 + ( S- l ) l ^ ^
Xl =  ------------------^ ---------------- X2 =  ---------------- —---------------
2[(ro4-^ 2) ( y roi)+o,3o,4] _2wiu;2(s_ 1 )
X3 = U>2
To better understand the relationship of Xi>X2 and X3 with the structural 
param eters, 9, v , and s, we evaluate their link numerically for a wide range of values. 
These relationships are depicted in figures 3.5 (a) to  ( d). As these figures show 
X2 >  0 and x i  < 0 for all the param eter values considered. Also, these pictures show 
th a t, for a given v , x i is decreasing on 6 , and X2 is increasing. We use these features 
°f Xi>X2 and X3 to  characterise the equilibrium PD in the next section. Using the 
definitions of Xi»X2 and X3 ? the set E th a t contains all firms th a t optimally choose 
to  invoice in dollars can be defined as follows,
E  =  {z  : cov [(at(z) -  at) ,o.s t] > x iva r  (a,it) +  var (t]t) -  X3C0 V {a, t ,r)t)}
(3.72)
Notice th a t condition (3.72) defines a fixed point over the space of sets. Therefore, 
to  evaluate condition (3.72) we need to know the set E, and to  know the set E we 
need to  know which mass of firms satisfy condition (3.72). Thus, we can not tell 
much about the equilibrium degree of PD of this economy unless we specify some 
structure for the second moments of at (z). Next, we use a very simple case th a t is 
enough to  obtain qualitatively results about the equilibrium degree of PD and its 
relationship with optimal monetary policy.
3.4.1 A Simple Case: Two-sector Economy
L et’s consider the case of a domestic economy where firms are allocated in two 
productive sectors 1 and 2. Firms in sector 1 face a productivity shock a ^ ,  whereas
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Figure 3.2: Firm’s Invoicing Decisions: Key Parameters
s o o v s o o v
Note: In all figures we have considered values for 9, v and s between 0 and 1
firms in sector 2 face the productivity shock a2}t. For the sake of simplicity we 
assume that both a i tt and a2,t have the same mean and variance and also that they 
are perfectly negatively correlated.
= 0 Et- i (a2,t) — 0
E t - i f a t  -  E t-!  (a2i())2 =  a 2 £ , - i ( a M -  £ (-i(a i,,) )2 =  <72
Et-i(ai,t -  Et-i(ai,t)) (a Et- ,(a2,t))
Under these assumptions, aggregate productivity in the domestic economy is not 
stochastic but constant, hence, at =  0, rjt =  af and cov (aSit,rjt) =  0. Therefore,
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condition (3.72) simplifies as follows,
E =  1 2  : cov [(at(z)) , aa>t] >  X i^ s,t +  X2 <^} (3.73)
Next we use the previous condition to determine the set of param eter values tha t 
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium with PD.
Case 1: Full PD  Dollarisation
This case corresponds to  s = (1 — 0), an allocation where all firms th a t pre-set prices 
choose to  invoice in dollars26. Furthermore, if s = (1 — 0), then aSft = at =  0 and 
consequently the condition th a t determines the marginal firm’s invoicing decision, 
condition (3.72) becomes
o >  (3.74)
Since, <r2 >  0 , and X2 (s) >  0 for all s 6 (0,1), as we show in figure 3.5, the firms’ 
expected profits under dollar invoicing never would be larger than  those under peso 
invoicing . This is, if all firms th a t pre-set prices choose to  invoice in a foreign 
currency, a marginal firm would find optimal to  deviate from this strategy and to 
invoice in a domestic currency since by deviating its expected profits would increase. 
Interestingly then, s = (1 — 0) would not be an equilibrium. To understand why 
this happens notice th a t when aS)t =  0, the central bank does not respond anymore 
to  dollar-firm’s productivity shocks. Consequently, firms’ marginal cost would not 
be correlated with the exchange rate  and therefore, firms would not have incentives 
to  invoice in a foreign currency.
26 In this economy the degree of PD s can not be equal to 1 since only a fraction (1 — 6) of firms 
pre-set prices. We assume that when indifferent, as in the case of flexible prices, firms set prices 
in pesos.
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Case 2: symmetric case, rii =  \
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where both sectors have equal size: n\ =  
n 2 = \  and where only one sector invoice in a foreign currency. The conditions tha t 
characterise this equilibrium are presented next27,
(s -  Xi) > X2 (3.75)
-  5 -  Xi ~  X2 <  0 (3.76)
Condition (3.75) guarantees th a t expected profits under dollar invoicing would be 
larger than  under peso invoicing for ty p e if i r m s ,  thosebelongingtosectorl.Ontheotherhand , cc 
2 f i rmswouldfindoptimaltosetpricesinpesosgiventhattype—lfirmsinvoice indollars28.Heno  
6 ). However, Since Xi and % 2  depend on s, individual firms invoicing decision would 
be affected by how other firms choose to  invoice and consequently the possibility of 
multiple equilibrium arise. To analyse all possible equilibriums in this economy it 
is convenient write conditions (3.75) and (3.76) as follows,
u \  > 0 g 2  <  0 (3.77)
In this way, and g 2  can be interpreted as the expected firms’ gains of invoicing in
dollars relative to  invoicing in pesos for type-1 and type-2 firms respectively. These 
two functions are defined as follows,
<*\ = (s -  Xi) -  X2 g 2  = ~ ( s  +  Xi) -  X2
To characterise the set of equilibriums le t’s denote by sj the value of s th a t solves,
= 0 and le t’s plot the relationship between Gi and s for a given a parameterisation 
of 6  and v. If 0 * is above the zero line for s G (0,1), then all type-1 and type-2 firms
27 These conditions are obtained directly from (3.72) considering that at =  0,7ft =  a£, aSjt — sai.t 
and cov (aS)f,77t) =  0
28 For the sake of exposition, we choose the sector 1 as the sector where firms invoice in a foreign 
currency. However, similar conditions apply for the alternative case where firms in sector 2 are 
those who choose to invoice in a foreign currency.
60
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Price Dollarisation Symmetric Case
a) Unique Stable Equilibrium, 6=0.35
3
2
1
0
1
-2
-30 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
s
b) Mixed Strategy Equilibrium B, 8=0.30
3
2
t
0
1
-2
-3
0.2 0.4 0.6
s
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Note: The solid line represents the expected relative profits of dollar invoicing versus peso invoicing, 
for type-1 firms, whereas the dotted line the relative expected profits of type-2 firms. The vertical 
line is place on s = 0.5
would find optimal to invoice in a foreign currency. The opposite would happen if 
Oi is below zero for all values of s. If these two curves cut the horizontal axis, on 
the other hand, the individual firm’s decision would depend on what other firms 
do. Figure 3.3 presents plots of cq. In each of these plots, cq is measured on the 
vertical axis and s on the horizontal axis. Figures 3.3 (a) and (b) show the case of a 
unique equilibrium, whereas figure 3.3 (c) shows the case of an equilibrium without 
PD and figure 3.3 (d) a case where full PD is not an equilibrium.
The first case, depicted in figure 3.3(a) as point A , corresponds to a pure
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strategy unique equilibrium. At this point, type-1 firms find optimal to  invoice in a 
foreign currency regardless what other firms do, whereas type-2 firms find optimal 
to set prices in pesos, given tha t a mass of s = n i ( l  — 6 ) type-1 firms invoice in 
a foreign currency. Notice, however, th a t firms in sector 2 would like to  invoice 
in dollars if s < but since all type-1 firms invoice in dollars and their mass is 
s = n i ( l  — 6 ) > this point is not feasible. Hence, s =  |( 1  — 9) is the unique pure 
strategy equilibrium in the economy.
The second type of equilibrium is shown at figure 3.3 (b) as point B.  In this 
case, type-1 firms’ invoicing decisions depend on what other firms do. In particular, 
when all type-1 firms choose to invoice in pesos, any one type-1 firm finds optimal 
to deviate and invoice in dollars. Similarly if all type-1 firms choose to  set prices 
in dollars, any one type-1 firm would find optimal to  deviate by invoicing in pesos. 
Then, an interm ediate equilibrium exist at point B, s =  sj, where some type-1 firms 
invoice in dollars and some invoice in pesos.
As Devereux et al. (2004) argue, firms can coordinate at this equilibrium
by playing mixed strategies. In particular, if every type-1 firm choose to invoice in
dollars with probability and to  invoice in pesos with probability ^1 — the
unique stable mixed strategy equilibrium would be s = sj. On the other hand,
figures 3.3 (c) and (d) depict those cases where no equilibrium with PD exists.
Figure 3.3 (c) shows the case where s = 0. In this case, type-1 and type-2 firms
find optimal to  set prices in pesos whatever other firms do. Hence, at point C  no
firm would have incentives to  deviated. Notice, however, th a t if s > sj type-1 firms
would have incentives to  deviate by invoicing in dollars, but, as in case (b), this
allocation is not feasible since s\ > ni  = | 29. Finally, figure 3.3(d) depicts a case
where both types of firms find optimal to invoice in dollars whatever other firms
do. In this case, firm’s invoicing decisions are not determined by conditions (3.77),
29 At this equilibrium type-2 firms choose to invoice in pesos regardless the value of s. The same 
is true for type-1 firms but for s <  s^. Since the mass of type-1 firms is |  <  sj it can not be 
the case that sj firms choose to invoice in dollars.
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but instead by conditions (3.74). Thereby, we are back to  case 1, where, as we 
previously shown full PD, s =  |  (1 — 0) is not an equilibrium.
However, to  fully characterise the equilibrium with PD it is crucial to  de­
term ine the set of param eter values th a t sustain each of the four cases we previously 
discussed. Unfortunately, since Xi and X2 are highly non-linear functions of 9, s and 
v  an analytical solution of this problem is not available. Instead we determine the 
equilibrium solution numerically. To this purpose we calculate 0 \ and a 2 for a wide 
range of values for 9 and v. In particular, we consider values of 9 between 0.1 and
0.99 and for v between 0.1 and 4 . Then we search and store only those param eter 
values for which conditions (3.77) hold for every s 30. Figure 3.4 depicts the sub-set 
of the param eter space th a t sustain each of the four cases previously discussed. As 
this figure shows, a unique equilibrium with partial PD, s = |  (1 — 9) exists when 
the degree of price stickiness is not too low, zone A. For larger values of 9 , both 
types of firms find optimal to invoice in dollars regardless what other firms do, zone 
D. This case corresponds to  case (d) previously analysed. Whereas for very low 
values of 0, zone C in the previous figure, the unique equilibrium is s =  0.
The previous figures suggest therefore th a t an equilibrium with partial PD 
is more likely to  hold when the degree of price stickiness is neither too small nor 
too large, in particular when 9 £ (0.27,0.5). Price stickiness affects firms’ invoicing 
decisions through several channels but in this model one th a t is particularly relevant 
is the one linked to  the central bank’s response to the state  of the economy. As 
we discussed in section 3.3.3, the central bank uses the exchange rate to  partially 
eliminate the relative price misalignments generated, when prices are sticky, by 
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
This strategy, however, is not costless since the output gap volatility in­
creases in response to the central bank policy. Furthermore, this extra cost is larger
30 In each range of values we consider a grid of 0.01.
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Figure 3.4: Unique Price Dollarisation Equilibrium
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Note: we considered values of 9 between 0.1 and 0.99 and for v between 0.1 and 4 and grids points 
of 0.01
when prices are stickier. Thereby, as equation (3.65) shows in this case the central 
bank optimally choose to put less weight on aSit, i«e as 0 — * 0, Aea — ♦ 0. This 
in turn implies that the correlation between firm’s marginal costs and the exchange 
rate is smaller, reducing firm’s incentives to invoice in a foreign currency.
Importantly, as figure 3.5 (b) shows, when the size of domestic productivity 
shocks increase relative to the size of foreign shock, the parameter space that sus­
tains a unique equilibrium, the darker area in the aforementioned figure, is larger. 
In this case a unique equilibrium exists for values of 0 below 0.27, the lower bound
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Figure 3.5: Unique Price Dollarisation Equilibrium Large Shocks
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Note: we considered values of 9 between 0.1 and 0.99 and for v between 0.1 and 4 and grids points 
of 0.01
2
of 6 when ^  =  1. Interestingly then, the previous analysis suggest that the larger 
the domestic shock respect to the foreign one, the larger the likelihood of observing 
a unique equilibrium with PD31. In this latter case, the gains from stabilising rela­
tive prices through the use of exchange rate in a dual-currency economy would be 
larger and consequently, the central bank would be willing to accept a larger cost in 
terms of output gap volatility. This result can be also interpreted in line with the 
intuition of Mundell (1961) on optimal currency areas, who defines this concept as
31 If we consider that each combination of 9 and v correspond to a particular economy. Then, 
larger the size of the domestic productivity shock, larger it would be the fraction of economies 
where a unique equilibrium with PD would be observed.
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a geographical area th a t share common real shocks. According to  this definition, 
in our model economy there exist two optimal currency areas when sector specific 
productivity shocks are large enough. Therefore, as Mundell (1961) suggested in 
this case it is optimal to  have two currencies.
Case 3: Asymmetric Equilibrium, rti > n 2
As figure 3.6 (b) to  (c) show, in the asymmetric case, there exist more equilibria 
than  in case 2. For instance, point C  in figure 3.6 (b) is an equilibrium under mixed 
strategies but not stable. At this point, type-1 firms choose to  invoice in a foreign
s*ccurrency with a probability and choose to  invoice in a domestic currency with
s*cprobability 1 —
Type-2 firms, on the other hand, choose to  invoice in a domestic currency 
with probability 1. However, this equilibrium is not stable since type-1 firms have 
incentives to  deviate. For example, if a marginal type-1 firm slightly increases the 
probability of invoicing in dollars, all type-1 firms would like to  follow it to  further 
increase its expected relative gains of invoicing in dollars.. Similarly, if any one 
type-1 firm deviates by choosing invoicing in pesos with a larger probability, the 
expected relative gains of invoicing in pesos are larger than  the corresponding to 
invoicing in dollars for all type-1 firms.
Also, in figure 3.6(c), point D  is an mixed strategy equilibrium. Similar to 
the equilibrium at point C, at point D  firms also play a mixed strategies and have 
incentives to  deviate. On the other hand, the equilibrium depicted a t figure 3.6(a), 
point A is exactly the same as in case 2, this is s = |  (1 — 0), and figure 3.6 (d) 
shows same case as figure 3.3 ( d)
Next we perform two simple exercises to  analyse the implications of de­
viations from the optimal policy on the equilibrium PD. In the first one we ask
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium Price Dollarisation Asymmetric Case
a) Unique Stable Equilibrium, 0=0.35
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Note: The solid line represents the expected relative profits of dollar invoicing versus peso invoicing, 
for type-1 firms, whereas the dotted line the relative expected profits of type-2 firms. The vertical 
line is place on s =  0.7
whether a central bank that is more adverse to inflation than what is optimal can 
achieve lower degrees of PD, whereas in the second one we look for the implications 
of excess of ‘fear of floating’.
P ric e  D o lla risa tio n  a n d  In fla tio n  A v ersion
In order to perform both exercises we parameterise deviations of the central bank 
from its optimal policy rule. For the first exercise, we use the following alternative
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central bank reaction function,
[(Ac -  s) A e t -  Oasj\ g + ( l - s )  7rH,t = 0
where we label by g the index of how much the central bank dislike inflation. When, 
g = 0 we have a central bank tha t is an inflation nutter, since, it this case, it would 
implement a policy where,
7TH,t =  0
As g increases we have a central bank who tolerates increasingly more inflation.
a2Figure 3.7 shows in the vertical axis the size of relative shocks, -£■ th a t sustain aaT)
unique equilibrium with PD and in the horizontal axis, a measure of how much the 
central bank likes inflation, (g — 1). We normalised this measure of central bank 
preferences, so th a t the optimal monetary policy is reached at zero. As this graph 
shows, when the central banks tolerates higher inflation levels, the relative size of 
shocks necessary to  sustain an equilibrium with PD falls, making it more likely.
W hen a central bank tolerates more inflation volatility, firms th a t set prices 
in pesos are exposed to  higher profit’s losses. In this more volatile environment, it 
turns out optimal for some domestic firms to  react by setting prices in dollars . By 
setting prices in dollars, firms partially isolate their relative prices from inflation. 
Thus, in our example with just two sectors, when inflation is more volatile PD is 
sustained as an equilibrium outcome for smaller domestic productivity shocks.
The other interesting insight provided by the previous exercise is th a t a cen­
tra l bank who implements monetary policy by using an inflation target framework, 
can effectively reduce PD. As the previous graph shows, an increase in inflation 
aversion increases the relative size of domestic versus real exchange rate shocks tha t 
sustain an equilibrium with PD. This in tu rn  implies, as we previously discussed 
th a t the set of param eter values th a t sustain a unique PD equilibrium increases.
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Figure 3.7: Inflation Targeting and Price Dollarisation
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In this second exercise, we parameterise ’’fear of floating” by considering that the 
central bank deviates from the optimal weights that it puts on exchange rate volatil­
ity, Ae and on the cross term between et and aSyt. More precisely, we shift both 
parameters by a factor, ge. When ge =  1, the central bank is using the optimal
weights derived in section 3.3. Then, we calculate the critical relative size of do-
2
mestic sector specific versus real exchange rate shocks, ^ , that uniquely sustain an 
equilibrium with PD, s =  n\ (1 — 6).
The results are presented in figure 3.8. As in the previous case, we nor­
malise the degree of fear of floating, by using 1 — g on the horizontal axis. This 
normalisation allows us to locate the equilibrium under optimal monetary policy at 
point zero on this axis.
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Figure 3.8: Excess of Smoothness and Price Dollarisation
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As the degree of ’’fear of floating” increases, an equilibrium with PD can 
be sustained with relative smaller domestic sector specific shocks, making more 
likely an equilibrium with s = n\  (1 — 9). Notice tha t all points on the horizontal 
axis except zero imply higher welfare losses than when the central bank implements 
monetary policy optimally. Thus, our model implies tha t excess of ’’fear of floating” 
induces an inefficient high level of PD. As we move from left to right in the previous 
graph, the size of relative shocks tha t allow an equilibrium with PD increases, 
making less likely to observe an equilibrium where, s = n\  (1 — 6 ).
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have studied how m onetary policy should be conducted in an 
small open economy where firms th a t faces sector-specific shocks can set prices 
in two different currencies. The results suggest th a t in this type of economies 
optim al m onetary policy involves some degree of exchange rate smoothing and an 
active reaction of the central bank to sector specific productivity shocks. W hen 
domestic sector specific productivity shocks are large enough or when price stickiness 
is not too large, a unique equilibrium with positive degree of price dollarisation is 
sustainable under optimal monetary policy. As in Mundell (1961), where it is 
optim al th a t two countries share a common currency when they face similar real 
shocks, in this chapter, we show th a t it might be optimal for a particular economy 
to have more than one currency when there exist asymmetric productivity shocks 
within the economy.
The chapter also explores the implications of deviations from optimal policy 
on the degree of price dollarisation. In particular, we analyse two cases: a)when 
the central bank is an inflation nutter and b) when it exhibits ” excess of fear of 
floating” . A central bank th a t is more adverse to  inflation than  society would 
generate, in equilibrium, a lower level of PD. In th a t sense, the model predicts tha t 
in countries where an explicit inflation targeting is successfully implemented it is 
less likely to  observe price dollarisation. However, in this model, an inflation nutter 
central bank would induces welfare losses by responding sub-optimally to  sector 
specific productivity shocks.
On the contrary, excessive ” fear of floating” leads to an ’’excessive” degree 
of price dollarisation, as firms try  to  take advantage the of benefits th a t pricing in 
foreign currency offers in this case. However, excess degree of price dollarisation 
induces welfare losses for society, since by keeping the nominal exchange rate more 
stable, the central bank has to  tolerate increasingly high levels of volatility in output
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gap and domestic inflation.
This chapter also shows th a t PD breaks the isomorphic representation of 
a small open economy relative to  a close economy even when the terms of trade 
channel is not present. In particular, we show th a t the dynamics of the economy can 
not be isolated from exchange rate fluctuations when there exist PD. Furthermore, 
in this case we show th a t it is optimal th a t the central bank smooths exchange rate 
fluctuations.
Finally, the chapter can be extended in many directions. First, we can use 
more general assumptions on preferences th a t allow studying simultaneously the 
interactions between the channel of terms of trade and sector specific productivity 
shocks on the design of m onetary policy. Second, we can assume a more complex 
structure on the correlations amongst sector specific productivity shocks, as in Loyo 
(2001), which it will permit us to  generate a continuous mapping between policy 
and the degree of price dollarisation, finally we could add taxes to  analyse the 
interaction between m onetary and fiscal policy when a country faces sector specific 
productivity shocks.
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CHAPTER 4
MONETARY POLICY AND CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION
How should monetary policy be conducted in an economy with CS? Should the 
central bank put more weight on exchange ra te  stabilization than  on inflation and 
the output gap stabilization? Is the interest rate channel weaker in this type of 
economy? Does CS precludes the central bank from controlling inflation? These are 
highly relevant questions for emerging market economies where CS is still significant, 
in particular, for those th a t have recently adopted an inflation-targeting regime like 
Peru, since this regime relies heavily on structural models for policy analysis and 
forecasting 1. This chapter provides some answers to  these questions within a micro­
founded general equilibrium model of a small open economy with endogenous CS.
We depart from much of the recent literature th a t uses general equilib­
rium models for studying the design of m onetary policy, such as Benigno and Be- 
nigno (2003), Gall and Monacelli (2005), Sutherland (2002) and Woodford (2003) 
amongst others, by considering th a t money plays a fundamental role in the economy. 
The aforementioned papers usually neglect the role of money either by restricting 
the effects of money to  the money market, or by assuming th a t it does not exist,
i.e, cashless economies2. The cashless economy assumption is justified for devel­
oped economies on empirical grounds, since for those economies there exists some
1 Peru was the first country with CS to adopt an inflation target regime. However, many other 
countries with similar features, as Uruguay, Bolivia, and Costa Rica are planning to follow this 
path. See Armas and Grippa (2005) for a detailed account of the inflation target framework 
adopted in Peru
2 A case where the effects of money are restricted to the money market is the one when preferences 
are separable in money holdings.
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empirical evidence showing th a t the indirect effects of money are relatively small3. 
However, the case for a cashless economy is much harder to  make for developing 
economies where the advantages of using money are larger since a much narrower set 
of alternative medium of payments is available for transactions than  in developed 
economies4.
In our setup, two imperfect substitutes medium of payments, a domes­
tic currency, the peso and a foreign one, the dollar provide liquidity services to 
households by reducing the transaction costs associated to  the consumption of fi­
nal goods. Households have to  use either of these two currencies for transactions. 
In some transactions households have to  pay a higher transaction cost when using 
pesos, and in others by using dollars. 5.
Under our modelling strategy, households choose optimally the composition 
of their money holdings by equalizing, a t the margin, the sum of the transaction and 
the opportunity costs of using each alternative currency. This condition completely 
pins down the degree of CS as an increasing function of the spread between the 
domestic and the foreign nominal interest rates. Consequently, CS is higher in 
economies where the domestic nominal interest rates are persistently higher than 
foreign ones, which is plausible in economies with long-run high inflation levels.
The previously described trading environment is introduced into a very 
tractable New Keynesian model of a small open economy to evaluate the implica­
tions of CS for the design of monetary policy6. The model shows th a t CS generates 
a channel by which the foreign interest ra te  distorts consumption, saving and labour
3 See Ireland (2001) and Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion on this issue, and Nelson 
(2002) for a critical view.
4 In Peru for instance less than 50 percent of the population participates on the financial system, 
similarly in Bolivia.
5 Alternative setups to model CS include shopping time and money in utility models For models 
with non-separable money-in-utility functions, see, Woodford (2003), chapter 3 for a closed 
economy, and Felices and Tuesta (2005) for an open economy.
6 Our small open economy model is related to De Paoli (2004), Felices and Tuesta (2005) and 
Galf and Monacelli (2005).
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supply decisions by generating a gap between the marginal utility of consumption 
and th a t of income. The relative impact of the foreign interest rate in this gap is 
increasing on the degree of CS.
Interestingly, the log-linear version of the model economy with CS admits 
a canonical representation analogous to those without CS, but th a t differs from the 
la tter in several im portant dimensions. Firstly, the foreign nominal interest rate 
appears as an endogenous cost-push shock in the Phillips curve and on the dynamic 
IS curve. The size of the foreign interest rate impact on the inflation rate  and on the 
output gap depends on the steady-state degree of CS. In particular, in an economy 
with CS, an increase in the foreign nominal interest rate  reduces the output gap and 
increases inflation7. This additional determ inant of the inflation dynamics makes 
it impossible for the central bank to stabilise simultaneously domestic inflation and 
the output gap.
Second, the welfare based loss function for the central bank in an economy 
with CS has some new features. Besides output gap and domestic inflation volatility, 
interest rate volatility generates welfare losses, where the interest rate volatility 
weight on the central bank loss function depends on the steady-state degree of CS. 
In particular, as the degree of CS increases it become less costly for the central 
bank to  allow more volatility on the domestic interest rate and the welfare costs 
of exchange rate smoothing increases. This later result implies th a t CS does not 
justify ’’fear of floating” , in the terminology of Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
These new features of an economy with CS have implications for the conduct
of monetary policy. First, in economies w ith a positive level of CS in steady-state,
interest rate rules th a t allow for a flexible exchange rate outperform, in term s of
welfare, those th a t generate some degree of exchange rate smoothing. Second,
7 This result provides some rationale for the empirical findings of Agenor et al. (2000), Neumeyer 
and Perri (2005)and Uribe and Yue (2004) who report a negative correlation between the 
foreign interest rate and output for emerging economies.
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interest rate  rules with some degree of persistence are desirable, although the gains 
of interest rate  smoothness decrease with the degree of CS.
Also, CS increases the area of determinacy for the rational expectations 
equilibrium under contemporaneous domestic inflation Taylor rules. In the limit, 
when CS is full, i.e. when only the foreign currency is used as medium of payment, 
the area of determinacy coincides with the one of a cashless economy and conse­
quently the Taylor Principle holds. Under all other cases, the set of param eters 
th a t allow the determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium is smaller. In 
particular, to  guarantee determinacy the central bank’s response to  output should 
not be too large.
However, it is im portant to highlight th a t even though CS increases the 
area of determinacy, the equilibrium achieved under those rules delivers higher 
volatility. More precisely, we show th a t both  domestic inflation and output gap 
volatility monotonically increase with the degree of CS.
This paper is related to  some previous work on CS and m onetary policy: 
Felices and Tuesta (2005), use a small open economy model with non-separable 
money in utility function th a t depends on bo th  domestic and foreign currency to 
analyse the effects of dollarisation on m onetary policy. Our set up differs from 
the one in the previous paper in considering a flexible cash-in-advance model to 
generate endogenous CS. This type of trading friction, by making explicit the trade­
off between the transaction and opportunity costs th a t the agent faces in choosing 
different types of currency, facilitates the understanding of the main mechanism 
through which CS affects the economy. Also, Uribe (1997) uses a model with 
trading frictions but in an economy with flexible prices to  analyse the persistency 
of CS. Gillman (1993) and Den Haan (1990) use models with transaction frictions 
but in closed economy models and to measure the welfare implications of inflation, 
and Woodford (2003) studies the implications of transaction frictions for optimal
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monetary policy in the context of a one-currency closed economy.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.1, we detail the 
model economy, although the derivations are presented in appendix B. Section 4.2 
discusses the implications of CS for the steady-state and flexible prices equilibrium 
and it presents the canonical representation of the small open economy under CS. 
Section 4.3, analyses the implications of CS for m onetary policy. Section 4.4 presents 
some concluding remarks.
4.1 The M odel
Following De Paoli (2004) and Sutherland (2002) we derive the small open economy, 
SOE from now on, as the limiting case of a two country general equilibrium model8. 
Households, consumption goods producers, interm ediate goods producers, and the 
central bank, compose the domestic economy economy. On one hand, domestic 
households freely choose between dollars and pesos as medium of payment. They 
also consume a bundle of final consumption goods, supply labour to intermediate 
goods producers through a competitive labour market, and save using a complete 
set of state contingent bonds.
Final goods producers, on the other hand, combine domestic and foreign 
produced interm ediate goods as inputs to  produce consumption goods. They op­
erate in a perfectly competitive market. On the other hand, intermediate good 
producers operate in a monopolistic competitive market and use labour as produc­
tion input. These firms fix prices in advance and face an exogenous probability 
of changing prices as in Calvo (1983). M onetary policy is implemented by the 
central bank through an interest rate rule. Only intermediate goods are traded
8 De Paoli (2004) derives a micro-founded loss function for a central bank in a SOE to study 
optimal monetary policy, whereas Sutherland (2002), studies the implications of adopting an 
inflation targeting regime in SOE.
77
internationally.
4.1.1 Households
Preferences
Households receive utility from the consumption bundle of final goods and disutility
from working. Their preferences are described by the following utility function:
Where E t represents the expectations operator conditional on information in period 
t, (3 € (0,1), the household subjective discount factor, a  >  0, the coefficient of 
risk aversion and <p > 0, the inverse of the Frish labour supply elasticity, L t the 
number of hours th a t household work and C* the composite of a continuum of final 
consumption goods denoted by Ct{s) and indexed by s G [0,1].
we adopt the convention of denoting foreign variables using an asterisks, i.e. Ct* 
and LJ, represent foreign agent’s consumption and working hours in period t.
Transaction Technology
purchasing final consumption goods. Transactions associated to  labour services and 
intermediate domestic and foreign goods do not require cash, these are credit goods
( 4 .1 )
(4.2)
Agents in the foreign economy have a similar set of preferences 9. In what follows
At the domestic and at the foreign economy households are required to  use cash for
9 See Appendix B .l for a description of the foreign economy.
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in the terminology of Lucas and Stokey (1987). In contrast to early cash-in-advance 
models as those of Lucas and Stokey (1987) and Svensson (1985) where households 
have available only one medium of payment, here, as in Uribe (1997) and Gillman 
(1993), domestic households are allowed to  choose freely between two imperfectly 
substitute medium of payments. These two competitive medium of payments, which 
we label as pesos and dollars, are issued by the domestic and foreign central banks 
at the time the asset market operates 10.
We impose restrictions on the trading environment at the goods market to 
capture some particular features of this market in economies with CS, for instance, 
the short supply of foreign notes and coins, which makes more costly the use of 
foreign currency in small transactions 11. Also, these restrictions try  to capture the 
costs associated to  the exchange rate differentials th a t households pay when using 
domestic currency for purchasing goods invoiced in foreign currency. In particular, 
we assume th a t households pay a currency-specific real cost at each transaction th a t 
depends on the type of good being purchased and the amount of the transaction. 
For some goods purchasing with pesos is cheaper than  with dollars, for others the 
appositive is true. We index goods by s and denote by t ( s )  and g(s) the propor­
tional costs per good th a t consumers pay when buying good s with dollars and 
pesos, respectively. To guarantee a well-defined CS equilibrium level we impose the 
following restrictions on the transaction cost functions of pesos and dollars,
t (s ) >: 0 >  0 g(s) x  0
^ > 0  <?(0) >  t (0 )  f l ( l ) < r ( l )  ( 4 .3 )
dr(s) dg(s) 
ds ^  ds
10 Uribe (1997) uses a flexible CIA model for domestic and foreign currency to study the deter­
minants of the persistence of currency substitution. On the other hand, Gillman (1993)uses an 
endogenous cash-credit model to evaluate the welfare effects of inflation.
11 The sub optimal distribution of foreign notes and coins is natural, since the unitary cost of 
transporting from abroad notes is decreasing on its denomination.
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These assumptions imply th a t transaction costs are lower in both curren­
cies for small s goods than  for large s goods. Also, they imply th a t it is cheaper to  
use dollars for purchasing small s goods and to  use pesos for large s goods12. Fur­
thermore, these assumptions guarantee th a t there exist a unique threshold good, 
st such th a t goods with index lower than  s t are purchased with dollars, whereas, 
goods with index higher than  st are purchase with pesos. Households choose this 
threshold level as part of their optimisation problem.
The household’s money holdings composition depends, however, not only 
on the transaction frictions described previously but also on the corresponding op­
portunity costs of holding each type of currency. The opportunity cost of holding 
each type of currency in tu rn  crucially depends on the timing of transactions. When 
all markets operates simultaneously, in particular when the exchange market is open 
at the time households attend to the goods market, sellers are indifferent between 
accepting pesos and dollars at the market exchange rate. In this case the only 
relevant relative cost for the household’s currency composition choice is the rela­
tive transaction cost between these two alternative means of payment. However, 
when markets open sequentially the opportunity cost of holding pesos and dollars is 
not the same, thereby, household’s currency composition depends crucially on the 
relative opportunity cost of pesos versus dollars.
The Timing of Transactions
As in Lucas and Stokey (1987) we assume th a t at the domestic and foreign economy 
households belong to  a representative family w ith four members th a t perform dif­
ferent tasks during each period, but th a t regroups at the end of each period to  pool 
goods, assets and information. One member, the seller, operates domestic firms,
12 These assumptions are not too restrictive, we could alternatively assume that, r(s) >z 0, drd^  < 
0, and, g(s) >z 0 and >  0. and our results would not change. In both cases, these
restrictions guarantee a unique CS equilibrium level.
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trades intermediate goods from foreign firms and sells final consumption goods to 
shoppers. The cash receipts from period t  production can be used, however, only in 
the next period. The second member, the shopper, uses available money holdings to 
purchase final consumption goods, the th ird member, the investor, has the task of 
trading assets: domestic and foreign currency and state  contingent bonds. Finally, 
the fourth member, the worker, supplies labour to  intermediate goods producers.
At each period of time markets open sequentially. First opens the asset 
market, during the morning. Then, after this market has closed, during the after­
noon, opens the goods market. At the asset market, domestic and foreign investors 
meet w ith the domestic and foreign central banks to trade a set of nominal one- 
period state  contingent bonds denominated in domestic currency. At this market 
also central banks inject fiat money, pesos and dollars 13.
The central banks set the domestic and the foreign interest rates and the
exchange rate is freely determined as an equilibrium outcome at this market. At this
tim e also households observe one of the many states of nature x t £ th a t generate
uncertainty. History of events up to  period t  is denoted by ( t and the conditional
probability of occurrence of state r t + 1  is given by Q {xt+i \ x t). We denote by
B  (x t+i | x t) the domestic household’s holdings of the state-contingent bonds and
by £ (xt+ 1  | Ct) period t  bond’s prices and state  x t . One unit of each of these bonds
pays one unit domestic currency in period t +  1 if the particular state, r t+i occurs,
otherwise they do not pay. Household enter to the asset market with their stock
of wealth carried over from the previous period, w  (x t) ,  plus a domestic currency
transfer from the government, T R t (xt). They use these resources to  purchase a
portfolio of state  contingent bonds B  (x t+i \ x t), and to accumulate money holdings
of pesos and dollars M  (Xt) and D  (x t). We denote by e (xt) the nominal exchange
rate, pesos per dollar. Thereby, the household budget constraint at the asset market,
13 Note that the timing of transactions in this model is similar to Lucas and Stokey (1987) who 
assume that the asset market open first. Svensson (1985) instead considers that the goods 
market open first.
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expressed in term s of pesos, is given by:
M  (xt) +  D (xt) e (xt) +  ^ 2  € (x t+1 I Ct) B  (xt+i \ x t) = m  (xt) + T R  (xt) (4.4)
Xt+iEV
During the afternoon, at the goods market, shoppers and sellers meet to  
exchange final consumption goods by currency. Shoppers can pay for each good 
with any currency, but transactions are costly. Rational households choose their 
currency’s composition to  minimise transaction costs and the corresponding oppor­
tunity cost of holding both currencies. Importantly, at this market neither house­
holds nor final-good producers can change the composition of their money holdings. 
They have to wait until the next day to  exchange domestic and foreign currency 
at the asset market. This in turn  implies th a t the relevant exchange rate  at this 
market is not the corresponding to  the one in the morning but the one expected for 
the next day. Otherwise final-good producers would not accept dollars in exchange 
for goods. If this is so, the opportunity cost of holding pesos and dollars would not 
be the same The next two equations present the two cash-in-advance constraints 
the affect households consumption possibilities at the goods market.
M  (xt) = f P ( s ,  x t) C  (s, x t) (1 -f g(s)d (s )
(4 -5)
£  e (xt+i) Q (xt+i | x t) D (xt) = f P ( s ,  x t) C  (s, x t ) (1 +  r(s) )d  (s)
xt+iG^ 0
Under these assumptions, domestic and foreign currency relative opportu­
nity cost would be given by the expected depreciation of the exchange rate. To 
understand this la tter point, le t’s suppose th a t the foreign central bank raises its 
nominal interest rate; rational domestic households would expect a depreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate for next period. Under these conditions, they would 
prefer to  hold only foreign currency for transactions instead of domestic currency, 
since by doing so, they will make capital gains. However, holding only dollars is
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not the optimal choice since pesos and dollars have different transaction costs. By 
holding only dollars households would have to pay a large transaction cost when 
purchasing some goods. Thereby, the optimal decision implies to  use both  pesos 
and dollars. At the optimal, the relative transaction cost and opportunity costs of 
using dollars and pesos have to equalise.
Also at the goods market, production of both intermediate and final goods 
takes places. After the goods market closes, sellers pool their receipts from this 
market with the wages received by the worker and with the unspent money holdings 
from the shopper.14. Therefore, the households stock of wealth at the beginning 
of next period is given by wage income, w ( x t) L ( x t), the state  contingent bond 
holdings, B  (xt+i), profits in domestic and foreign currency, E (x t ) and E* (x t), and
dollars and consequently their stock of wealth at the end of
B  (xt+1 ) +  E (xt) +  M  (xt) (4.6)
1
-  J  P  (s, x t) C  (s, x t) (1 +  g(s)d (s) +  w (xt) L  (xt)
si
+  ^ 2 e  (x* + i ) ( x*+i 1 x t ) D  (x t )
xt+iev 
st
-  J  P ( s , x t) C  (s, x t) ( 1  +  r(s) )d  (s)
0
+  ^ 2  e (z*+i) ft {xt+i | Xt ) E* (xt)
xt+iEV
14 This includes the transactions costs which are charged by the sellers during the goods market 
transactions. This assumption is harmless to our results and it is made only on the sake of 
simplicity. It does not affect the substitution effects that transaction costs generate in the 
economy.
the unspent pesos and 
period t, is given by:
zu(x t+l) =
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We further restrict household decisions to  satisfy the following transversal- 
ity condition.
lim V '  f  (xt+i | Ct) (xt+i) ^  0
n—^oo z  ^xt+iG^
Household Optimality Conditions
Each household maximises her utility function given by equation (4.1) subject to 
the cash-in-advance constraints and the flow budget constraint, equation (4.6). The 
households’ first-order conditions are given by the following set of equations:
Degree of Currency Substitution The degree of CS is determined by 
the fraction of consumption goods purchased using dollars, s t . Optimality implies 
th a t for good st the marginal cost of using dollars and pesos has to  be the same. 
Two costs are associated to money holdings, the standard opportunity costs given 
by the domestic nominal interest rate, in the case of pesos, and the foreign interest 
rate, in the case of dollars; and the transaction costs r ( s )  and g(s ), respectively. 
Consequently st is determined by the following condition,
1 +  T (St ) 1 ~  (1+i,) - .
Condition (4.7) is very similar to the one derived by Baumol (1952), in which the 
optimal demand for money is obtained when the transaction cost of exchanging 
bonds by money equalises the nominal interest rate, its opportunity cost. It is 
also in line w ith the condition derived by Eichenbaum and Wallace (1985) where 
the optimal demand for different types of money is determined by equalising their 
corresponding marginal transaction costs. This condition allows to solve for s t , once 
the transaction cost functions of pesos and dollars are parameterised. To obtain a 
tractable solution we choose the following exponential cost functions,
r  (st) =  exp(tf0 +  st) -  1 g (st ) = exp (n0 +  n i s t)) -  1 (4.8)
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W here by imposing tha t, >  rii and n Q > \kG, we guarantee th a t conditions in
(4.3) are satisfied. From condition (4.7)the degree of CS is determined by,
2 - -
n 0 ~  +  log — !1£ iI
*  =  -V----------------------------------------------------------------- (4.9)
The previous condition shows th a t in equilibrium s t is increasing on the level of 
domestic interest rate, it and decreasing on the foreign interest rate, i This is a 
very intuitive result since for instance, when i t increases, using pesos becomes more 
costly and consequently the demand for dollars rises, leading to a higher s t . Our 
assumptions also imply th a t even when both  the domestic and the foreign interest 
ra te  are zero there exist a positive level of CS. In this case, the degree of CS reaches 
its lower bound given by,
("o -  tto) (4 10)
This minimum degree of CS, s Q captures the fact th a t even with zero nominal 
interest rates there exist a set of goods for which is cheaper to  use dollars for 
transactions, n 0 >  4/0. Only in the case where no =  4/o =  0 an equilibrium where 
both  nominal interest rates are equal delivers a zero degree of CS. The equilibrium 
with positive levels of currency substitution and low inflation levels is consistent
with the experience of CS in countries like Bolivia and Peru in recent years. The
key implication of CS for consumption decisions across goods is, as the following 
first-order conditions show, th a t the marginal utility of consumption is larger than 
the marginal utility of income due to  transaction costs:
Uc,tdc?{s) =  P t ^ Xt ( X +  f^ ) ^  + 9 for s ^ (4'n )
Uc't d c ( s )  = Pt^ Xt ( 1 +  ^  +  T f° r S < '§t (4' 12)
where, Af, qt and n t, represent the lagrange multipliers associated to  the budget con­
straint and the two CIA constraints, respectively. The condition th a t determines 
the optim al consumption of small s  goods, 5  <  St , implies th a t at the optimum,
85
the good s marginal utility of consumption has to  equalise the marginal benefit of 
savings but adjusted by the cost of using money, which is given by its opportu­
nity cost and its corresponding transaction cost, ^ 1  +  ^  ( 1  +  r  (s)). Similarly, for 
goods with high index, s > s t , optimality implies th a t the marginal utility of con­
sum ption has to  equal the marginal utility of income, adjusted by the corresponding 
transaction cost, ( 1  +  g (s)), and the opportunity cost of holding domestic currency, 
^ 1  +  Prom the corresponding first order conditions for holdings of pesos and 
dollars we obtain:
J  =  1 -  E t (Qt,t+1) =  1  -  (4.13)
^  = 1 -  E t ( Q t+1^ )  = 1 - — L ? .  (4.14)
A* \  et J  (1+*?)
In order to  analyse the implications of CS in the economy, we aggregate the optimal 
conditions for the demand of each final good, given by equations (4.11) and (4.12) 
to  obtain the optim ality condition for the demand of the consumption bundle. As it 
is shown in detail in appendix B.3, these conditions imply th a t the marginal utility 
of consumption and the marginal utility of income, given by the lagrange multiplier, 
At , differ by the factor, T t :
Uc,t =  At (1 +  T t) (4.15)
T t measures the distortion associated to  the transaction costs in pesos and dollars. 
In equilibrium, T t depends on both the domestic and the foreign nominal interest 
rates and the equilibrium degree of CS, s t through function, T (st) in the following 
way:
( 1 +  T t) =  ^1 +  ( 1 +  r ( s t)) (4-16)
using the functional forms for the transaction costs in dollars and pesos, defined in
equation (4.8), (1 +  T (st)) can be w ritten as the following exponential function on
st15 : _ 2
1 +  T (st) =  exp + nQ-  ($,. -  m ) y ^  (4.17)
15 See appendix, B.3, for details of this derivation
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Figure 4.1: The Steady-State Costs of Transaction Frictions
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Note: Transaction costs are measured in the vertical axis as fraction of steady-state 
consumption. The nominal domestic interest rate is measured in the horizontal axis
Observing equation (4.15 ) it is easy to understand how CS affects the equilibrium 
of the economy. As this condition shows, transaction costs create a wedge between 
the marginal utility of consumption and that of income, Tt, which distorts the 
efficient allocation of consumption and labour. This distortion is increasing in both 
the domestic and the foreign nominal interest rate.
Interestingly, when keeping fixed the foreign interest rates, the marginal 
effect of it on T t is decreasing, since, when CS is allowed, agents can freely substitute 
domestic currency for foreign currency. Thus, by allowing CS agents can reduce the 
welfare cost of high nominal interest rates. Figure 4.1 illustrates this latter point 
by showing that function T t is concave on the nominal interest rate it .
Notice that is minimised when i =  0, although, this condition does 
not guarantee that transaction frictions are fully eliminated. As we mentioned
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Figure 4.2: Money Demand Functions
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previously, only when, n0 =  4>o =  0, a zero nominal interest rate guarantee zero 
transaction costs.
On the other hand, using the CIA constraints and equation (4.15) we can
write the corresponding money demands for domestic and foreign currency as fol­
lows,
M t    r ' '  ( 1 —'s t ) ( l + Y t )  e t D t    r *  s t ( l + T t )  /  a -t r>\
«  ~  Ct 2 - ^  Pt ~  2 * (4‘18)i+*t i+*r
These two money demand functions exhibit standard properties. Both are 
increasing in the level of domestic consumption, and Mt is decreasing (increasing) 
on it (ij), whereas, Dt is decreasing ( increasing) on i\ (it). Furthermore, taking a log 
quadratic approximation of the two previous equations around their corresponding 
steady-states, it is easy to show that Mt is decreasing and a convex function of it 
thus, the model implies that an increase in the volatility of the opportunity cost of
holding money would lead to  higher money demand. Figure 4.2 plots and 
for different values of the domestic interest rate, holding fixed Ct and i\.
S av ing  a n d  P o r tfo lio  D ecisions Savings and household’s portfolio de­
cisions are determined by the usual Euler conditions. At the optimum households 
are indifferent amongst allocating wealth in any period, since the expected present 
discounted value of the marginal utility of wealth is the same across periods:
1 = E t (  s .fA,+1 A (4.19)
(!+ **) \A* ( 1  +  7r*+1)
Notice th a t since, Xt = ^ 4 t) ’ saving decisions of agents will depend, besides 
the level of the real interest rate, on the degree of CS. Furthermore, since markets 
are complete, it also holds that:
(I77T, ■ 8 (iSTifSb) <*■“)
Combining equations (4.19) and (4.20), we obtain the uncovered interest parity 
condition (UIP):
( l + i j  M i ^ & ) (4.21)
L a b o u r  S u p p ly  Households supply labour in equilibrium up to  the point 
where the marginal cost of working equalises its marginal benefit:
W f
u h,t = X t (4.22)
The marginal benefit AtWt depends, amongst other things, on the level of nominal 
interest rates and on the degree of currency substitution through Xt. This is a 
second channel through which currency substitution affects the economy. Since, 
real wages affect marginal cost of firms and through the Phillips curve, inflation, 
the degree of CS, as we discuss in detail in the next sections, will affect inflation 
dynamics.
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R isk  S h a rin g  C o n d itio n  The complete markets assumption implies 
th a t the price of the state contingent bond domestically and abroad have to  be 
the same, therefore, we have th a t the following condition it must hold:
 ^ _  W + lPt _ P^ t+lPtCt+1 f A OQ>*
& + 1  “  "  AtetPt+1 (423)
Denoting by Qt the real exchange rate, the relative price of foreign goods in terms
F£e,
Pt
p*e
of domestic goods, Qt = -p  we can transform  the previous expression into the
following condition:
Qt+i  =  (4.24)
At+ 1 \
Following Chari et al. (2 0 0 2 ) we iterate the previous equation backwards to  obtain 
the following risk sharing condition16:
Qt  =  (4.25)
where the constant term  so is defined as follows:
Co =  ^<3o (4.26)
4 .1 .2  F irm s
F in a l G o o d  P ro d u c e rs
There is a continuum of final good producers of mass n  indexed by j  in the domes­
tic economy, which operate under perfect competition, and a mass 1  — n  of final
goods producers in the foreign economy. Domestic final goods producers use home, 
Yh,u and foreign, Yp>t, intermediate goods as inputs into the following production 
function:
Y l  =  [(1 -  a ) i  (¥„<)*? +  (a ) i  ( Y p ^ l  ^  (4.27)
16 Chari et al. (2002) use a model of an open economy with complete markets to analyse the role 
of price stickiness in explaining the volatility of the real exchange rate.
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y ]H,t = Y h = ( ( i ^ / u ^ m 1 5 1  «*(*)) * " ‘
(4.28)
where 77 >  0  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign inter­
mediate goods, whereas, e >  1 , is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of
intermediate goods. Then the cost minimizing demand functions by firm j  of each 
type of differentiated good is given by the following two conditions:
Y l t (z)  =  (1 -  a )  ' ( ^ t )  V  (4-29)
Y^ t[z)=“ 0 >r) '(t?) " Yti (430)
The price level charged by final good producers is equal to  its marginal cost and it 
is given by:
Pt =  ((1 -  a) I * 7  + a P ^ )  ^  (4.31)
where:
P«,t =  ( n J  P H,t (2) d z  j  P F,t = { n f  PF,t (2) d2)  (4 32)
Final goods producers in the foreign economy have a similar technology to  th a t 
used by domestic intermediate producers, see appendix B .l for details on the foreign 
economy.
Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate good producers of mass n  allocated in the 
domestic economy and of mass 1  — n, in the foreign economy th a t operate under 
monopolistic competition. Each of these producers uses a constant returns to  scale 
technology to produce a particular variety of intermediate goods. This technology 
takes labour as production input as follows :
Y„,t (z) =  A tL t (z) (4.33)
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where A t represents an aggregate productivity shock th a t follows the following 
A R (  1 ) process:
ln(i4t) =  x  ln(i4t_i) +  Ct (4.34)
with (t ~  N  (0, a . W ith this type of technology, the real marginal cost of the 
representative intermediate good producers is given by
W *  Ptmet =  -7 - ^ - 5 -  (4.35)
A t i t  -TH,t
Similarly, the foreign intermediate goods producers uses a constant returns to  scale 
production function given by:
YFit(z) = A ; l ; (z ) (4.36)
where A% represents the foreign productivity shock, which also follows an autore­
gressive process:
ln(^*) =  X*ln(At*_1) +  Ct* (4.37)
with Ct ~  N  (0, cr^ *) . The aggregate demand for the intermediate good z  is obtained 
by adding up the demand of both the home and foreign final goods producers for 
this good, as follows:
n 1
Y„,t (z) =  J Y ^ t (z)d(j) + j  (Y£.() (z)d(j)  (4.38)
0 n
In this economy the law of one price holds for a particular good 2 , therefore we have 
that: PH,t(z) =  etPH,t(z )i and PF,t(z) = etPF,t(z )i consequently, the aggregate 
demand for home intermediated good 2  is w ritten as follows:
Y„,t (z) =  '  (tP) " ((1 - a) Vt + (1~al (1~n)Q^) (4-39)
  n   1
Where, Y t = f Y tJd(j), and Y t = j Y t3*d(j), represent the aggregate production
0 n
level of final goods at the domestic and foreign economy, respectively. Using a 
similar derivation for the foreign economy we obtain Yptiz)  , which is given by:
< - >
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The Small Open Economy
Following Sutherland (2 0 0 2 ), we parameterise the participation of foreign inputs in 
the production of home and foreign final goods, a  , a*, respectively as follows:
where n  represents the size of the home economy, and 7  its degree of openness17. 
This particular param eterisation implies th a t as the economy becomes more open, 
the fraction of imported goods used in domestic production increases, whereas as 
the economy becomes larger, this fraction falls.
The SOE corresponds to  the home economy when the size of this economy 
approaches to  zero, n  —» 0. In this case we have th a t a  —► 7  and a* —► 1 . Conse­
quently, the foreign economy does not use any home produced intermediated good 
for production of foreign final goods and changes in home aggregate demand have
Q y
a nil impact on the foreign economy, this is =  0. Furthermore, in this limiting 
case, P* =  Pp and:
In order to  save notation, we define domestic output, Yn,t and foreign output, Yp,t, 
as follows:
a  = ( 1  — n) 7  1  — a* =  7 1 7
(4.42)
(4.43)
(4.44)
17 Sutherland (2002) derives the SOE in a model where the home and foreign economy trade 
final consumption goods. In this chapter in contrast, the home and the foreign economy trade 
intermediate goods.
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thus, the demand facing individual intermediate goods producing firms can be sim­
ply expressed as:
Y„,t { z )=  YFj1(2 ) = ( £ & £ > )  ~VF,t (4.45)
Price Setting
At each period t  intermediate goods producers face an exogenous probability of 
changing prices given by (1 — 6). Following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), we 
assume th a t this probability is independent of the price level chosen by the firm 
in previous periods and on the date the firm last changed its price. A typical firm 
choose its price Pn,t(z ) to  maximise the present discounted value of its expect flow 
of profits, given by:
Et E  (6P)k ( V n t  ( P£ - Z-  -  mct+k'\ YH,t+k(z) 
j ^ 0 \  \  rH,t+k J
(4.46)
le t 's  denote by t+k the inverse of the cumulative domestic inflation level as follows:
Phj
% + k  =
H,t+k
(4.47)
and by Yij,t+k{z) the demand of intermediate good z conditioned on th a t its price 
has kept fixed at Ph^{z ):
H,t
(4.48)
The first order condition th a t maximises equation (4.46) is given by:
.k ( n -aE f E m t  (c ;+\  (
_k= 0 '  ' H,t
* t+k - ( e -  1 ) m ct+k YHjt+k(z)
=  0 (4.49)
As it is shown in appendix B.2 , from this first order condition we can derive a non 
linear recursive representation of the Phillips curve given by the following three 
equations:
N t = n \ tmctYHj  +  0(3ir€Ht+1 N t+1 (4.50)
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D t — +  QPftHj+iDt+i (4-51)
6 ( W 1 =  1 -  (1 -  6) (4.52)
W here, N t and D t are auxiliary variables defined in this appendix. A similar set of
equations characterises the Phillips curve in the foreign economy.
Real Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade
Next, we define some identities th a t are helpful in describing the dynamic equilib­
rium  of an open economy. First we define the term s of trades, Tt , as the relative 
price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods, as follows:
Tt = ^  (4.53)■TH,t
since the domestic economy is small and the law of one price holds, the price of 
foreign goods is determined by Pf , t = etP t . Using, the previous identity, it is 
possible to  obtain the term s of trade from the following equation,:
Tt =  3-  (4.54)
PH,t
where Pjjtt =  Furthermore, using the definition of the consumer price indices
for the home and foreign economy and the small open economy assumption, we
have that:
£ Y  = ( 1 - 7 ) +  7  T t- "  (4.55)
T t /
Using this last identity, we can define a relationship between CPI inflation and home 
inflation as follows:
i r , V - _ ( l - 7 )  +  ^  (4 .56)
n H, tJ ( 1  — 7) +  T ^ t- i7
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4.1.3 Monetary Policy
The central bank sets monetary policy by choosing the nominal interest rate ac­
cording to  a Taylor rule. We consider the following generic type of Taylor rule,
\  0 7 r ( l — P i )  /  \  0 z ( l — P i)  /  \  0 e ( l — P i)
P i I \  I  V t  \  (  e t
( 1  +  it) — ( 1  +  i) ( 1  +  i t- i )
J  \ y t J  \ & t — i
where i = {H, C P I }  , <j>v > 1, <j>x > 0 , <j)e > 0 , 7ff represents the inflation target of 
the domestic central bank, y, the natural level of output in the domestic economy, 
H , stands for home prices, and C P I  for the consumer price index.
4.1.4 Baseline Parametrisation
The model is calibrated with standard param eter values for small open economies. 
In particular, we choose, a = rj = 1 , to  m itigate the effects of term s of trade on 
the dynamic equilibrium of the economy, as in Gall and Monacelli (2005). The 
param eter j3 is set to 0.99, which implies a annual real interest rate of 4 percent. 
The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply, y?, is set to  3, consistent with micro 
studies th a t report low labour supply elasticities. The param eter 6 is set to  0.75, 
which implies th a t firms keep prices unchanged on average four quarters. The 
degree of openness of the domestic economy 1 — 7  is set to 0.7, whereas, e is set 
to  6 , which implies a mark up over marginal cost of 20 percent. The persistence 
of all shocks is set to 0.95 and the variance of their innovations to  0.00712. The 
param eters th a t characterise the transaction frictions are calibrated to  generate a 
relatively low steady-state level of CS under zero inflation, thus we set \I>o =  0 .0 1 , 
=  1.1, n 0 =  log(2 — /3) +  0.151 and ipi =  0.01, which imply a 15 percent degree 
of CS.
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4.2 Dynamic Equilibrium and Currency Substitution
In order to  highlight the effects of CS on the economy we choose a param etrization 
where the intertem poral elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign intermediate goods are equal to  1 , i.e. a = r) = 
1. In this case, the welfare effects of term s of trade are completely eliminated, 
since the income and substitution effects th a t term s of trade generate perfectly 
cancel out each other. Consequently, domestic and foreign shocks do not affect the 
current account of the economy. This simplification makes easier to  characterise 
analytically the implications of CS for welfare and optimal m onetary policy. We use 
equations, (4.15), (4.19), (4.25), (4.43), (4.54), (4.55) and (4.56) to  obtain domestic 
consumption in terms of domestic and foreign output and the transaction cost 
distortion, as the next equation shows,
a - r r i y .  T ^ f ’fTPfy <i5I>
Using equation (4.57) and the definition of marginal costs, equation (4.35), we 
eliminate the lagrange multiplier Xt and the marginal costs, mct from equations 
(4.50) and (4.51) to obtain the following non-linear representation of the Phillips 
curve,
Nt = M ( W ) 7 (irw) 7 MCt + 60Et (n"'t+lJVt+l) (4-58)
a = 0 jp)1 ( y ^ y ; )  1 7 +epEt <4-59)
0 1 1 ^  =  1  - ( i - 0 ) ( g ) l £  (4.60)
Similarly, we use equations (4.22) and (4.35) to  write the real marginal costs 
in terms of domestic output, Yutt the transaction cost distortion, T t , productivity, 
A t and the relative price distortion generated by domestic inflation, A t , as follows,
Yh?  (  1 +  T (
i T 7 f ; j a r  ( t s i )
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Where, A* =  dz , can be w ritten recursively as follows,
A , =  gA t-t +  (1 -  6) ( * ~  (4.62)
Similarly, we use equation (4.57) and equation (4.56) to  eliminate consump­
tion from the Euler equation,
l + t^+i J  \ 1  +  'y'TtJ n^ t+i (4.63)
These transformations allow us to define the rational expectations equilibrium as 
the solution of the system of Non linear equations given by equations (4.16), (4.17), 
(4.9), (4.58), (4.59), (4.60), (4.61), (4.62), (4.63) and (4.1.3), for a given a sequence 
of {ij} and
Equations (4.58) to  (4.62) represent the non-linear version of the Phillips 
curve, whereas equation (4.63) the corresponding aggregate demand. Notice th a t 
besides marginal costs, domestic and foreign output and future expected inflation, 
transaction distortions, T t , which depend on CS, determine inflation. Transaction 
costs, as we discussed previously, depend on both the domestic and the foreign 
nominal interest rates as it is established by equations (4.16), (4.16) and (4.9).
It is through this variable th a t CS affects the economy. W hen transaction 
frictions are not present, Y* =  0, the economy collapses to a standard cashless SOE, 
as the one analysed by Gall and Monacelli (2005). However, when T t > 0 CS plays 
a role in the transmission mechanism of m onetary policy.
In particular, transaction frictions, T t , act as a stochastic tax  for holding 
cash th a t breaks the equality between the marginal utility of income and consump­
tion. This stochastic tax  affects, by making more costly to  transform  income into 
consumption, the dynamics of both the aggregate demand and of inflation. The role 
th a t CS plays in this mechanism is to  determine the weights of both the domestic
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and the foreign nominal interest rates on T t . In the coming subsections we explain 
in detail the effects of CS for the steady-state, the flexible and the sticky price equi­
librium. In section 4 we address the implications of CS for optimal monetary policy 
and for the determinacy of the equilibrium of Taylor rules. From now on, we adopt 
the convention of denoting by capital letters w ithout time subscript, the correspond­
ing steady-state value variables, and by lower case letters their log deviations from 
their steady-states, i.e. X  is the steady-state of X t and x t =  lo g (^ ) .
4.2.1 The Steady State
We analyse a deterministic steady-state where all shocks take their unconditional 
means, and where both domestic and foreign inflation rates are equal to  zero. Since 
a t this steady state, M C  =  from the corresponding steady-state analog of equa­
tion (4.61) we obtain the following steady-state level of domestic output,
Yh  = { 1  -  (4.64)
where 1  — =  '^ ( i + t ) ^  account s f°r the overall distortions in this economy. As
equation (4.64) shows, the level of output is below its optimal level of 1. Two factors 
distort output a t the steady-state, the degree of monopolistic competition, measured 
by the degree of mark-up, /z, th a t induce firms to  produce below its efficient level, 
and transaction frictions, measured by T , th a t rise the marginal cost of firms above 
its optimal level.
The size of this second distortion is positively related to  both  the long- 
run levels of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates. In economies where 
steady-state nominal interest rates are high, the cost associated with transanctions 
would also be high and therefore consumers would endongenously choose to use 
more foreign currency as medium of payment.
Figure 4.3 plots the welfare loss associated to  the nominal interest rate
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Figure 4.3: Transaction Costs and Currency Substitution
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Note: On the vertical axis, steady-state costs are measured as proportion of consumption  
levels. On the horizontal axis the nominal interest rates is measured in units
generated through the distortion on output previously discussed. As this figure 
shows, this cost is increasing on the nominal interest rate, though it is much lower 
when CS is allowed. CS reduces the welfare costs of inflation because it permits 
households to optimally minimise transaction costs by shifting their money demand 
towards a foreign currency when the cost of using the domestic currency rises.
4.2.2 T h e  F lex ib le  P r ic e  E q u ilib riu m
In contrast with the monopolistic distortion that only affects the steady-state of the 
economy, transaction frictions also distort the dynamic equilibrium of the economy,
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in particular, they induce an inefficiently dynamic output level. In this economy, 
the efficient flexible price output level coincides w ith domestic productivity, yet, as 
equation (4.65) shows, transaction frictions generate a gap between this efficient 
level and the output level under flexible prices. Next equation illustrate this latter 
point,
Vt = a t -  (4-65)
where, v t = log (^p^) and $ =  ( ^ t )  18• This gap is increasing on both the domestic 
and the foreign nominal interest rates weighted by the degree of CS as follows,
v t = u  ((1 -  s )  i t +  stf)  (4.66)
where, u  = 2(i+i)-i' Crucially then, in economies where CS is high, the foreign 
interest rate  is the variable th a t has a larger impact on distorting the dynamic 
behaviour of output and not the domestic one.
The efficient output level in this economy is achieved when v t = 0 . How­
ever, this allocation is not feasible under neither a policy of zero inflation nor a 
policy of zero domestic nominal interest rates. W hen inflation is zero, both the 
nominal interest rate and the degree of CS are positive, therefore, v t 7  ^ 0. Similarly, 
when the domestic interest rate is fixed to  zero, as equation (4.9) shows, the degree 
of CS is not necessarily equal to zero, thus, v t 7  ^ 0 .
To achieve the efficient allocation we assume, similarly to  Woodford (2003), 
th a t the central bank has additional instruments, in particular th a t it can pay 
interest on money holdings, and th a t it can tax  the holdings of foreign currency, 
Tm 19 These two additional instruments can be used to  make v t = 0. Under these 
assumptions, v t and s  are determined by the following two equations,
Vt =  uj ((1 -  s )  ( i t  - i ™ )  +  s  (i* +  T™)) (4.67)
18 Equation (4.65 ) is obtained by taking a log linear approximation of equation (4.61), details of 
this derivation are provided in appendix B.4
19 Woodford (2003) studies models with transaction frictions but with only one currency for close
economies and Walsh and Ravenna (2006) studies models with working capital.
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s  = )) (4.68)
(tfi - n i)
It follows from equations (4.67) and (4.68) th a t by setting, i t = i™ the central bank 
can eliminate the distortion generated by the domestic nominal interest rate, and 
by making r m =  jf ( 2  — exp (n0 — ^ 0)) — 1 , the corresponding distortion generated 
by the foreign nominal interest rate, thus v t = 0. Therefore, under this particular 
set of money holding taxes the central bank can induce an efficient level of domestic 
output, y% = at , and equation (4.65) can be w ritten as follows,
In what follows, we assume th a t the economy exhibits some degree of transaction 
frictions in steady-state, thus, we set r m = 0 and i — im to  be small. Consequently, 
v t 7  ^ 0  , thereby the flexible price equilibrium and the efficient one do not coincide. 
This discrepancy affects how the central bank implements monetary policy in a 
fundamental way. In the next section, we show this issue in detail.
4.2.3 The Equilibrium under Sticky Prices
In order to  analyse the effects of CS on the dynamic equilibrium under price stick­
iness, we take a log-linear approximation of equations from (4.58) to  (4.62) around 
the deterministic steady-state. It turns out th a t the economy exhibits a canonical 
representation of three equations: a dynamic aggregate demand, a Phillips curve 
and an interest rate policy rule. These three equations are presented next:
(4.69)
x t =  E tx t + 1 -  (it -  E t7rH,t+i ~  r ” ) +  aiEtA i t+1 +  o> £tA z *+ 1  (4.70)
TTHj  =  (3Et 7TH>t+i + KXt +  Kih + A C /z j (4.71)
(4.72)
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where, x t represents the gap between output under sticky prices and its efficient 
level, i.e, x t =  yt — Vt, and r ” the natural interest rate, which is function only of 
structural shocks. The new set of param eters are defined as follows:
Table 1: Definition of Param eters
Oi = uj'd (1 — 7 ) (1 — s) ac =  A ( 1  + ip)
&i* = (1 — 7 ) s Ki = u;$A(l — 7 ) (1 — s)
Kf = $Acj(1 — 7  )s
It is apparent from its canonical representation th a t the economy with CS 
exhibits two new features. First, the foreign interest ra te  shows up in the Phillips 
curve, equation (4.71), as a cost-push shock, where the m agnitude of its impact on 
inflation depends on the degree of CS. Only when the degree of CS is zero, s = 0 , 
the foreign interest rate does not affect the dynamics of inflation. In this case, the 
economy behaves similarly to  the one analysed by Woodford (2003)20.
The mechanism th a t generates the channel by which zj appears in the 
Phillips curve works as follows: transaction costs create a gap between the marginal 
utility of consumption and th a t of income, given by v t . This gap, for a given degree 
of CS, is increasing in both the domestic and the foreign nominal interest rates,
At =  ~ct -  v t (4.73)
Consequently, as interest rates go up, the real value of a given real wage in term s of
consumption falls. Since more real resources have to  be allocated for transforming
wage income into consumption, workers respond by cutting their labour supply.
This, in turn , pushes real wages up and accordingly marginal cost rises. The next
20 Woodford (2003) analyses a model of a close economy where transaction frictions affect the 
equilibrium of the economy. He finds that in this type of economies, the domestic interest rate 
affects directly the dynamics of inflation, similarly to the implications of our model.
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equation makes explicit this link between transaction and marginal costs,
met = (1 +  (p) (yt -  at ) +  (1 -  7 ) v t (4.74)
The degree of CS determines the relative weight th a t the domestic and the foreign 
interest rate have on marginal costs. Equation (4.75) shows how the presence of 
transaction frictions distorts the proportionality between the real marginal cost and 
the output gap,
met = (1 +  tp) x t +  (1 -  7 ) v t (4-75)
Therefore, a central bank th a t targets x t = 0, can not stabilise the marginal cost 
of firms, since zero output gap does not imply zero transaction costs, v t =  021. If 
the central bank does not stabilise marginal costs, can neither stabilise inflation. 
Consequently, in an economy with CS, it would be impossible for the central bank 
to  simultaneously achieve zero inflation and zero output gap.
The second new feature of this type of economies is a negative effect of 
on aggregate demand. This effect is different to  the one based on the intertem poral 
substitution mechanism. As equation (4.76) shows, its impact on aggregate demand 
is given by cq*, which is increasing on the degree of CS. Also, notice th a t under CS, 
the partial response of the output gap to an increase on the domestic nominal 
interest rate  becomes, — ( 1  +  0 *). Since as the degree of CS increases, cq falls, the 
output gap become less responsive to changes in the domestic interest ra te  as CS 
increases, weakening the interest rate transmission channel of monetary policy:
x t = E tx t + 1 -  (it -  E tnH,t+i ~  r?) -  Oiit -  +  (JiEti t + 1 +  ai*Eti*t+1 (4.76)
Under CS, when an agent decides to  postpone one unit of income for future con­
sumption, the cost of her decision in period t  is given not only by the marginal utility 
of consumption but also by the transaction cost, v t . Similarly, the next period ben­
efits of th a t decision includes, besides the present discounted value of the marginal
21 Note that transaction costs reach their minimun value only when the domestic nominal interest 
rate is set close to zero.
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utility of consumption, the corresponding expected value of the transaction cost, 
E tv t+1 . Since all shocks in the model are transitory, it holds th a t —vt + E tv t + 1 <  0. 
Thus, when nominal interest rate  increases, the associated transaction cost rises, 
making more expensive to  consume in period t  relative to  future periods. The inter­
action of these two effects induces agents to  reduce their consumption levels. The 
effect of transaction costs on savings decisions can be seen more easily by observing 
the following representation of the Euler equation th a t results after Xt is replaced 
by its equivalent given by equation (4.73),
ct= E tCt+1 - v t + E tv t + 1 -  (it - E t7rt+1) (4.77)
In order to  illustrate the effects of these new mechanisms on the rational expecta­
tions equilibrium, we solve for it, by considering th a t there exist only one shock in 
the economy, the foreign nominal interest rate. This assumption help us to obtain 
simple analytical solutions. Furthermore, we assume th a t i\  follows the following 
autorregressive process:
h  = Ph- i  4" £t
Under this assumption, the rational expectation equilibrium of equations (4.70), 
(4.71) and (4.72 ) is given by the following two equations:
x t = -bi*t (4.78)
*H ,t =  , (4 -79 )1 /3p
where,
(oSpI +  Kf +  Gi* ( t1 Ki M )b =
( l  +  +  tfi) ( 1  - 0 P -  (« +  ^ x )
For most parameterizations, b > 0 and Kf — b& > 0. Therefore, an increase in 
foreign interest rate leads to  a fall in output gap and to  an increase on the domestic 
inflation rate. However, it is im portant to  highlight th a t the inflation responses to
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Figure 4.4: Response of Output and Inflation to a Foreign Nominal Interest Rate
Shock (a)
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the foreign nominal interest rate is smaller than tha t of output gap, since the fall 
in output gap through the standard aggregate demand channel partially offset the 
direct impact of i*t on inflation in the Phillips curve.
These implications are confirmed in figures 4.4 and 4.5 tha t shows the im­
pulse response functions of domestic inflation, output gap and the nominal interest 
rate to  a positive foreign interest rate shock. These responses were obtained under 
the benchmark parameterisation for two different levels of the steady-state degree 
of CS.
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As figure 4.4 shows, the response of the three aforementioned variables to  
the foreign nominal interest rate shock is stronger when the degree of CS in steady- 
state  is higher. It is also im portant to highlight th a t as the analytical solution of 
the equilibrium indicates, the response of inflation is much lower than  the one of 
output gap, since the endogenous response of the domestic nominal interest rates 
and the output gap partially offsets the initial impact of i*t on inflation.
Notice th a t when the output gap weight on the central bank’s reaction 
function is large enough, 4>x —► oo, the response of the output gap to  zj, measured 
by b shrinks towards zero. In this case, the effect of i\  on domestic inflation reaches 
its maximum value,
Kf
1 pp
On the contrary, when the central bank does not react to  the output gap, (f)x = 0, 
the fall in output more than compensate the direct effect of the foreign nominal 
interest rate on inflation, — btz <  0 , thus, both the domestic inflation and the 
nominal interest rate falls in equilibrium. As in the previous case, here as well, 
the response of the three variables, output gap, inflation and the domestic nominal 
interest rate are increasing on the degree of steady-state CS. Figure 4.5 shows the 
impulse responses of these three variables when <f>x =  0  for two different levels of 
steady-state CS.
A direct implication of our model is th a t economies with CS should be more 
sensitive to  foreign nominal interest shocks than  economies without CS. This result 
is in line with the empirical evidence reported by Agenor et al. (2000), Neumeyer 
and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2004), who document a negative correlation 
between domestic output and the foreign nominal interest rate  for emerging markets, 
where CS is more frequent. The next section explores the implications CS for the 
design of m onetary policy; in particular we derive the micro-founded loss function 
of the central bank, then this loss function is used to  evaluate the performance
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Figure 4.5: Response of Output and Inflation to a Foreign Nominal Interest Rate
Shock (b)
Domestic Inflation
Q- - 0 .0 2
m -0.04
-0.06
Output gap
0
o -0.05
- 0.1
e -0.15
- 0.2
Nominal Interest rate
-  -  DoIlarization= 20 %
—  Do!larization=60%o -0.02
-0.04
e -0.06
-0.08
Note: Dollarisation ratios correspond to  steady-state levels
of different interest rate rules. Finally, we analyse the implications of CS for the 
determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium.
4.3 Monetary Policy under Currency Substitution
In this section we analyse how CS affects m onetary policy. In particular, we discuss 
the implications of CS for the convenience of exchange rate  smoothing and for infla­
tion determination. Although, there exist empirical evidence th a t shows th a t many 
central banks in emerging economies, in particular, in economies with dollarisation, 
tend to actively intervene in the exchange rate market to  reduce the volatility of
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their nominal exchange rates, it is not clear cut whether or not this behaviour is 
optimal. Authors like Calvo and Reinhart (2 0 0 2 ), emphasise the role of financial 
dollarisation. However, Cespedes et al. (2004), and Gertler et al. (2004), using 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, find th a t even with financial dol­
larisation, a flexible exchange rate outperforms a fixed one. Also, chapter 3 shows 
th a t in economies with sector specific productivity shocks it is possible to  sustain 
an equilibrium with price dollarisation, and th a t in this case, it is optimal for the 
central bank to  allow some degree of exchange rate smoothing.
In order to  evaluate the benefits of exchange rate  smoothing in economies 
with CS we derive the micro-founded loss function of the central bank. As in 
Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), this loss function comes from 
a second-order approximation of the utility function of the representative household, 
around a particular steady-state. We choose a steady-state where the effects of terms 
of trade are eliminated, but where transaction frictions play a role. In particular, 
we choose an steady-state of zero inflation, but where, z — im is relatively small, 
thus both domestic and the foreign nominal interest rate  distort the dynamics of 
the economy.
4.3.1 The Central Bank Loss Function
As we show in appendix B.6 , the loss function for a central bank in a SOE with CS 
has the following form,
q  t=°°
L  = — f t  K1  “  S) (A^  +  +  A®t +  *H,t] (4'8°)
t= 0
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where, A», fi, A#, A and A#* are positive parameters. Notice th a t this loss function 
differs, in at least two dimensions, from those obtained for economies where trans­
action frictions are not allowed22. First, in an economy with CS, both the domestic 
and the foreign nominal interest rates generate welfare losses. In particular, the 
central bank has an incentive to  keep domestic interest rates low and stable, but 
also to  induce a negative correlation between the domestic and the foreign interest 
rates.
To understand why the central bank has this incentive, notice th a t when 
CS is positive, s > 0 , the foreign nominal interest rate also generates transaction 
costs for households, therefore a central bank, which aims at maximizing households 
welfare, would have the incentive to move i t in the opposite direction of i*t to  com­
pensate the costs generated by fluctuations in the foreign interest rate. Remarkably, 
this incentive is larger, as the degree of CS increases.
The cross term  between domestic and foreign interest on the central bank 
loss function, also has implications for the desirability of exchange rate  smoothing. 
Since, smoothing exchange rate implies th a t the central bank has to  move the 
domestic interest rate to mimic the path  of foreign domestic, the welfare loss of 
exchange rate smoothing turns out to be increasing on the degree of CS. Thus, we 
can argue tha t CS does not provide a rational for fear of floating.
Second, the incentives of the central bank to  smooth fluctuations on the 
domestic nominal interest rate are decreasing on the degree of CS. In the limit, when 
s = 1 , the domestic interest rate does not generate welfare losses, thus the central 
bank has no incentives to smooth domestic nominal interest rate fluctuations. In
22 For instance Woodford (2003), obtains, for an economy with transaction frictions, a loss func­
tion that depends on quadratic terms of inflation, output gap, and the nominal interest rate. 
He shows that this latter term justifies some degree of interest rate smoothing.
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this case, the loss function collapse to  the one derived by Woodford (2003)23. 
Interestingly, steady-state CS only affects the interest rate weights on the central 
bank loss function but not the weights of the output gap and inflation. This is so 
because CS does not affect production efficiency, only consumption levels.
Next, we use the micro-founded loss function, equation (4.80), to  rank 
different interest rate rules. In particular, we compare the performance of domestic 
inflation and consumer price inflation interest rate rules under different degrees of 
interest rate and exchange rate smoothing, the policy rules are parameterised as 
follows,
i t = piU-i +  (1 -  Pi) [0 *7rH,t +  <j)xx t +  4>eE tA e t] (4.81)
it = piit- 1 +  (1 -  Pi) [0 *7h +  <t>xx t +  (j)eE tA e t] (4.82)
A policy rule would outperform another if it generates a rational expecta­
tions equilibrium th a t implies a lower expected welfare loss than  the alternatives. 
In order to calculate the expected welfare loss for each interest rate rule we solve 
up to second-order the rational expectations equilibrium of the economy, defined 
by equations (4.58) to  (4.63), plus the interest rate  rule defined previously24. The 
rational expectations equilibrium is calculated for a set of economies, each of one 
defined for a particular value of 0 e and pi.
This strategy allow us to consider the case of economies where the degree 
of CS is not too small, as it is indeed the case of economies with CS, but at the 
same time it perm it us to  keep approximation errors small enough. This in turn  
allow us to  evaluate implement able monetary policy rules in a consistent way.
Figure 4.6 compares the welfare loss generated by implementable interest
23 Woodford (2003), shows that in a close economy where there exist transaction frictions, the
expected loss function of the central bank depends, besides the variance of output gap and 
inflation, on the variance of the nominal interest rates.
24 To solve up to second-order the dynamics equilibrium of the economy we use the perturbation 
method and the code produced by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
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rate  rules th a t react to  the CPI and domestic inflation, the output gap, the lag 
interest rate and the change in the exchange rate, considering different degrees of 
exchange rate smoothing. In all figures, the horizontal axis measures the degree of 
exchange rate smoothing, indexed by the value of <f)e.
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b, show the welfare losses under domestic inflation 
rule and CPI inflation, where the solid line represent rules without interest rate 
smoothing, whereas the dotted line considers those where the central bank reacts 
also to  the one period lagged domestic nominal interest rate. Figure in Panel 4.6c, 
compares a rule th a t reacts to domestic inflation to  one th a t reacts to CPI inflation, 
when both do not consider interest rate smoothing, whereas 4.6d does the same 
comparison but considering th a t both rules feature interest rate smoothing.
All three figures show th a t welfare losses are increasing on the degree of 
exchange rate smoothing. However, as 4.6c describes, welfare losses are higher for 
those rules tha t target the consumer price inflation in comparison with those tha t 
target instead domestic inflation. Thus, as in Gall and Monacelli (2005), we also 
obtain th a t targeting domestic price inflation allows the central bank to  deliver a 
superior outcome in term s of welfare. This results comes directly from the central 
bank micro-founded loss function, where the definition of inflation th a t generates 
welfare losses is not CPI inflation but domestic inflation. Consequently, a central 
bank th a t reacts to  CPI inflation generates higher volatility on the output gap 
and the nominal interest rates which are not compensated by a lower volatility on 
domestic inflation.
Also, Panel 4.6a and 4.6b, show th a t rules th a t consider some degree of 
interest rate smoothing outperform those th a t do not smooth the nominal interest 
rate. Consequently, interest rate smoothing turns to  be a desirable objective for the 
central bank under CS. The intuition of this result is simple, a lower variability on 
domestic nominal interest rates reduces expected transaction costs, thus expected
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Figure 4.6: Welfare Ranking of Interest Rate Rules
a) Domestic Inflation Taylor Rule b) CPI Inflation Taylor Rule
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Note: In panel (a) and (b) a value of 0.8 for the lag of the nominal interest rate has been consider 
for rules with interest rate smoothing, those represented with dotted lines. Panel (c) compares 
both type of rules without interest rate smoothing and Panel (d) does it when a value of 0.8 is 
used for the parameter of the lagged interest rate. In all cases, a steady-state value of CS of 5 
percent has been considered
welfare losses are mitigated.
To sum up, in small open economies with CS the central bank should al­
low the exchange rate to float and put less weight on interest rate smoothing, in 
comparison to economies without CS. Also, the steady-state degree of CS does not 
affect the relative weights the central bank put on output gap and domestic inflation 
stabilization, it only affects the weight on interest rate smoothing.
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4.3.2 Determinacy of Equilibrium
In this subsection we analyse the implications of CS for the determinacy of rational 
expectations equilibrium. A question th a t has not been analysed yet in the literature 
is whether or not CS affects the capability of the central bank to  anchor inflation 
expectations. We address this question in this subsection by showing how the 
conditions for the determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium changes 
with CS for interest rate rules th a t target domestic inflation. W ith this purpose 
and following Woodford (2003), we write the canonical representation of the model 
economy as follows:
E tzt+ 1 — +  aet
where: zt = ftH,t
x t
, and
A  =
(1 r)
p V  p
( l + a i ) < p T r  —  ( l+ C T i^ T r ) ^ ------------------------ l  +  ( l + < T i ) 0 x  +  ( l + 0 ’i</>7r )
_  f  K + K j < t > x  ^
(4.83)
Since there are two forward looking variables in the model, the rational expectations 
equilibrium is uniquely determined when both eigenvalues of m atrix A  are outside
the unit circle. As it is detailed in Woodford (2003), the necessary and sufficient
conditions for this to  hold are:
det A >  1 (4.84)
det A  +  trace(A) >  — 1  (4.85)
det A  — trace (A) >  — 1  (4.86)
W riting conditions (4.84),(4.85) and (4.86 ) in terms of the parameters of the model 
we obtain:
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( 1  _  ^  +  (X + f d L ^ ) )  ^  +  ^  >  o (4.87)
( 1  -  (3 -  Ki) (j)x +  «(07r -  1 ) >  0  (4.88)
2 ( 1  +  0 ) +  /^(1 + ^ ) ( 1  +  2ct.) +  ^ N\ 0;c+ ^  +  1 ((7.k _ k .) )  > 0  (4.89)
0 V 0  P )  V0 0
It turns out tha t conditions (4.87 ) and (4.89 ) hold for any pair of positive values 
of (f)x and 0 7 r when the inverse of the elasticity of substitution is large enough. In 
particular when it satisfies the following lower bound25.
<P > ^ - j f -  (4-90)
Therefore, under this param eterisation the only condition th a t is relevant for de­
terminancy is (4.88 ). Notice th a t this condition coincides with the Taylor prin­
ciple when Ki = 0. This occurs when the degree of CS is 1 , (s =  1 ), since, 
Ki = A ( 1  — 7 ) ( 1  — s ) . Interesting, the model implies th a t the conditions for de­
terminacy under full CS coincides with those of a cashless economy, panel (a) of 
figure 4.7.
In a cashless economy, the domestic nominal interest rate affects the econ­
omy only through its effect on the dynamic IS curve, the same happens when s =  1 
in an economy with CS. In contrast, when s ^  1 , the area of determinacy is much 
smaller, panel b, figure 4.7. In this case, the domestic interest rate have a direct 
effect on inflation through the wedge th a t transaction cost generates between mar­
ginal cost and output gap. The effect of the domestic interest rate on inflation is
25 To understand why this is so, notice that condition (4.87 ) holds when {(3 a iK — Ki) > 0. Since, 
under our benchmark parameterisation, cr* =  (1 — 7 ) (1 — s), =  A (1 — 7 ) (1 — s) and k =
A (1 +  ip), we have that
(0<TiK -  Ki) =  (1 -  7 ) (1 -  s) A (/3 (1 +  (p)~ 1)
which is positive for values of <p that satisfy condition (4.90). Similarly, condition (4.89), holds 
when {aiK — Ki) =  A (1 — 7 ) (1 — s) 9? >  0, which is always true when <p >  0 . Therefore, 
the only condition that determines the set of parameter values for (f)x and (f>n that render the 
equilibrium determine is condition (4.88)
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Figure 4.7: Determinacy and Currency Substitution
a) CDI Policy Rule No Transaction Cost b) CDI Policy Rule CS=0.7
| Area of Determinancy 
| Area of Indeterminancy
Determinate
Indeterminate
larger, as the degree of CS decreases, /q is smaller. This additional effect of the 
domestic interest rate on inflation generates the possibility for indeterminacy of the 
equilibrium.
To see how this mechanism for indeterminacy works, le t’s suppose that 
the central bank observes a negative output gap, by the Taylor rule the central 
bank would reduce the interest rate, however this reduction on nominal interest 
rates leads to a lower inflation through a .^ This second round effect generates 
a further reduction on the nominal interest rate, since the central bank tries to 
stabilise inflation. When (px is large enough, the direct effect of nominal interest
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Figure 4.8: Determinacy and the Degree of Currency Substitution
a) C D I Policy Rule C S =0 .7  b) CD I Policy Rule C S =0 .85
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rates on inflation is larger than the indirect effect on output gap, therefore, the 
nominal interest rate and domestic inflation will keep falling and the central bank 
will not be able to stabilise the economy. This cycle leads to the indeterminacy of 
the equilibrium. Consequently, in economies with CS as the degree of CS falls the 
area of determinacy for the rational expectations equilibrium shrinks, this is shown 
in figure 4.8, panel (a)
On the contrary, when the degree of CS increases, falls, the area for 
determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium increases, figure 4.8, panel 
(b). This, however does not imply tha t the CS delivers a more stable economy. As 
we discussed in the previous section, the volatility of both inflation and output gap 
increases with the degree of CS. Therefore, even though CS allows the central bank 
to react more aggressively to stabilise output gap and guarantee the determinacy of 
the rational expectations equilibrium, at this equilibrium both the output gap and 
domestic inflation volatility would be larger.
117
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have developed a very tractable and fully micro-founded model 
of a small open economy with CS th a t can be used for monetary policy analysis. 
The model economy have a canonical representation analogous to their counterparts 
w ithout CS but differ from the la tter ones in two im portant dimensions: first, the 
foreign nominal interest rates appears as an endogenous cost push shock in the 
Phillips curve, where the magnitude of its effect on inflation depends on the degree 
of CS. Second, the domestic nominal interest rates has a direct effect on inflation, 
making less effective the use of the nominal interest rate for the control of inflation.
These new features th a t CS adds to a standard small open economy model 
have interesting implications for monetary policy. First, the central bank faces a 
trade-off between stabilizing inflation and the efficient level of output gap, where 
the magnitude of this trade-off depends on the degree of CS. In particular, as the 
degree of CS increases, the central bank have to  accept a higher volatility of output 
gap to  m aintain the volatility of inflation.
Second, CS increases the volatility of inflation, both domestic and CPI, 
and output gap under a variety typical interest ra te  target rules. Moreover, rules 
th a t smooth the nominal exchange rate perform worse than  those th a t allow more 
flexibility on the exchange rate. In particular, the volatility of inflation and output 
gap increases with the degree of smoothness of the exchange rate, similarly to the 
case of economies without CS. Therefore, CS does not justify ’’fear of floating” , 
smoothness of the exchange rate.
Finally, CS increases the area of determinacy for the rational expectations 
equilibrium under contemporaneous domestic inflation Taylor rules. In the limit, 
when there is full substitution of the domestic currency, the area of determinacy 
coincides with the one of a cashless economy, therefore the Taylor Principle holds.
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In contrast, when there is no CS, but money m atters in the dynamic equilibrium, 
the set of param eters th a t allow its determinacy shrinks. In particular, for a given 
reaction of the central bank to  inflation deviations, the central bank cannot react 
too much to  output gap to  guarantee equilibrium determinacy.
The model can be extended to  several directions. For instance, the as­
sum ption th a t transaction costs are rebated to  households can be relaxed. Also, 
the term s of trade distortion can be included to  analyse the interaction between 
this channel and CS. We leave these extensions for future research.
119
CHAPTER 5
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND DOLLARISATION
Chapter 2 presented some evidence suggesting th a t the degree of PD is related 
to  the country’s average income-levels. Casual evidence, furthermore, reveals th a t 
PD is concentrated mostly on goods whose demand is derived from the consump­
tion of high-income customers; and to a lesser extent on goods associated to the 
consumption of low-income customers, like necessity goods1.
Motivated by this evidence, this chapter develops a model where agents’ 
dollarisation decisions and income distribution are related. In particular, the model 
allows us to  study whether differences in income levels m atter for the pattern  of PD 
across type of goods and for agents’ portfolio decisions regarding foreign-currency 
denominated assets.
The model is an overlapping generation monetary model with two key as­
sumptions: a) prices are sticky, and b) agents’ preferences are non-homothetic2. 
The type of preferences is im portant in our modelling strategy since it allows dif­
ferences in income levels to play a role in consumption and portfolio decisions. In 
particular, under this type of preferences changes in agents’ income levels affect the
1 This pattern of PD is independent of the type of good being considered, whether goods are 
tradable or not tradable, or whether its purchase implies a large or small payment. For instance 
in Peru, firms offering education services set prices in different currencies depending on the 
location of the institution - in rich neighbourhoods prices are in dollars, whilst in poor ones 
prices are in pesos. Moreover, small transactions like haircuts are charged in dollars in some 
beauty shops located in rich neighbourhoods, and large transactions, like real estate, are priced 
in pesos in poor areas.
2 See Matsuyama (2000) and Matsuyama (2002) for macroeconomic models with non-homothetic 
preferences
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composition of agent’s consumption basket. As income rises the participation in 
the consumption basket of some goods rises, whereas th a t of the others fall3. The 
former are considered as luxury goods, and the latter, as necessity goods.
We introduce non-homotheticity as in Schmitt-Grohe et al. (2006) by 
assuming th a t agents need to consume a fixed minimum amount of each good to  
receive utility. This amount constitutes a subsistence point. Goods with larger 
subsistence points can be considered as necessity goods since agents’ consumption of 
these goods fall by less in states of nature where income is low. Whereas goods with 
low subsistence levels are considered as luxury goods because agents’ consumption 
of these goods increase (fall) by a larger proportion when income also increase (fall).
The key implication of this type of preferences for firms’ decisions is tha t 
it generates a  time-varying demand price elasticity, which depends on the income 
level of firms’ customers. In particular, the demand price elasticity increases when 
the income of firms customers increases. Firms produce differentiated consumption 
goods under monopolistic competition using labour and a constant returns-to-scale 
production function. Also, they can choose between a domestic and a foreign cur­
rency for invoicing4.
The main implications of the model can be summarised as follows. First, 
income distribution m atters for agents’ portfolio decisions. More precisely, a  low- 
income agent’s portfolio decisions are more sensitive to  the volatility of agent’s 
purchasing power, which is crucially determined by the degree of PD, and to a 
lesser extent to  the volatility of the exchange rate. High-income agents’s portfolio
3 This feature is in contrast to the case of homothetic preferences, where only the average level 
of income in the economy determines the demand for goods, and other moments of income 
distribution do not play any role.
4 One of the first works in invoicing decision theory is Klemperer and Meyer (1986), who discuss 
the decision between Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly competition under uncertainty. Other 
papers, such as: Giovannini (1988), Donnefeld and Zilcha (1991), Johnson and Pick (1997) and 
Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005), study the decision of pricing in the exporter’s or the importer’s 
currency under international trade. For general equilibrium Devereux et al. (2004), Loyo (2001) 
and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004).
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decisions, instead, respond more strongly to  the volatility of exchange rate than  the 
volatility of domestic prices, when forming their portfolios.
At the aggregate level, agents’ optimal portfolio decisions imply th a t FD 
is positively related with PD. The intuition for the existence of this link is simple. 
Since PD induces uncertainty in agents’ purchasing power, agents optimally choose 
their portfolio to  minimize the effect of this type of uncertainty on their consumption 
choice.
Second, th a t firms would optimally choose to invoice depending on the 
volatility of exchange rate, the correlation of their marginal costs with the exchange 
ra te  and on the degree of non-homotheticity of their custom ers’ preferences. In 
particular, we find th a t firms would have more incentives to invoice in dollars when 
the volatility of exchange rate is low, their marginal cost are highly positive cor­
related with the exchange rate and when the degree of non-homotheticity of their 
custom er’s preferences is relatively low.
An interesting result th a t helps to  explain some of the stylised facts on 
PD discussed above is th a t optimal firms’ invoicing decision implies, under certain 
conditions, th a t firms producing necessity goods would not choose to set prices 
in a foreign currency even when their marginal costs are highly correlated with 
the exchange rate. This result, couple with the implication of non-homothetic 
preferences th a t in low-income countries necessity goods represent a large share 
of the typical consumption basket, implies th a t PD does not have a large effect 
on the degree of exchange rate pass-through. This implication of the model is 
consistent with what is observed in Bolivia and Peru, where necessity goods, like 
food, represent more than  45 and 35 percent of their corresponding consumption 
baskets used to measure the CPI inflation; and the degree of pass-through is below 
20 percent, although the levels of FD are above 60 percent.
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In those economies then, monetary policy can operate when FD is high, be­
cause income distribution limits the effect of dollarisation on the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through to  prices5.
Why firms th a t have marginal cost highly positive correlated w ith the ex­
change rate do not choose to  invoice in dollars?. The answer is related to  the effect 
th a t exchange rate  movements have on firms’ profits when their customers have 
non-homothetic preferences. Under this type of preferences the exchange rate  does 
necessary have the beneficial effects on firms’ expected profits th a t otherwise it 
would generate, in particular, when firms’ marginal costs are highly correlated with 
the exchange rate.
In this case, invoicing in a foreign currency increases firms’ relative prices 
precisely in those states of nature where the demand-price elasticity is high, thus, 
increasing firms’ profit volatility. Therefore, when firms’ customers have non- 
homothetic preferences, firms’ expected profits are reduced under dollar invoicing 
relative to peso invoicing. For firms producing necessity goods the negative effect 
of invoicing in dollars dominates its positive effect on expected profits, hence, firms 
producing these type of goods may choose to  invoice in a domestic currency. For 
firms producing luxury goods, however, the oppositive happens.
Third, we find at the aggregate level it is possible to  obtain multiple equilib­
rium. Importantly, however, we find th a t the set of multiple equilibrium is reduced 
when firms’ customers have non-homothetic preferences. In particular, in this case, 
there exist an stable equilibrium where the degree of PD is determined by the size of 
the sector producing luxury goods. This result is interesting since it rationalises the 
fact th a t in economies where income distribution is unequal PD is not very large.
5 Gonzalez-Anaya (2002) provides evidence showing that low levels of PD coexist with high 
levels of FD for a large sample of dollarised economies. They measure price dollarisation by 
the short-run level of pass-through of the exchange rate. Also, see Armas et al. (2001), Miller 
(2003) and Winkelried (2003) for estimations of degree of exchange rate pass-through to prices 
for Peru.
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Our model is related to  previous work on endogenous dollarisation deci­
sions in general equilibrium frameworks. In particular to  Sturzenegger (1997) and 
Ize and Parrado (2002)6. In those two papers, endogenous dollarisation decisions 
are analysed but in different macroeconomic frameworks. Sturzenegger (1997) uses 
an endogenous cash-in-advance model to  analyse the welfare implications of en­
dogenous currency substitution. In his framework, the size of the transaction is 
the key feature in explaining the pattern  of dollarisation. Agents decide the cur­
rency in which to  trade comparing the fixed cost th a t implies trading in dollars 
with the cost of trading in domestic currency, the inflation tax. As the inflation 
tax  is proportional to  the value of the transaction, they show th a t expensive goods 
are endogenously traded in foreign currency since the benefit of trading with this 
currency (avoiding the inflation tax) exceeds its cost.
On the contrary, with cheap goods the cost of trading in dollars is higher 
than  the inflation tax, therefore the transaction is made using domestic currency. 
This approach, however, does not explain why small transactions associated with 
high-income customers are made in foreign currency. We instead consider th a t the 
size of the transaction is not the most im portant element in determining dollari­
sation patterns, but the interaction between the firm’s customers income-level and 
the optimal strategies of firms in setting prices.
On the other hand, Ize and Parrado (2002) use a representative agent
general equilibrium model to  analyse the interaction between PD, FD and monetary
policy. In their model, the decisions of FD and PD are endogenous decisions based
on minimum variance portfolios. They find th a t both  FD and PD respond to  the
variance of real exchange rate  and inflation, but PD responds as well to  monetary
policy and to the nature of the shocks. Since this model uses homothetic preferences,
it predicts homogenous pricing strategies for firms and consequently it is not able
6 Recent papers on dollarisation, such as Cespedes et al. (2004) focus more on the effects of 
liabilities dollarisation on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and in exchange rates 
regimes.
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to explain the pattern of dollarisation across types of goods.
Also, the model in this chapter is very closely related to the literature 
on endogenous exchange rate pass-through to prices, in particular to  Bacchetta 
and Wincoop (2005), Devereux et al. (2004), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2004). 
In all these models exporting and importing firms choose endogenously between a 
domestic and a foreign currency for invocing by comparing expected profits under 
each invoicing strategy. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) analyse this problem in a 
general equilibrium static framework, whereas Devereux et al. (2004), and Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2004) study this problem ina a dynamic general equilibrium setup.
This chapter is organised as follows: in section 5.1 we present the model. 
In section 5.2 we discuss the optimal financial and price dollarisation decisions of 
individual agents. Section 5.3 shows determ ination of the general equilibrium level 
of PD. Section 5.4 discusses the link between the degree of pass-through and the 
income level. Finally, section 5.5 presents some concluding remarks. The proofs of 
the propositions are detailed in the appendix C.
5.1 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of two overlapping generations, the 
young and the old. Each generation lives for two periods and it is composed by a 
continuum of agents of mass 1  indexed by their labour productivity levels 0 *, which 
are distributed according to F  (0) over the support [0,0], with 0  <  0 < 0 <  oo and
r&J0 QdF (0) =  1 . Agents, when they are young, supply labour inelastically to  firms 
and take portfolio decisions, whereas when they are old only consume a continuum 
of differentiated consumption goods.
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We restrict the set of assets available to  young agents to  fiat money, conse­
quently their savings are constituted only by their domestic currency money hold­
ings. Young agents have, however, the option of indexing their money holdings to 
the nominal exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate, et is defined as the price of 
the domestic currency in terms of the foreign one. In addition, it is assumed tha t 
the exchange rate  depreciation rate, denoted by , is normally distrib­
uted with a positive mean and constant variance, i.e ~  N(d, <r|). This variable 
represents the only source of uncertainty in the model. On the other hand, agents’ 
preferences over consumption goods are non-homothetic, which implies th a t agents’ 
income-level heterogeneity generates heterogeneity in agents’ consumption basket 
composition.
Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically com­
petitive firms using all types of labour supplied by young agents and a constant 
returns to  scale technology. One period in advance, these firms choose their prices 
and the currency for invoicing optimally.
The timing of decisions is as follows, first , before observing the realisation 
of the exchange rate, young agents choose the degree of indexation of their portfolios 
th a t maximises their next period expected utility. Simultaneously firms choose their 
optimal price and their currency for invoicing. Then the exchange rate is observed, 
firms produce at the pre-set prices and agents consume.
5.1.1 Preferences
Each agent i lives for two periods, t  and £ + 1 . W hen young, during period £, agents 
supply labour inelastically to  firms and take saving decisions. W hereas during 
period t +  1 , when they are old, agents consume a bundle of differentiated goods, 
X l+1. Preferences over the consumption bundle are defined by the following
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generic utility function,
V* =  0 E t U  (X '+1) (5.1)
where U is a continuous and concave function of X \.  On the other hand, the 
consumption bundle is a composite of a continuum of differentiated consumption 
goods defined by the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator,
where, e > 1  represents the elasticity of substitution across differentiated goods 
and 7 * a subsistence consumption level for good z. We follow Schmitt-Grohe et al.
As we show in the next sections, non-homotheticity has crucial implications for
income levels, how much it changes depends on 7 Z .
Goods with larger 7 * represent goods whose consumption is more a neces­
sity. This is so because when agents’ income falls their consumption of those goods 
falls by a smaller proportion in comparison with how much fall agents’ consump­
tion of goods with lower 7 Z. On the contrary when income rises, the expenditure on 
goods with lower 7 z increases by a larger proportion th a t the expenditure on those 
goods with larger 7 *.
During period t  agents receive dividends and wages according to their labour 
productivity, which is indexed by 0*. Since agents do not consume during this period 
they use all their income for savings. The only asset available for savings is money, 
consequently agents’ savings coincide with their money holdings at the end of period 
t, which are given by,
Where, Wijt represents agent’s i wages and D iit her corresponding dividends. In-
e
(5.2)
(2006) in using idiosyncratic subsistence levels to  model non-homothetic preferences.
the portfolio agent’s decisions and invoicing firms’ decisions. W ith this type of 
preferences, the households’ marginal valuation of different goods changes with their
M* =  (W* + D\) (5.3)
dividual’s dividends in tu rn  are defined in term s of agents’ labour productivity as
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follows,
D\ = 6iDt (5.4 )
Where D t represents aggregate dividends. A simple way to  rationalise this dividend 
rule is to  assume th a t workers receive a contingent bonus on the firm’s profit level. 
During period t  +  1, agents use their savings to  finance consumption expenditure. 
They face the following budget constraint,
J.1 Pt+i{z) c't+1(z)d(z) < M 't+i (5.5)P  C1-1 V / \  /    p'0 •* t+1 * t +l
where, Pt+i(z) represents the price of good z during period t  + 1, which is defined 
as follows,
Pt*{z)et + 1 if z  E T  
Pt{z) otherwise 
and Pt denotes the aggregate consumer price index given by,
Pt+l(z) = (5.6)
P t + 1 = f  P t W - d  (z) + f  (,P;{z)et+l) l~c d (z) 
JO Jv
11 —e
(5.7)
Here, T  is defined as the set of all firms th a t set prices in a foreign currency. This 
set has mass v  and measures the degree of price dollarisation in the economy. On 
the other hand, we denote by rf the fraction of money holdings of agent i indexed 
to the nominal exchange rate, her degree of financial dollarisation, and by M f,  her 
money holdings a t the end of period t, which is defined by,
£t+i —
et
(5.8)
Agents Consumption Decisions
The optimal amount of consumption for each type of differentiated good is obtained 
by minimising the expenditure of consuming the bundle X \.  From the first order 
conditions of this cost minimization problem, we obtain th a t the consumption of
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each differentiated good is decreasing on its relative price and increasing in the level 
of to tal consumption, as the next equation shows,
— £
° ^ (2) =  ( ^ r j  - X m + v , (5-9)
Notice th a t Cl+1(z ) is contingent on the realisation of the depreciation of the nom­
inal exchange rate because both, X \+l and p t + 1 depend on this variable. On one 
hand, P t + 1  is linked to  £f+i through the degree of PD. In this case, when a large 
fraction of firms find optimal to  invoice in a foreign currency the correlation between 
p t + 1 and £t+i is positive and high. On the other hand, X \+l depends on through 
agent’s porftolio decisions. If an agent choose to  index a large fraction of her money 
holdings to the exchange rate, then the correlation between X}+1 and would be 
also positive and high. To illustrate this la tter point le t’s link X \+1 and i f  using 
the agent’s budget constraint. By aggregating agent i consumption across type of 
goods we have tha t,
f  ^ f ^ - C ' t+1(z)d(z) =  X't+1 + f  (5.10)
Jo t-\-1 Jo t-\~ 1
Let’s denote by Q + 1  =  f*  Ptp ^  Q + i (z)d (z ) the to ta l consumption of agent i , 
and by 7 1+1 = f*  ~^ ~ Yzd(z), her subsistence consumption level. Hence, total 
consumption level for agent i is defined as follows,
Ci+1 = ^ 1 + T in  (5.11)
By using equation equations (5.11) and (5.8), equation (5.5), the budget constraint 
of individual i, can be w ritten as follows,
X lt+i = ~p^~ ( l  +  rf£t+i) — 7j+i (5.12)
The previous equation shows th a t for a given price level, when rf is large, 
the correlation between X lt+l and £t+i is also larger.
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Portfolio Decisions
The consumption level of agent z, CJ+ 1  depends not only on her income level but 
also on the realisation of the exchange rate. This latter variable affects consumption 
decisions through the portfolio choice of individuals, rf and also through the the 
degree of PD. In states of nature where the exchange rate  depreciates, those agents 
with larger rf would benefit more, since their income levels would increase more 
than  those who have chosen to index a lower proportion of their money holdings 
to  the foreign currency. The opposite would happen in the case of an appreciation, 
where agents with relatively low values for rf would face lower reductions in their 
income levels. Consequently, financial dollarisation become a crucial determ inant 
of both the expected level and the volatility of consumption.
Given the distribution function for the depreciation rate, contingent paths 
for Pt + 1  and Pt+\(z),  and a mass v  of firms th a t set prices in foreign currency, agents 
choose rf to maximise their expected discounted utility, equation (5.1), subject to 
the budget constraint, equation (5.12). The optimal rf th a t solves this problem is 
determined by the following condition,
rf = arg max PEtUl-srf1(1 + r,iej±^ r i ] ~'yl+1 ( 5 .1 3 )
In section 5.2.1 we fully characterise this decision and discuss its main 
implications.
5.1.2 Firms
Consumption goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms using 
labour and a constant return  to scale production function. Each firm uses a com­
posite of all types of labour available in the economy. Let’s define by ht (z) the 
amount of aggregate labour utilised by firm, z, and by 6l the marginal productivity
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of labour offered by agent z, then, the production function is defined as follows,
Yt{z) =  ( 7  e 'h iW d i]
Under these assumptions, the aggregate nominal wage rate, which for each firm 
represents their marginal cost, is given by,
w > =  ( j f  w t *
Where, individual wages are determined by the value of agent’s marginal produc­
tivity of labour,
W} =  PPt (5.14)
By aggregating this condition across types of labour we obtain,
Wt =  (jf 6'Ptd i \  = 9Pt (5.15)
Using, the previous equation to eliminate Pt from equation (5.14) we can write the 
agent’s z wages in terms of its productivity and aggregate wages as follows,
W} = P W t (5.16)
Before observing the realisation of the depreciation rate, an im portant decision 
th a t firms take is the currency on which they set prices. They can choose between 
a domestic and a foreign currency for setting prices one period in advance. Price 
rigidity is a key building block of the model, since when prices are flexible firms’s 
invoicing decisions do not have any meaningful effect on firms’s expected profits 
and consequently, firms are indifferent between invoicing in domestic or in foreign 
currency.
Aggregate demand for each type of good is obtained by adding up demand 
for goods across the distribution of individuals. For a typical firm, its aggregate 
demand function is defined as follows,
Ytd( z ) = ( Z & y  X t +  l z  (5.17)
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W here the aggregate subsistence level of good z, is defined as, j z = L  7‘d F P .  
Furthermore, we normalise the subsistence levels of good 2 , 7 *, as follows 7 * =  
7 1 X ,  where, 7 * <  1  and variables w ithout time subscript denote steady-
state  variables. This normalisation has the advantage of delivering analytical solu­
tions for the steady-state price level of each type of good.
Notice in equation (5.17) th a t because preferences are non-homothetic firms 
face a tim e varying demand-price-elasticity. As this equation illustrates, the to tal 
demand for good z  is given by the sum of two types of demands, one which has a 
constant price elasticity, e, and another which is completely inelastic. Consequently, 
w ith non-homothetic preferences the demand-price-elasticity of good z  is a weighted 
average of 0  and e where the weights th a t each of these values receives depend, 
amongst other factors, on the level of aggregate demand.
W hen X t is high, the weight th a t e has on the determ ination of the demand- 
price-elasticity is also high, increasing the demand-price-elasticity for good z. The 
opposite happens when, X t is low. To the extend th a t X t is positively correlated 
with the exchange rate so does the demand-price elasticity.
In particular, in states of the nature where the depreciation of the ex­
change rate increases (decreases) aggregate demand, the demand-price-elasticity also 
increases (decreases). Importantly, the effect of exchange rate on the demand-price- 
elasticity is stronger when j z is larger. This novel link th a t non-homothetic prefer­
ences generate between demand-price-elasticity and the exchange rate is a crucial 
determ inant of the firm’s invoicing decision, as we show in the next section.
Price Setting
One period in advance firms take two decisions, a) they choose the currency in which 
set prices and b) they pick up the corresponding optim al price level. At the end
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of period £, each firm chooses the price level, Pt {z), th a t maximises their expected 
profits. W hen setting prices in domestic currency, the firm’s expected profits is 
given by,
'  P ME t n t+i (z) =  Et (P,(z) -  Ww ) t+1 X t +1  +  7z (5.18)
and its corresponding first order condition by,
0 =  [ l - e ] P t ( z ) - 'E t (P?+1X t+1) +  (5.19)
ePt{ z ) - l~‘ E t {Wt+1P?+1X t+,) + lz
Whereas, when the firm is setting prices in foreign currency its expected profit 
function is given by,
Pt(z)*et + 1
E t ^ t + i  i z )  —  E t (P ;(z)e t+1 -  Wt+1) t+i X f + 1  +  7 2 (5.20)
where P t(z)  and IIJ+ 1  (z) represent the optimal price in foreign currency and the 
corresponding expected profit function, respectively. In turn , the first order condi­
tion th a t determines the optimal price in foreign currency is characterised by the 
following equation,
0 =  [1 -  s] Pt-(z )-£P ( (i?+1X t+1e ^ )  (5.21)
+ ePt(z) 1 £E t (et+j Wt+i P^+1X t+i) +  izEtet+i
conditions (5.19) and (5.21) determine, for firm 2 , its optimal prices in pesos and 
in dollars, respectively. The corresponding second order sufficient conditions are 
satisfied provided 7 z is not too large. For the case of domestic currency, 7 Z has to 
satisfy the following upper bound to  have a well defined maximisation problem.
W t+1 fP t( z )
l z  < E t X t+i (5.22)Pt(z) \ P t+1
Whereas, for the case of foreign currency price, the corresponding upper bound is 
given by,
Wt+i (  P t ( z )et+1l z  < E t
Pt*(z )et+1 t+i t+i
(5.23)
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Firms Invoicing Decisions
Firms choose the currency for invoicing by comparing the expected value of their 
profits when using pesos and dollars in setting their prices. Notice th a t although 
firms face the same cost structure, they will not choose the same pricing strategy, 
since they face different demand functions. In particular, firm z will choose to set 
prices in dollars, if and only if,
Etn;+1(z) > £ (n t+1(z) (5.24)
Where, E tTlt+i(z) and E tUl+i(z)  are defined in equations (5.18) and (5.20), respec­
tively. Firms maximise their profits taking as given, wages, the portfolio decisions 
of agents and 7 z . Using condition (5.24) we can define the dollarisation decision of 
firm 2: and the set T  th a t contains all firms which set prices in foreign currency, as 
follows:
ddt (z) = <
1 if E tTil+l{z) > E tUt+i(z)  
0  otherwise
T  =  {z  | ddt (z, rj) =  1 }
Consequently, degree of price dollarisation is given by the dimension of T,
v =  d im (T ) (5.27)
5.1.3 Market Clearing Conditions and Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the labour market is obtained by aggregating the condition 
(5.16), which implies tha t,
By further defining the aggregate demand level as:
X t = [  X}(z)di  (5.29)
Jo
and by aggregating the condition (5.17 ) we obtain the following aggregate resources 
constraint
Ct = Yt = X t +  7  (5.30)
where, Yt = Jq d z , and 7  =  f*  Pt^ 7zdz. On the other hand, the equilibrium
degree of financial and price dollarisation is determined by the solving the following 
fixed point problem,
v  =  dim (T (77(t>)) (5.31)
Given the income distribution, F (9),  and the distribution of the depreciation of 
the exchange rate, a rational expectations Nash equilibrium is defined as a set
of allocations {CJ},{Ct},{XJ}, {^J}, {Yt (z)}, {ddt (z)}, T , v  and 77; and prices,
{Pt(z)}, {P£(z)} ,Wt and {Pt} th a t satisfy conditions,(5.9), (5.30),(5.31), (5.12), 
(5.13), (5.17),(5.27), (5.31), (5.25),(5.19), (5.21), (5.28), and (5.7).
Since the model is highly non-linear, analytical solutions are not easy to 
obtain. For this reason, we use a log-linear approximation of the model around a 
deterministic steady-state to  obtain the equilibrium dynamics and a second-order 
approximation of the economy around the steady-state to  analyse agents’ portfolio 
and firms’ invoicing decisions7. The log-linear dynamic equilibrium of the economy 
is provided in appendix C.3, and it is used to calculate the second moments of the 
endogenous variables, which, in turn , allow us to  determine the equilibrium portfolio 
and invoicing decisions.
7 In a recent paper Devereux and Sutherland (2006) propose an algorithm to solve open economy 
macroeconomic models with endogenous portfolio composition, they show that it is enough to 
fully characterise the portfolio composition to approximate the up to first-order the equations 
that determine the dynamics of the economy and up to second-order, those that determine the 
agent’s portfolio choice
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5.2 Dollarisation Decisions: Partial Equilibrium
5.2.1 Portfolio Decisions
From equation (5.13), the first order condition th a t characterises the agent’s port­
folio decision is given by,
£t+iE t Ux (X t+1) = 0 (5.32)
Pt+1 .
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2006), we take a second-order approximation 
of equation (5.32), and a first-order approximation of the agent’s budget constraint, 
equation(5.12), to  obtain the agent’s optimal portfolio choice. In both cases we 
approxim ate these equations around the non-stochastic steady-state.
A critical issue, though, when approximating these equations is how to de­
term ine the appropriate steady-state value for the portfolio allocation, since this 
variable is undetermined at the non-stochastic steady-state. However, as Judd and 
Guu (2 0 0 1 ) show, it is still possible to  find an approximation point by locating a 
bifurcation point in the set of non-stochastic equilibria. Devereux and Sutherland 
(2006) show th a t the steady-state gross portfolio derived using their method corre­
sponds to  the approximation point derived by Judd and Guu (2001) method. In 
appendix C . 2  we proof th a t this is indeed the case in our model.
From now on, we use hats to denote deviations of variables with respect 
to  the steady-state values, i.e, x | + 1  =  H^ i— . The second-order Taylor expansion 
of the agent’s first order optimal portfolio condition evaluated at the steady-state, 
X  = X ,  n  =  n  and £ =  0, is given by,
— <rEt (xt+i£t+i) ~  Et (£t+ip^+i) =  0 (5.33)
where, a = u^ x . In turn, the corresponding linear approximation of budget
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constraint is given by,
( l  -  £ • )  $5 =  V % + i -  P t+ 1 -  Jo Pp ^ ! z ( P t + i M  -  P t+ 1) d ( z )  +  O  a ( II3)
(5.34)
The optimal degree of financial dollarisation of agent i is obtained by solving 
for the value of rf th a t satisfies equation (5.33) after obtaining E t (xt+1&+1 ) and 
Et (ft+i 7rt+i) using equation (5.34). The following proposition establishes the con­
ditions th a t determine the optimal degree of financial dollarisation, rf.
P ro p o s it io n  5 .2 .1 . The optimal degree of financial dollarisation of agent i, rf, is 
given by the following condition,
r f \ \  Etpt+i€t+i
t+ 1
k u :E t Z l  1 \J o  p C
See appendix C.2
Several interesting results follows from the previous proposition: first, when 
preferences are homothetic, 7 * =  0 , all agents have the same degree of financial 
dollarisation. Consequently, relatively poor and rich agents have exactly the same 
proportion of their savings indexed to a foreign currency. In this case, the degree of 
dollarisation of agent’s portfolio depends on the degree of PD and on the variance 
of the nominal exchange rate, as the next equation shows ,
i   ( -I \ ^tPt+l^t+1
P ~  V7 1 ) £ 2(rEt£t+i
The previous condition shows th a t agents choose higher degrees of financial dollari­
sation when the correlation between the consumer price index and the exchange rate 
is also higher. By indexing their savings to  a  foreign currency, agents protect the 
purchasing power of their money holdings against unexpected changes in domestic
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inflation8.
W hen preferences are non-homothetic, 7 * >  0, however, additional implica­
tions can be obtained from proposition 5.2.1. In this case, agents optimally choose 
different degrees of financial dollarisation. In particular, for agents with relatively 
higher income-levels, lower their degrees of financial dollarisation depend on a 
lesser extent on the degree of pass-through, measured by the correlation between 
the exchange rate and the aggregate price level. The opposite happens w ith low- 
income agents. In the limit, a very poor agent, whose consumption is very close to 
her subsistence level, ^ 7  —► 1 , the sensitivity of her portfolio choice to  the degree 
of financial dollarisation would reach its maximum value of 1. This la tter result 
follows directly from the fact when preferences are non-homothetic, the level of 
consumption th a t generates utility, X}+1 is more sensitive to  the depreciation rate 
for relatively low-income agents. Therefore, for those agents, the volatility of the 
exchange rate  has a greater negative effect on their expected utility.
5.2.2 Invoicing Decisions
To choose which currency to use as unit of account, firms compare the expected 
value of their profits under the two alternative pricing strategies, pricing in pesos 
and pricing in dollars. In particular, firm 0  will choose to  set prices in dollars, if 
and only if,
E tn i+1(z) > EtUH1{z) (5.35)
In order to  gain tractability and ease the interpretation of the determ inants of the
invoicing firm’s decision, as in the case of portfolio decisions, we take a second-order
Taylor approximation of both, IIt+i( 2:) and IIJ+ 1  (z) around a deterministic steady-
state and then, we use these approximated expected profit functions to  evaluate
8 Ize and Parrado (2002) find a similar result when analysing the dollarisation decision for wage 
setters. Different from them, in this chapter, this result is a particular case of a more general 
result where dollarisation decisions differ across agents depending on their income levels
138
condition (5.35). Also for clarity, in what follows we assume th a t E t£ =  0 The 
following proposition summarises the main result.
P ro p o s it io n  5 .2 .2 . A particular firm will choose to set prices in a foreign currency 
i f  and only i f  the following conditions holds,
0 <  - 7 * \Cov (£t+1x t+1) -  |  (V arft+i)]
~ l z  [eCov (6 +ipt+i) +  Cov£t+iwt+i]
+  (e -  1 ) ( c o v € t+iwt+1 -  i  (y a r^ t+ i)^
Proof See appendix C . 2  □
The condition established in proposition 5.2.2 has two components: the first 
one, depends crucially on 7 *, and it is associated to the time varying price elasticity 
th a t non-homothetic preferences generates. The second one, is independent of 7 *,
and it is determined by the cost structure of the firm. In the particular case of
homothetic preferences, i.e 7 * =  0 ,, the demand-price-elasticity is equal to e, and 
consequently the firm’s invoicing decision is only determined by the cost structure 
of the firm. In this case, a particular firm would set prices in dollars if the following 
condition holds
Et€t+iwt+i -  ^  [Var£t+i] > 0 (5.36)
Interestingly, this condition implies th a t setting prices in dollars would be 
a dominant strategy for firms when marginal costs are highly correlated with the 
exchange rate 9. By setting prices in dollars, firms with this cost structure generate 
a positive correlation between its revenues and its costs, which stabilise their profits 
and increase expected profits.
Setting prices in dollars, however, also increases the volatility of firm’s
revenue, which reduces expected profits. W hen the former effect is larger than
9 This condition is similar to condition (3.70) in chapter 3, and to those found by Devereux et 
al. (2004) and Loyo (2001) but using different macroeconomic frameworks.
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the la tte r one, firms find optimal to invoice in a foreign currency. This is exactly 
what condition (5.36) establish. Consequently, in this particular case, the model 
predicts th a t invoicing in a foreign currency would emerge only in sectors where 
firm’s marginal costs are highly correlated with the exchange rate, as it would be 
the case of the importing sector.
Let’s consider now the case of non-homothetic preferences, 7 * ^  0. In 
this case, the demand-price-elasticity is not constant, bu t it depends on aggregate 
demand, the aggregate price level and the firm’s pricing strategy. In particular, this 
price elasticity covaries positively with the aggregate demand and the aggregate 
price level.
As we have shown previously, when marginal costs are highly correlated 
with the exchange rate, setting prices in a foreign currency makes sense, because it 
allows firms to  stabilise expected profits. W ith non-homothetic preferences, how­
ever, the beneficial effect of invoicing in a foreign currency diminish, since, in this 
case, the demand-price-elasticity is time varying and correlated with the exchange 
rate. Through this link, when both Cov£t+iPt+i and Cov (£*+1 :2 7+1 ) are positive 
(negative), setting prices in dollars generate a positive(negative) correlation be­
tween the exchange rate and the time varying price elasticity, which in tu rn  in­
crease (reduces) the volatility of profits and, consequently, reduces (increases) ex­
pected profits.
This additional effect of the exchange rate on expected profits depends on 
the value of 7 *. Given th a t is idiosyncratic, firms choose, different invoicing 
strategies, even when they have the same cost’s structure.
In particular, provided, Cov£t+iw t+i > 0 , Cov (£*+1 :2 7+1 ) >  0, and condition 
of proposition (5.2.2) holds, only firms w ith a sufficiently small 7 * are likely to set 
prices in dollars. On the contrary, firms w ith a large 7 *, large enough to  violate 
the condition established in the previous proposition, find optimal to  set prices in
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domestic currency. This is a remarkable result, since, the la tter type of goods can 
be categorised as of more necessity than  those with low values of %. Hence, the 
previous proposition implies, under certain conditions, th a t only goods which are 
considered as relatively luxury are invoiced in dollars. In contrast, goods considered 
as necessity goods, those with larger values for 7 Z, are invoiced in domestic prices.
This implication of the model fits pretty  well the pattern  of dollarisation 
observed in economies like Bolivia and Peru, where, as we discussed previously, firms 
discriminate prices, by invoicing in dollars those goods consumed by high-income 
customers and in pesos those goods consumed mainly by low income customers, 
even when their marginal costs are highly correlated to the exchange rate.
The previous proposition also implies th a t there exist strategic complemen­
tarities amongst firms when choosing their invoicing strategy. In order to  visualise 
this implication, le t’s rewrite the condition established in the previous proposition 
as follows,
(Var£t+i)
0  <  - [ ( e - l ) - 7 z e]
2
- 7 zCov (£t+1x t+1) +  [(e -  1) -  7 Z (1 +  e)] Cov (&+iPt+1 ) (5.37)
Since the sufficient condition for the optimal price at the steady-state im­
plies th a t (e — 1 ) — 7 Z ( 1  +  e) >  0 , for a given 7 2, the previous condition is more 
likely to  hold when the degree of pass-through is higher. This is, when there exist a 
larger fraction of firms th a t set prices in dollars. Consequently, larger(smaller) the 
fraction of firms th a t set prices in dollars, more (less) likely th a t a t the margin a 
firm set prices in dollars.
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5.3 General Equilibrium
In this section we use conditions (5.27) and (5.25) to  solve for the equilibrium level 
of PD. To fully characterise condition (5.25), it is convenient to  rewrite condition 
(5.37) as follows,
(e -  1) (C ov(t+1wt+1 -  f i ^ t i l )  
l z  ~  e [Cov (wt+i£t+1) -  \  (Var£t+1)] +  Cov (ft+i^t+i) +  Cov (£t+1wt+1) 5^ '38^
Interestingly, the degree of FD, rj, affects the firms’ invoicing decision through its 
effect on Cov (£t+ix t+i). As it is show in appendix C.3, the degree of FD and the 
Cov (£t+iXt+i) are linked through the following condition,
Cov (&+ixt+i) = ( v ~  \ v )  -
where, Xp = f*  — and (pt is a variable th a t denotes relative price disper­
se *
sion, defined in the appendix previously mentioned.The degree of FD, rf however, is 
linked also to  PD. By aggregating the individual’s portfolio decisions, established 
by proposition 5.2.1, we obtain the following conditions for 77,
< 5 -3 9 >
Clearly, FD is increasing on the degree of PD. Consequently, PD and FD are si­
multaneously determined. To define this equilibrium, we express equation (5.38) in 
term s of deep param eters by eliminating the second moments th a t characterise con­
dition (5.38). We achieve this transformation by using the dynamics equilibrium 
of the economy, detailed in appendix C.3. After using this equilibrium to write 
Cov  (7nt+i ^ +i), Var(£t+1 ) and the Cov (£t+iu;t+i) as function of structural parame­
ters, the firm’s condition for invoicing in dollars would be given by as follows,
0 <  7 * (z, v) (5.40)
where
( a - l ) \
Using equation (5.39 )the optimal degree of financial and price dollarisation is ob­
tained as fixed point over the following set,
v  = dim (T) =  dim [{z | 0 <  7 * (z, u)}] (5-42)
Solving this fixed point is not a trivial task. Nevertheless, it is possible to  provide 
some qualitative implications of the model by analysing the determ inants of 7 *.
5.3.1 Benchmark case: Homothetic Preferences
In this case, the condition th a t characterizes firms’ optimal invoicing choice, the 
expected firm’s profit of invoicing in dollars relative to pesos, is given by,
E tn ;(z )  -  E tu t (z) =  -  0  >  0
Notice th a t since the invoicing decision of a particular firm depends on what other 
firms do, in particular on the fraction of firms th a t choose to  invoice in a foreign 
currency, u, there exist multiple equilibriums. According to this condition, a m ar­
ginal firm would find optimal to  invoice in dollars only when v  > 0.5. Otherwise it 
would choice to invoice in pesos. Therefore, there exist three possible equilibriums 
in this case, v  =  0, v  = 0.5 and v  =  1. These are depicted in figure 5.1 as points 
A, B and C. Two of these equilibriums are stable, points A and C; and one, B, is 
unstable:
1 . Point A, v  =  0 is an equilibrium point since a t this point, given th a t all firms 
have chosen to invoice in pesos, an individual marginal firm’s expected profits 
under peso invoicing are larger than  under dollar invoicing, thus, firms do not 
have incentives to  deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
2 . Point C, v  =  1  is also an stable equilibrium since, in this case, given th a t all 
firms have chosen to  invoice in dollars, any individual firm’s expected profits
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are large under dollar invoicing than  under peso invoicing, therefore, it has no 
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
3. Point B, v  = | i s  also an equilibrium. In this case, firms would be indifferent 
between choosing invoicing in pesos and in dollars, because its expected profits 
are exactly the same under these two strategies. Firms can coordinate in this 
equilibrium by playing mixed strategies by which each firm with probability 
0.5 chose to invoice in pesos and with probability 0.5 choose to  invoice in 
dollars. This equilibrium point, however, is not a stable one, since if a small 
mass of firms choose to  deviate slightly from its equilibrium strategy, all firms 
find optimal to deviate and therefore the equilibrium moves to  A or C in figure
5.1
5.3.2 Equilibrium with Non-homothetic Preferences
When preferences are non-homothetic the determ ination of the equilibrium PD is 
more complex. In particular, the equilibrium depend on proportion of luxury and 
necessity goods in the economy . To illustrate this point, we focus on a simple 2 - 
good economy case where a mass of ri\ firms produces good 1  and a mass of 1 — rii 
firms produces good 2. We further assume th a t good 1  is a necessity and th a t good 
2 is a luxury good. In this case, the equilibrium is determined by two conditions, 
the optimal invoicing choice of type - 2  firms, given by,
EtUl(z) -  Etn t(z) = fw -  0  > 0 
And the optimal invoice choice of type-1 , determined by the following condition
Figure 5.1: Equilibrium PD Homothetic Preferences
-2 Type1 firms 
 Typ^ firms
-3
0.5u 0.70.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9
Note: The vertical axis shows the relative expected gains of invoicing in dollars and the horizontal 
axis the degree of PD
Notice tha t this latter condition differs form the former one only when 
7 ^ 0  and cr > 1 . Otherwise, the equilibrium with non-homothetic preferences 
would be the same as the one with homothetic preferences. In what follows we 
focus the analysis on the case 7 ^ 0  and cr > 1 . A first interesting implication of 
non-homothetic preferences is tha t as the value of 7  increases, type - 1  firms would 
find optimal to invoice in pesos for a larger set of values of v. To see this point notice 
that the value of v  tha t makes type - 1  firms indifferent between invoicing in pesos 
and dollars is increasing on 7 . As figure 5.2 shows, for type - 1  firms it is optimal 
to invoice in pesos when v  G {va,vd)  whereas for type-2 firms this would be the
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case if v  G (v a ,v b ). Effectively then, non-homothetic preferences, by creating a 
time-varying price elasticity, reduce type - 1  firms’ incentives to  set prices in dollars. 
The set of equilibriums is depicted in figure 5.2. As this figure shows, besides A, 
and C, a new stable equilibrium arise in this case, point E, where, v  =  1  — n\. At 
this equilibrium all type - 1  firms choose optimally to  invoice in pesos and all type - 2  
firms choose to  invoice in dollars. This equilibrium holds when n\ > Instead, 
when rii < b  point B, is not anymore equilibrium. In this case, type-1 firms find 
optim al to  invoice in domestic currency regardless what type-2 firms do. Therefore, 
given th a t type - 1  firms chose to invoice in domestic currency, type - 2  firms would 
also find optimal to  do so and the equilibrium would be point A. Similarly, point 
D would not be an equilibrium either. In this case, the equilibrium would shift to 
point C.
An interesting implication of the previous results is th a t in poor economies 
where necessity goods, type - 1  goods, represent a large fraction of consumer’s ex­
penditures, n i —► 1, the degree of PD, v  = 1 — rii would tend to  be small. This key 
implication of the model is in line with the observed pattern  of PD in economies 
like Bolivia and Peru, low-income countries where the levels of PD are small besides 
the high levels of FD and CS. Next, we show how non-homothetic preferences have 
further implications for the degree of pass-through.
5.4 Implications for the Exchange Rate Pass-Through
A key implication of non-homothetic preferences in our model is th a t the structure 
of the consumption basket changes as agents’ income changes. In particular, the 
participation of necessity goods on the consumption basket fall as income rises. 
This implication is consistent with cross-country d a ta  on consumption basket com­
position, which shows th a t in developing economies the participation of food on
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Figure 5.2: Equilibrium PD Non-Homothetic Preferences
-2
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Note: The vertical axis shows the relative expected gains of invoicing in dollars and the horizontal 
axis the degree of PD
the average consumption basket is larger than in developed economies. To illus­
tra te  how the average income level affect the degree of pass-through, let’s define the 
following CPI index,
P c p i j  = [  a{z)Pt (z)dz 
Jo
where, a(z) = , represents the steady-state participation of good 2: in the
consumption basket of the representative agent. Using this definition of price index 
the degree of pass-through is defined by a  = a(z)dz.
Let’s further consider that there exist a continuum of economies, which are
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indexed by their average income level, • Using the steady-state calculated
in appendix C .l, it is easy to calculate the weighs a ( l )  and a ( 2 ) for the two-good 
economy described in the previous section. The steady-state equilibrium price levels 
of economy j  are given by,
and their corresponding consumption levels, by
To ease the exposition of the link between income levels and the degree of pass­
through, we calculate the degree of pass-through, a  (2 ) for a set of calibrated 
economies. Since the analytical solution for this param eter value is highly non­
linear, to gain in clarity we calibrate its solution using the following values e = 1 0 , 
7 i =  0.3, and 9j = [1 : 10].
As figure 5.3 illustrates the degree of pass-through is decreasing on the 
country’s income level. For low-income countries, the degree of pass-through is 
below the degree of PD, whereas the oppositive is true for high-income countries.
This novel result fits very well the pattern  of dollarisation in countries like 
Peru and Bolivia. These are low-income economies, where the degree of PD is 
relatively large, but the degree of pass-through is much lower. This implication 
also explains why the degree of pass-through across regions in countries like Peru, 
as section 2.3 shows, is negatively correlated to their corresponding average-income 
levels.
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Figure 5.3: Pass-Through and Average Income
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Note: The vertical axis shows the degree of pass-through and the horizontal axis the country’s 
income level
5.5 C o n clu d in g  R em ark s
This chapter develops a simple overlapping generations model tha t allows a com­
prehensive analysis of both agent’s portfolio decisions and firm’s invoicing problem. 
The model shows tha t PD induces FD. A high degree of PD induces agents to save 
in foreign-exchange indexed assets to avoid the effect of unexpected movements 
in the exchange rate in their purchasing power. The portfolio decision of agents, 
though, depends on their income levels. Low-income agent’s FD decisions are more 
sensitive to the degree of PD, whereas those of high-income agents to the expected 
exchange rate depreciation and its volatility.
Also, the model provides a rationale of why prices of necessity goods tend
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to be set in domestic currency, even when firms face marginal costs in foreign 
currency. At the aggregate level, this result implies th a t the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through into prices has an upper bound which depends on the average 
income level.
Two features of the economy tu rn  out to  be critical in limiting the scope 
of a foreign currency in performing the function of unit of account, sticky prices 
and income distribution. On one hand, the combination of sticky prices and un­
certainty about the exchange rate turns the invoicing decision of firms meaningful. 
Hence, setting prices in a foreign currency may become, under certain conditions, 
a dominant strategy for firms. On the other hand, differences in custom er’s income 
and non-homothetic preferences generate a time varying price elasticity of demand, 
which reduces the benefits of setting prices in a foreign currency.
Although the model is highly stylised, we believe it captures reasonable well 
the main stylised facts of PD. However, we would like to  explore some extensions 
to the model, in particular, we would like to  provide a numerical solution of the 
general equilibrium implied by the model. Also, the use of alternative type of 
non-homothetic preferences are considered in our future research agenda
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CHAPTER 6
INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY AND DOLLARISATION
PERSISTENCE
In this chapter dollarisation means deposit dollarisation1 which leads eventually 
to  credit dollarisation and to  the vulnerability of the financial system of highly 
dollarised countries. As stressed by Cook (2004) and Cespedes et al. (2004), the 
efficacy of monetary policy in small open economies with flexible exchange rates 
is compromised by the negative balance sheet effects generated by dollarisation. 
In this case, sudden real depreciations can have detrim ental consequences on the 
economic activity by reducing the net worth of firms and generating adverse effects 
on investment. This situation gives a rationale for a “fear of floating” behavior of 
central banks, Calvo and Reinhart (2002); Moron and Winkelried (2005).
One of the most salient features of dollarisation, and probably the one tha t 
causes more concern to  policymakers, is its persistence. It is well documented tha t 
dollarisation increases sharply during episodes of unduly macroeconomic instability 
and th a t it remains stubbornly high even after successful stabilizations . 2 A prima  
facie explanation of the hysteresis is lack of confidence in domestic currency assets 
as a result of the traum as brought by past inflation, devaluations, banking crises, 
and so on. This, however, is not very consistent with the strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals observed in several highly dollarised countries, notably Peru and some
1 This is also known as asset substitution Reinhart et al. (2003) or financial dollarisation Ize 
and Levy-Yeyati (2003).
2 See Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Savastano (1996), Quispe (2000) and Kamin and Ericsson
(2003).
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transition economies in the early 2000s.
An alternative avenue to address this puzzle is to  adapt the existing cur­
rency substitution literature based on adjustm ent costs or network externalities. 
G uidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Sturzenegger (1997) and Uribe (1997) develop mod­
els where the cost of using the dollar for transactions depends negatively on the 
aggregate currency substitution ratio, so once transactions get dollarised, there is 
no benefit to  switch back to  using domestic currency if others continue using dollars. 
An obvious limitation is th a t this approach refers to  the medium-of-exchange and 
not to  the store-of-value function of money. Moreover, these models rely heavily on 
a knowledge stock th a t drives the persistence (a “ratchet variable”), so even though 
they can neatly explain upward trends in the depth of dollarisation, they are not 
useful in explaining how to  de-dollarise, as this may imply an implausible reduction 
in the knowledge stock.
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) provide a different framework for modelling 
dollarisation. They derive a minimum variance portfolio (MVP) th a t depends on the 
relative volatility of inflation and real depreciation rates. Dollarisation would persist 
even when inflation is low and stable insofar as the real depreciation volatility is 
smaller than  th a t of inflation. However, this framework is static whereas persistence 
is inherently a dynamic phenomenon. In our view, the MVP approach, which is 
now very popular and has proven successful in explaining cross-sectional variation 
of dollarisation levels, 3 was not designed to  deal with dynamics, since the MVP, the 
underlying equilibrium level of dollarisation, depends on unconditional moments .4
Curiously, the fact th a t researchers have apparently overlooked is the very
3 Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) provide empirical evidence that the MVP has some explanatory 
power for the average level of dollarisation across countries. De Nicolo et al. (2005) extends 
this empirical analysis by considering a broader set of countries.
4 Dollarisation hysteresis is observed in several countries with high real exchange rate volatility, 
e.g. Russia. The reason of this apparent contradiction with the portfolio approach may be 
that it is very difficult to get a sound estimate of the unconditional variances that compose the 
MVP.
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nature of the participants of the dollar deposit market in dollarised economies: de­
positors are extremely heterogenous, ranging from large entrepreneurs to  small firms 
to  non-profit organizations and to individuals (rich and not-so-wealthy ) . 5 Partici­
pation costs in the dollar market are virtually nil due to  liberalization, deregulation 
and, importantly, due to  the emergence of informal currency traders -  known as 
cambistas in many Latin American countries -  who benefit from buying and selling 
dollars with tighter markups than  those in the banking sector . 6 A typical cambista 
would hold a limited amount of money for business (say, between US$2,000 and 
US$5,000) as she is aiming to  meet the dollar demand of individuals or small firms, 
normally unwilling to  pay the higher bank premium to get their savings dollarised . 7 
As a result, participation becomes independent of the scale of the transaction and 
hence widespread.
The aim of this chapter is to  draw attention to  the fact th a t heterogene­
ity of depositors can easily explain the persistence of financial dollarisation. As 
pointed out by Granger (1980), differences in individual dynamics lead to aggregate 
persistence. Thus, as it is reasonable to  expect th a t the dynamics of the optimal 
currency portfolio of a financial expert differs from th a t of a blacksmith, a persistent 
aggregate dollarisation ratio arises naturally. There are of course various differences 
between a financial expert and a blacksmith, but provided th a t both access the dol­
lar deposit market almost for free, the relevant difference to  our analysis centers 
in their ability to  process information and, therefore, to  take informed portfolio 
decisions . 8
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.1 we briefly
5 An exception is Sturzenegger (1997) who studies the implications of income inequality on cur­
rency substitution, yet with no reference to deposit dollarisation.
6 Agenor and Haque (1996) provide an account of informal currency markets.
7 Even large firms may find it profitable to trade with a pool of (well-organised) cambistas.
8 Surely, income differences can also be important if the income gap between the financial expert 
and the blacksmith is wide. However, we find that in dollarised economies the dollar deposit 
participation of (many) firms and (a lot of) individuals can be taken roughly as having the same 
importance.
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explore these issues using Peruvian and Polish d a ta . 9 For reasons explained be­
low, these cases illustrate nicely our claim about the interplay between individual 
heterogeneity and aggregate persistence. Besides, it gives us an idea of how the 
dollar deposit markets in representative countries are shared amongst various types 
of depositors.
In section 6.2 we develop a stylised model where agents face noisy infor­
mation and differ in their ability to  forecast when taking portfolio decisions. An 
im portant result from this setup is th a t the dynamics of the individual’s optimal 
portfolio depends on her prediction errors of future dollar returns. It turns out th a t 
it is optimal for agents to be cautious when modifying the currency composition 
of their deposits as there is uncertainty on the quality of the data  agents receive. 
This caution is reflected in portfolios th a t may adjust in a relatively slow fashion. 
Finally, we show th a t upon aggregation of the individual dollarisation decisions it 
is possible to  generate a  very persistent economy-wide dollarisation ra tio . 10
In section 6.3 we test the empirical hypotheses of the theoretical model and 
find supportive evidence from aggregate d a ta  of three Latin American countries 
and Poland. The results suggest th a t the distributions of “forecasting abilities” 
behind the aggregate dollarisation ratios are very widely spread. We regard this 
result as consistent with the idea of financial experts sharing the dollar market with 
blacksmiths who save in dollars. In section 6.4 we discuss possible extensions to  the 
analysis. Section 6.5 concludes and gives policy recommendations. Derivations and 
complementary results are shown in the appendix D.
9 The figures used in section 6.1 come from the Central Bank of Peru and the National Bank of 
Poland. The facts discussed there are recorded in the annual reports of these institutions.
10 Our approach is related to other branches of the literature. For instance, Lewbel (1994) uses ag­
gregate information to test heterogeneity on consumption dynamics whereas Michelacci (2004) 
explains the high degree of persistence of output with the cross-sectional heterogeneity of pro­
ductive firms.
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6.1 Two Illustrative Cases
As documented by Savastano (1996), dollarisation emerges progressively in response 
to  macroeconomic instability, particularly high levels of inflation, showing a well- 
defined pattern: first agents replace domestic currency as reserve of value, holding 
usually dollars outside the financial system ( “under the m attress” ). Then, the dollar 
is used in some transactions, typically involving real estates and durable goods, and 
eventually some prices are set in dollars. Most governments later on allow banks to  
issue deposits in foreign currency to  avoid financial disinterm ediation . 11 The actual 
experience of various countries shows th a t within a year an economy can increase 
its dollarisation ratio  enormously, see Figures 6.1(a) and 6.2(a).
On the other side, episodes of dedollarisation (i.e., a sustained reduction in 
the dollarisation ratio) are not very common and thus there is no well-established 
pattern  in the literature. Yet, if ever happened, the dedollarisation process is likely 
to be slow. The analysis of these events, as opposed to  the increase of dollarisation, 
provide very useful information about the way different depositors decide the cur­
rency composition of their savings and on how they respond to  news coming from 
the macroeconomic environment.
6 .1 .1  Peru in the Early 2 0 0 0 ’s
Although the Peruvian dollarisation experience shares various of the aforementioned 
features, it has its own appeal . 12 As shown in Figure 6.1(a), in 1991 (after a four­
digit hyperinflation in 1990) the ratio was 60% and has remained fluctuating roughly 
between 65% and 70% for a decade. Since 2000, it has shown a sustained reduction 
to about 50% in 2005. Of course, 50% is still a big number, but there are some 
interesting facts behind this recent drop.
11 See also Kamin and Ericsson (2003), De Nicolo et al. (2005) and Levy-Yeyati (2006).
12 See Quispe (2000) for a careful historical account of the dollarisation experience in Peru.
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There are a t least two forces driving this decrease. Firstly, after 8  years 
of announcing inflation targets within a monetary targeting regime (since 1994) 
and after 5 years of having achieved a one-digit inflation rate, the Central Bank 
announced the adoption of a fully fledged inflation targeting regime in 2002. This 
has helped to  anchor inflation expectations and has reduced inflation and nominal 
interest rate volatility. Secondly, between 2001 and 2005, the nominal and real 
exchange rates have appreciated (6.2% and 5.1%) as a result of a very favorable 
foreign environment: increasing terms of trade leading to  an export boom and very 
low international interest rates. In a nutshell, the real return  to  holding deposits 
dollars vis-a-vis holding deposits in domestic currency has fallen considerably in the 
early 2 0 0 0 ’s.
Figure 6 .1 (b) shows deposit dollarisation by type of deposit: demand, sav­
ings and a breakdown of tim e deposits in certificates, “CTS” and others. A glimpse 
of the figure reveals th a t both  demand and “CTS” deposits have not reacted to the 
recent change in the dollar real return trend. Demand deposits accounts for about 
2 0 % of to tal deposits and as the most liquid, almost transactional kind of deposit 
the flat pattern  is justified. On the other side, the CTS is the Peruvian version of 
an unemployment insurance; by law, it is hold exclusively by individuals and can 
be claimed only when an individual becomes unemployed. The CTS deposits have 
reacted even less than  the demand deposits, which is puzzling.
The figure also shows a m oderate downward trend in the savings and other 
time deposits. About 80% of the saving and roughly half of the other time deposits 
are held by individuals. From 2001 to  2005 both ratios have decreased in about 
10%. W hat is remarkable from Figure 6.1(b) is the strong reaction of the certificate 
of deposits ratio which has fallen in almost 40%, and with no doubts is driving the 
fall in the aggregate ratio of Figure 6.1(a). The interesting fact is th a t although the 
certificate of deposits have similar term  than  the CTS and the other time deposits, 
they are mainly held by firms and not individuals.
156
Figure 6.1: Deposit Dollarisation in Peru
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6.1.2 P o la n d  T ow ards a  M a rk e t E conom y
The Polish experience is regarded as the most successful shift from a planned to a 
market-oriented economy, and is a thriving example of dedollarisation. By the end 
1980’s, Poland was on the verge of a profound economic crisis. The huge distortions 
on relative prices and the cumulative fiscal deficits, inherited from the years of 
central planning, induced a rapid increase in inflation that reached its historical 
maximum of 550 percent in 1989. In response to this unstable macroeconomic 
environment, dollarisation ratios increased rapidly, from levels around 20% in 1985 
to a peak of 60% in 1989. This is shown in Figure 6.2(a).
After the introduction of a series of pro-market reforms and of a stabilization
program (the so-called “shock-therapy”),13 dollarisation ratios dropped to averages
13 A drastic series of institutional and market reforms were put in place in 1990: the government 
liberalised controls of almost all prices, eliminated most subsidies, abolished administrative 
allocation of resources in favor of trade, promoted free establishment of private businesses, 
liberalised the system of international economic relations, and introduced an internal currency 
convertibility with a currency devaluation of 32%.
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Figure 6.2: Deposit Dollarisation in Poland
(a) Dollar deposits to M2 (b) Dollarization of banking deposits
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of 40% percent by the end of 1993, hand-to-hand with the reduction of inflation 
(from 500% to 36%). As the macroeconomic conditions kept improving, additional 
institutional reforms were put in place. Notably, in 1997 the National Bank of 
Poland was granted independence and a well-defined objective: to guarantee price 
stability, dollarisation decreased even more reaching by 2 0 0 1  the level of 18%, 
comparable with tha t of developed European economies, as the UK.
A common feature of the Polish experience with the Peruvian one discussed 
above is the observed heterogeneity of dollarisation dynamics amongst type of de­
posits. Figure 6.2(b) reveals tha t by the end of 1993, the difference between the 
dollarisation ratios of households and firms was of the order of 70% for time deposit 
and 40% for demand deposits. These differences remained on the range of 20% for 
more than 4 years.
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6.1.3 Moral
The differences between how individuals and firms decide their portfolio composition 
is obvious. Usually firms have more resources allocated to  the management of their 
funds, whereas individuals often base their decisions on their experience, those of 
some neighbors and their limited access to information. Moreover, the decision­
making even within firms or within individuals is likely to  be dissimilar. Our brief 
inspection of the Peruvian and Polish experiences illustrates our main claim tha t 
these differences accounts for much heterogeneity in dollarisation decisions. We 
next analyze how this translates into persistence.
6 .2  A Simple Model
We use a simple framework to  show how the combination of imperfect, noisy infor­
mation on real returns of foreign assets, and specially the heterogeneity amongst 
market participants can generate a persistent degree of dollarisation.
The model economy is populated by a number of almost identical individ­
uals. They share the same endowment, which is normalised to  one, and the same 
preferences, bu t they differ in their ability to  process information and therefore in 
their expectations on future outcomes . 14
Agents choose every period the composition of their portfolio between two 
assets, one th a t offers a fixed real return R p which is denominated in domestic 
currency (pesos from now on) and the other denominated in dollars with real return 
R^ . The real ex-ante excess of return of the dollar over the pesos asset is simply
D  __ d D  T)Pi t f  — rtf. — i t  .
14 Our analysis hold for agents with heterogenous endowments, i.e. wealth/income inequality, 
as long as they are correlated with the abilities to process information. See appendix D.3 for 
details.
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6.2.1 Portfolio Decision
Depositors are risk adverse. Individual i devotes an amount x it of her savings to the 
dollar asset and the remaining 1 — x^  to  purchase the asset in pesos. We follow Ize 
and Levy-Yeyati (2003) in postulating a standard mean-variance utility function. 
The portfolio decision is ex-ante and based on imperfect information on real returns, 
so utility for individual i is defined in terms of the conditional expectation for period 
t +  1  with information up to period t , 15
Uit =  E t [xitR ?+ 1 +  (1 -  x it)R p] -  0.5var* (xitR p+ 1 +  (1 -  x it)R p ) (6 .1 )
=  E t [xitR t + 1 +  R p] -  0.5vart (xitR t+i) =  xuht+i + R P ~  0.5(xit)2Vit+i
where and Vn+\ are the mean and variance of the excess return R t th a t indi­
vidual i expects for period t - 1- 1 , conditional on information up to  period t.
The value of xa  th a t maximises (6.1) is
Xit  =  —  (6 .2 )
Vit+ 1
Thus, agents will increase their dollar deposits when they expect a higher real return 
on this asset for the same expected variance, or when they expect a lower variance 
given a level of excess of returns.
6.2.2 Forecasting
As equation (6 .2 ) reveals, the only relevant pieces of information for portfolio deci­
sions are the ex-ante excess return and its variance. To make things easier, consider 
th a t each agent focuses directly on forecasting R t , and not on forecasting its compo­
nents (R ^  or R p , which may imply forecasting inflation, depreciation, confiscation 
risk and so on), and assume th a t R t follows a general A R (1 ) process
R t + 1 = fi(l -  a) + a  R t + wt+i wt ~  iid(0 , cr^) (6.3)
15 We have imposed a value of one to the risk aversion parameter in the utility function. This 
assumption is harmless to our results.
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In period t, the excess return R t cannot be perfectly observed. W hat agents observe 
is an idiosyncratic noise-ridden version of R t , Su = Rt + Sit where £u ~  iid(0 , o f j .  
Our assumption th a t agents receive different signals can be easily rationalised as 
a reduced form of a problem where agents face a common signal, but they have 
different capacity for processing aggregate information. As in Sims (2003), when 
agents face limited capacity for processing information, they would choose optimally 
how much effort to  allocate in certain activities, as portfolio management. Since 
individuals face different resources and capacity constraints, when agents have to 
invest real resources to  increase its capacity for processing information on manage­
ment activities -  for instance, to  learn how to  read and interpret financial news -  
they can rationally choose to  allocate different capacity for processing information 
on this activity, therefore agents would eventually face different signals.
Each individual has a forecasting model of the form
R t+l = n ( l - a )  + a R t + w t+ 1  wt ~ i i d ( 0 ,a l )
(6.4)
S it = Rt + tit eu ~  Hd(fi, of*)
Since Su is a noisy indicator, individual i has first to  extract R t from Su  (i.e., 
“nowcasting” ) and then forecast its mean and variance to  implement (6 .2 ). Define 
Qi = aw /aei as signal-to-noise ratio which plays a key role in determining how the 
noisy observations are weighted for signal extraction and prediction. The higher is 
qi the more past observations are discounted in forecasting the future. As it can be 
seen from (6.4), each individual is given a value of qi to  perform her predictions, and 
this value alone determines the whole forecasting model. This is the only source 
of (cross-sectional) heterogeneity in this setup. Everything else -  a, ijl, a^ and the 
process (6.3) -  is of common knowledge across individuals.
T hat individuals are heterogenous in their ability to  extract information 
from their signal rationalises in a simple manner the fact th a t those with high qt (the 
financial experts) are able to  extract more information from the noisy indicator Su 
than  those with low qi (the blacksmiths). In contrast to the latter, the former might
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be able to  distinguish whether changes in Su reveal underlying movements in R t or 
are just due to  noise. This in tu rn  implies differences in the speed in which short- 
run forecasts are adjusted as new information becomes available, and translates 
directly to  portfolio differences amongst market participants. We interpret this 
heterogeneity as differences in the ability people have to forecast
Define f#: the optimal predictor of R t conditional on the information of 
agent i available at time t  — 1 , i.e. conditioned on S it and Vu = E t [(Rt — fu )2] as its 
mean squared error (MSE). Standard results from the signal extraction literature 
lead us to  the optimal prediction rule16
fit+i = f i ( l - a )  + a  f it -I- kit(Sit -  fu) = p ( l  -  a) +  (a  -  k it) f it +  kitS it (6.5)
where the forecasted value of R t for next period is the projection of today’s fore­
casted value plus a correction, an updating th a t is proportional to the latest pre­
diction error incurred (Su — fu ) - 17 The value of ku , the Kalman gain, is given by 
the (adjusted) ratio of the MSE of fu  to the variance of the noisy indicator,
kit = a  ( — -£—2 ) (6-6)\ v u  +  (Jtij
The MSE of fu  evolves according to  the following recursion
v i t (c?o%  +  a l )  +  a & l  (a ^
v « + i -------------------. . .  , _2---------------  b^ - ' )vit ~r crei
For expositional convenience define Vu = vita~^. Then, (6.7) becomes
vit(a2 +  qf) +  Qi ( c o ^
Vit+l =  — —  (6-8)vit + 1
16 The reader that is familiar with state-space modelling will note that the recursions (6.5) and 
(6.7) above are straightforward applications of the Kalman filter. See Ljungqvist and Sargent 
(2000, ch. 2 and ch. 21) and Harvey and De Rossi (2006) for further details.
17 It is important to emphasise that fu  represents the best forecast of Rt conditional on information 
up to period t  — 1. Since portfolio decisions are to be taken one period in advance, they do 
not incorporate the information contained on the signal Su, but this information is taken into 
account to improve the next period’s forecast of Rt+i-
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It is clear from equation (6 .8 ) th a t ViT + 1 =  f{v iT). There is a fixed point such 
th a t Vi = f ( v i ) 18 and moreover, since f'{vi)  <  1  it is globally stable: regardless of the 
initial condition Vio we have th a t ViT —► Vi and consequently kiT —> ki = avi(v i + 1 ) - 1  
as r  —► oo. This means th a t as r  becomes larger, i.e. as each individual has 
performed the signal extraction exercise a number of times, the updating process 
defined in (6.5) and (6.7) converges to  an equilibrium rule . 19 If it is assumed tha t 
this recursive process was initialised long before period t  then v# (or vn) and ku 
can be safely treated as constants tha t depends on This fact simplifies the 
calculations considerably without compromising our conclusions.
To have a better grasp of the way heterogeneity amongst agents affects 
their forecasts (and portfolios), assume for a moment th a t a  —► 1 and solve (6.5) 
recursively to  get
oo
f*it+1 = hi  ^ (^1 h y S i t - j
j =0
It is clear from this geometrically distributed lag expression th a t different draws of 
qi (and hence of ki) are associated with different ways of weighting the available 
information (the noisy indicators up to period t) in order to  produce a forecast. 20
18 The fixed point is the positive root of v \  +  [(1 — a 2) — qi\vi — qi — 0.
19 Convergence is monotonic (viT >  ViT+i >Vi )  because ViT+ 1  is based on more information than
ViT.
20 As noted in Harvey (1989, ch. 4), the forecasting model converges to the popular Exponential 
Smoothing method (ES) if a  —> 1 . However, the scheme explained here is optimal in the sense 
that it minimises the one step ahead MSE, whereas ES is basically ad hoc.
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6.2.3 Individual Dynamics
Using the fact th a t vit —► Vi, ka —> ki and the optimal updating/forecasting rule
(6.5), the optimal dollar investment (6.2) boils down to
=  I « ± i  =  t m  =  +  { a - k i ) ( ! A  +  (  ! l )  Si t  (6.9)
V it+ l Vi Vi \ V i J  \ V i J
After plugging (6.5) into (6.9), we get
^ it  — 1 Ci b iS it (6 .10)
where a* =  (a  — ki), Ci =  //( 1 — a )v ~ 1 and bi = (i>i +  l ) -1 . The individual’s 
dollarisation ratio follows an autoregressive process and, as such, exhibits some 
degree of persistence th a t depends on ki. It is easy to  show th a t ki is increasing in qi, 
which implies th a t the individuals w ith higher qi (those who gain more information 
from the signal each period) have less persistent dollarisation ratios. As (6 .1 0 ) 
shows, the higher the ki, the lower the degree of persistence of dollarisation ratios. 
Furthermore, individuals with low qi will tend to consider the dollar asset as less 
risky, since they would attach a higher fraction of the variance of the signal to the 
noise and not to  real excess return.
The dynamics of individual dollarisation decisions shows th a t with noisy 
signals of returns, individuals have to  rely on past information to optimally forecast 
them, and have to  react with caution to  news. To the extent th a t past portfolio 
decisions contain past information of returns, it becomes optimal for individuals to 
make their dollarisation ratios depended on past dollarisation ratios . 21 Thus, our 
simple model shows th a t noisy information can render not only persistence but also 
an higher individual dollarisation ratio.
21 A similar result but in a different setup can be found in Aoki (2003). In that paper the central 
bank sets interest rates in an environment with noisy information on output and inflation. The 
optimal policy rule implies some persistence coming from the cautiousness that the lack of 
perfect information demands.
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6.2.4 Aggregate Dynamics
In a static world the effects of aggregation are well-known: it tends to  smooth away 
individual erratic movements and to  fill in discontinuities th a t may be present at 
the disaggregate level. W ithin a dynamic framework, aggregation also increases 
persistence . 22 To see why consider a group of individuals who hold a small amount 
of the dollar asset and face an aggregate shock th a t makes it more attractive (e.g., 
a strong real depreciation). According to  (6.10), these individuals will increase 
their dollar holdings immediately. But then, they will also revise their expectations 
about future returns in favor of the dollar asset, thereby perpetuating the impact 
effect of the shock on aggregate dollarisation. Thus, the m oderate persistence in the 
individual portfolio formation due to  the lack of perfect information, summarised 
in equation (6 .1 0 ), is exacerbated by aggregation . 23
Consider th a t qi is drawn from a distribution such th a t the cdf of a* is 
F(a). To better understand the workings of aggregation and how aggregate data  
can help us to  draw conclusions about the underlying heterogeneity in dollarisation 
decisions, it is convenient to  focus for a  moment on the case where the aggregate 
signal, Su is an iid  sequence. We then relax this assumption.
Aggregation W hen Signals Are i i d
Appendix D .l shows th a t aggregation of (6.10) across the distribution of a renders 
the following process for the economy-wide dollarisation ratio X t ,
oo
Xt = Y JAjXt^  + C + Ut (6.11)
3= 1
22 The classic reference for the econometrics of this effect is Granger (1980), which assumes that 
F (a ) (defined below) is a Beta distribution. See also Pesaran (2003) and Zaffaroni (2004) for 
recent developments.
23 See Michelacci (2004) for a similar analysis.
165
where the Aj (j = 1 , 2 , . . . )  are coefficients, C  is a constant and Ut is an aggregate 
serially uncorrelated disturbance. As suggested before, the remarkable fact is th a t 
although at the individual level the dollar share in the portfolio follows an A R (1 ) 
process, it becomes AR(oo) a t the aggregate -  usually known as a process exhibiting 
long-memory.
As stressed by Lewbel (1994), the coefficients in (6.11) are tightly related to  
the shape of F(a). In appendix D .l it is also shown th a t they satisfy the recursion
s—1
A s = m s — m s- jA j  for s = 1 , 2 , . . .  (6-12)
j = i
where m s is the s-th  moment  of the distribution of a, m s = f  as d F (a). Hence, it 
is easy to  verify th a t
mean(a) =  m \ =  A \  
variance (a) =  m 2 — m \ = A 2
skewness(a) =  (m 3 — 3m im 2 +  2  m 3 )(m 2 — m 2 ) - 3 / 2 = (A 3 — A iA 2 )(A 2 ) - 3 / 2
These relations allow us to  determine how the distribution of forecasting abilities 
affects persistence at the aggregate level. The higher Ai, the higher the mean 
which implies th a t the average individual has herself a more persistent behaviour, 
rendering subsequently a more persistent X t. On the other side and strikingly, 
a higher A 2 renders also more persistence: the higher the heterogeneity amongst 
individuals, the more persistent the aggregate dollarisation ratio. Finally, as pointed 
out by Zaffaroni (2004), the low frequency behaviour of the aggregate is determined 
by the shape of the cross sectional distribution as a —> 1". Hence, a distribution 
with a heavy left tail (A3 <  A iA2), which indicates a higher mass of persistent 
individuals (a & 1 ), would suggest higher aggregate persistence.
It is now clear th a t this framework can be tested straightforwardly. If the 
estimates of A s using aggregate d a ta  are inconsistent with the notion of various 
dynamic processes th a t have been aggregated into (6 .1 1 ), then we are to  reject the
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model. 24 The most obvious symptoms of contradiction would be a non-positive 
estim ate of A 2 , the variance of a , 25 or a very negative value for A i,  the mean.
Aggregation W hen Signals are Correlated
Recall now th a t Su = Rt +  £u, where eit is an idiosyncratic shock. Then, the 
aggregation of (6.9) (see appendix D .l) leads to
which as opposed to  (6 .1 1 ) includes a distributed lag of R t . This difference is clearly 
a consequence of postulating different assumptions about the nature of Su- Yet, 
the coefficients A s (s =  1 , 2 , . . . )  have the same interpretation and implications as 
before.
6.3 Empirical Evidence
This section tests whether the dynamics of the aggregate dollarisation ratio in se­
lected countries can be regarded as coming from the aggregation of heterogeneous 
depositors. In other words, we estim ate the param eters A s in equations (6.11) and
(6.13) and investigate, from the estim ated moments of the underlying distribution 
F(a), the extent of heterogeneity amongst participants in the dollar deposit market.
It is im portant to  bear in mind th a t the amount of information about 
individual behavior th a t can be inferred from aggregate data, as we attem pt to 
do below, is unquestionably limited. Different assumptions regarding individual 
decisions can be found to  be consistent with a given observed aggregate variable.
24 Or the assumptions behind the aggregation, see appendix D .l.
25 Note that A 2  =  0 implies a degenerate distribution of a on the point Ai,  i.e. a model with a 
representative agent or identical individuals.
(6.13)
j = l r=0
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Yet, there are some facts reported below th a t are supportive to  the main hypothesis 
of this paper and the predictions of the theoretical model.
6.3.1 Baseline Specification
Consider equation (6.11). Three points are worth mentioning before presenting 
some results. Firstly and unsurprisingly every dollarisation ratio  X t we considered 
has a unit root2 6 and to avoid well-known biases in the estim ation of autoregressive 
coefficients when a unit root is present we estimate (6 .1 1 ) in first differences,
oo
A X t = Y, A j A X t - j  + ul (6.14)
3=1
Appendix D .l shows th a t (6.14) is not only the first-differenced version of (6.11), 
bu t is also the result of aggregating (6.10) after first-differentiating. Hence, the 
coefficients in (6.14) axe indeed the same as in (6.11). The disturbance U} is auto­
correlated and heteroscedastic2 7  so robust inference is required.
Secondly, due to  data  limitations it is not possible to  estimate equation
(6.14) as it stands. D ata are finite, so a truncation in the lags of the A R {oo) 
process is unavoidable.
Lastly, if convenient, we consider even richer dynamics than  the suggested 
by our very stylised theoretical model by introducing a M A(1 ) component in (6.14). 
In practice, this fact has no other implication for our analysis than  to  produce 
better estimates of the A s. As noted by Lewbel (1994), with a MA component 
present only a finite number of the moments of F(a) can be recovered as an infinite 
autoregression in X t (or in A X t) cannot be separated from the MA param eter, say 
9. This is a theoretical rather than  empirically substantive concern; as noted earlier, 
our attem pt is not to  recover every moment of F(a), but just the first few.
26 Results of unit root tests are available upon request to the authors. See also appendix D.2.
27 See Pesaran (2003) for further details.
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We gathered information for Peru and Uruguay (two highly dollarised coun­
tries), Mexico and Poland. D ata are quarterly spanning roughly from the mid-1980’s 
to the mid-2 0 0 0 ’s. As it is customary in the dollarisation literature, X t is measured 
as the ratio of foreign currency deposits from the private sector in the domestic 
banking system to M2 . 28  This information is widely available and our sources are 
the websites of the various central banks and the International Financial Statistics 
database, IFS. The regression with the shortest time series (Poland) has N  = 69 
observations; the one with the largest (Peru), N  =  94.
Results
For each country an ARIMA(2,1,0) was first fitted to equation (6.14). Then, we 
test for residual autocorrelation and include further lags until the residuals appear 
serially uncorrelated. In every case, no more than  2  lags is needed, but for Mex­
ico the lag length is 4. For robustness sake we then include a MA component 
in the best autoregressive specification. Table 6.3.1 reports for each country the 
best autoregressive model, ARIMA(2 ,1 ,1 ) or ARIMA(4,1,0), and the corresponding 
ARIMA(2,1,1) or ARIMA(4,1,1) equations. The column labelled 6  contains the 
estim ated MA coefficient. For each country we have marked our preferred specifi­
cation, i.e. the more parsimonious model th a t describes the data  sufficiently well, 
with a *.
A finding th a t is robust amongst countries and specifications within the
same country, is th a t the coefficients A \  and A 2 are significantly positive. Recall
th a t A i  is the mean of F(a), and A 2 is its variance. Besides, the estimates of
the implied th ird  central moment As — A i A 2 in each country suggest th a t F(a)  is
skewed to  the left. Provided th a t A \ > 0 , a left-skewed F (a ) would be expected
28 A popular alternative definition of the dollarisation ratio discriminate between residents and 
non-residents, which includes deposits by residents abroad (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003). We did 
not include this definition in our empirical work as the corresponding available time series are 
shorter for the pool of countries analyzed.
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Table 6.3.1: ARIMA Models of the Deposit Dollarisation Ratio in Selected Countries
ARIMA model A x A 2 ^ 3 A 4 0 As — A 1A 2 Tr
M exico (1985.Q4 to  2005.Q3, N  =  77)
(4,1,0) 0.221* 0.199* -0.192* 0.114** -0.236* 0 . 2 2 1
(0.078) (0.078) (0.072) (0.064) (0.095)
(4,1,1)* 0.480* 0.195* -0.216* 0.251* -0.097* -0.310* 0.261
(0 .1 1 1 ) (0.094) (0.063) (0.047) (0.018) (0.086)
P eru  (1980.Q1 to  2005.Q3, N  = 94)
(2,1,0)* 0.173* 0.142* -0.024** 0 . 2 0 0
(0.063) (0.058) (0.013)
(2 , 1 , 1 ) 0.186** 0.139* -0.058 -0.026 0.173
(0.094) (0.065) (0.143) (0.016)
Poland  (1985.Q4 to  2002.Q4, N  =  69)
(2,1,0)* 0.474* 0.113* -0.053* 0.215
(0.016) (0.052) (0.024)
(2,1,1) 0.476* 0 .1 1 1 * -0.007 -0.053* 0.275
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0.049) (0.045) (0.024)
U ruguay (1985.Q1 to  2005.Q3, N  = 83)
(2 , 1 , 0 ) 0.218* 0.290* -0.063* 0.153
(0.091) (0.116) (0.029)
(2,1,1)* 0.265** 0.215* -0.093* -0.057** 0.196
(0.147) (0.055) (0.034) (0.033)
Maximum likelihood estimates. Figures in parentheses are robust (consistent) standard errors.
* [**] denotes significance at a 5% [10%] level. The standard error of the third central moment 
A 3  — A 1 A 2  was computed with the delta method. R 2  is the adjusted R 2. Regressions include a 
constant and, if necessary, a few dummy variables for outlier removal. In all reported equations, 
Breusch-Godfrey and Jarque-Bera tests suggested uncorrelated and normally distributed residuals. 
The preferred specifications are marked with a ★.
if the mass of those individuals with relatively persistent portfolios is relatively 
large respect to the mass of individuals with a close to  zero (corresponding to those 
who change their portfolio quickly). Negative skewness, thus, is consistent with a 
financial expert sharing the dollar market with a non-expert blacksmith saving in 
dollars.
A remarkable fact from Table 6.3.1 is th a t the estimates for Peru are close to  
those of Uruguay, whereas the Mexican estimates are similar to  the Polish. Recall 
th a t Peru and Uruguay are heavily dollarised (above 50%), whereas Mexico and 
Poland, even though have reported sizeable dollarisation ratios by the early or
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mid-90’s, have dollarisation ratios less than  30% by the end of the sample. In 
Peru and Uruguay the coefficients are of comparable magnitude, A 2 ~  A i,  which 
means th a t the underlying F(a) is very spread, the a ’s are fairly heterogeneous29. 
Hence, the highly dollarised economies appear to  have a spreader F(a) which is 
consistent with the idea of decreasing participation costs as dollarisation expands. 
Furthermore, when parameterise F(a), we found the dollarised countries are more 
heavily skewed than  Mexico and Poland. The estim ated of the mass of persistent 
individuals,Pr(0 <  a <  1), is roughly 0.85 for Peru and Uruguay and about 0.6 for 
Mexico and Poland.
6.3.2 Augmented Specification
Consider now equation (6.13). In the likely case th a t signal S t is not i id , then the 
estimates of Table 6.3.1 may be biased due to  the omission of relevant variables. 
Next, we augment the ARIMA models of Table 6.3.1 to  investigate whether this 
omission changes our main conclusions.
As discussed above, the actual object to be estim ated is
P X  P R
A X t  = Y  AA x t- i  +  Y  B A R t-i  +  u t (6-15)
j =1 j —0
where p x  and p r  are finite lag lengths. The presence of R t and its lags in (6.15) 
follows directly from the fact th a t the individuals in the theoretical model base their 
decisions exclusively on this variable. Nonetheless, a richer modelling framework 
can easily extend (6.15) to
P x  P R  P R
A X t  = Y  A A x t- j  + Y  B ? ^ R ?-i + Y  B i X R t-i  +  V t  (6-16)
j =1 j =o j =0
As R t = RJ? — R f ,  equation (6.16) encompasses (6.15) which is a restricted version
29 These estimates imply a coefficient of variation y[A^IA\ of 2.18 for Peru, 1.75 for Uruguay, 0.91 
for Mexico and 0.71 for Poland
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with B f  = —Bg for every s. For this reason, we will focus on (6.16) from now on. 30
An empirical issue th a t raises with the introduction of the real returns in 
the aggregate equations is, precisely, how to measure them. The “true” returns 
involve expectations of future macroeconomic variables, which historical d a ta  are 
barely available for the countries in our analysis. Call i f  and i f  the nominal interest 
rates in domestic currency and US dollars, respectively, 6 t the nominal depreciation 
(i.e., the percent change of the nominal exchange rate, domestic currency per US 
dollar) and 7rt the CPI inflation. We entertain two measurements of the real returns:
i f . - I + i L - i  J f  =  i ± £ - 1
1  +  ? T t + 1 1  +  A t
f t D  _  ( 1  +  +  ^ t + l )  _  1  R D  =  _  I
1 l + 7 T t+i * 1+7T*
CPI and nominal exchange data  are readily available. For i f  we use the 
deposit rate in domestic currency for Peru, Poland and Uruguay and the saving rate 
in domestic currency for Mexico. For i f ,  we found da ta  on the interest rate  paid 
to domestic deposits in dollars only in the case of Peru and Uruguay. For Mexico 
and Poland we approximate i f  with the deposit rate  in the US . 31 Our sources are 
still the central banks and the IFS.
Finally, the presence of a contemporaneous return (6.16) may .rise the pos­
sibility of endogeneity bias. We use a 2SLS procedure to  estim ate this equation. 
The instruments are listed in the note to  Table 6.3.2. It is worth mentioning th a t 
OLS or the exclusion of the contemporaneous returns did not alter the main results
30 The estimations of (6.15), which are similar to our purposes, are available upon request to the 
authors.
31 Unfortunately we could not find time series long enough of country risk to have a better measure 
of I?f in these two countries. The estimation results, though, were robust when we considered 
the LIBOR rate (in US dollars, at various terms) instead of the US deposit rate.
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of this robustness check.32
Results
Table 6.3.2 displays the estimation results. To save space we do not report the 
coefficients of the returns (as they are not of direct interest for our analysis) but do 
report an F -statistic  assessing its overall significance. We set the lag length p x  =  3. 
This is the best choice for Mexico; for the other countries, the optimal is p x  = 2, 
but we still set p x  = 3 to ensure th a t no autoregressive effect is ignored. The choice 
of p r , reported in the table, responds to  the minimization of the Schwarz criterion.
Recall th a t by estimating the augmented equations we are assessing whether 
the results of Table 6.3.1 are robust. So, are they robust? In general they are. A 
quick comparison of the estimates in Table 6.3.2 with those in Table 6.3.1 reveals 
th a t due to  the presence of the returns, the fit of the various equations increases, 
but the estimates of A i, A 2 and A3 — A 1A 2 do not change much. The notable 
exception to  this pattern  is the Mexican case when the returns are measured in the 
ex-post manner, as A \ losses statistical significance. However, the main claim of the 
previous sections still holds, qualitatively and almost quantitative: the heterogene­
ity of decision-makers th a t underlies the aggregate dollarisation ratios is high, and 
this fact leads to aggregate dollarisation persistence.
6.4 Caveat: The Role of Learning
An alternative way to  rationalise the fact th a t individuals are heterogeneous in their
forecast of R t is to  assume th a t they cannot perfectly observe the true process tha t
governs the evolution of R t. For instance, because they do not know the exact
32 We did not find a significant cointegration relationship between X t , R f  and R ®  or between 
X t  and R t  to treat (6.16) as an error correction model. Structural breaks in our 2 0  year data 
span may explain this failure. Consistently with this, the levels of the returns did not appear 
to have enough explanatory power in the equations of Table 6.3.2.
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Table 6.3.2: Augmented Equations
Ai a 3 A s  — A 1A 2 Ho : R  =  0 PR
M exico (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, N  =  77)
ex-ante 0.291* 0.202* -0.273* —0.331* 11.50* 2 0.554
(0.096) 
ex-post 0.129
(0.066)
0.287*
(0.092)
-0.240*
(0.113)
-0.278*
[0.000]
22.56 2 0.565
(0.108) (0.089) (0.080) (0.091) [0.000]
Peru  (1980.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N =  89)
ex-ante 0.242* 0.195* 0.003 -0.047* 9.086* 3 0.435
(0.043) 
ex-post 0.501*
(0.047)
0.138**
(0.053)
-0.027
(0.015)
-0.069**
[0.000]
30.85 2 0.649
(0.098) (0.083) (0.068) (0.036) [0.000]
Poland (1985.Q4 to 2005.Q3, A  =  68)
ex-ante 0.449* 0.132* -0.002 -0.059* 1.638 3 0.275
(0.043) 
ex-post 0.586*
(0.058)
0.164*
(0.049)
-0.123
(0.022)
-0.096*
[0.203]
2.402** 4 0.394
(0.077) (0.070) (0.160) (0.043) [0.099]
U ruguay (1985.Q1 to 2005.Q3, N  =  80)
ex-ante 0.252* 0.280* -0.109 -0.070** 3.153* 3 0.124
(0.104) 
ex-post 0.267*
(0.114)
0.349
(0.140)
-0.073
(0.038)
-0.093**
[0.049]
2.189 2 0.152
(0.103) (0.117) (0.143) (0.047) [0.119]
2SLS estimates. Instruments for R® and R f  (and for the ex-ante R ^ )_ 1 and R^-i) are oil prices 
changes, US GDP growth and lagged values of these and the i?-variables. Figures in parentheses 
are robust (consistent) standard errors. * [**] denotes significance at a 5% [10%] level. Figures in 
the Ho : B  =  0 column are E-statistics, p-values shown in braces. For Peru, Poland and Uruguay, 
we set .A3 =  0 to compute the third central moment and its standard deviation. Diagnostic tests 
suggested well-behaved residuals, see notes to Table 6.3.1.
value of a  in (6.3). In this case, individuals should form priors on the value of this 
param eter in order to  forecast R t and to  make their portfolio choices. Agents may 
have different priors on a , but they can update those priors as new information on 
R t arrives . 33
This assumption is plausible in circumstances where the central bank does 
not have an explicit inflation target or it has one th a t is not perfectly credible, for 
instance because it attem pts to  stabilise simultaneously the exchange rate and the 
inflation rate. Uncertainty of this type may induce positive expected values for R t ,
33 For models with learning and heterogenous priors, see Arifovic (1996) and Marimon et al.
(2004).
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since some agents might expect higher levels of inflation, making more profitable to
invest in dollar assets.
Consider a common signal, Su = S t = Rt +  £t where et ~  iid (0 , a^) is an 
aggregate shock. Under this type of uncertainty, the perceived law of motion for R t 
of individual i, becomes
Although every agent faces the same signal extraction problem, they portfolio 
choices differ since they have different priors of a. In this case the optimal portfolio 
allocation for individual i would be given by
where =  et +  Rt — Ta. Notice th a t the implications for aggregation and hetero­
geneity are different in this case to those obtained in the baseline model. Here, all 
agents have the same ability to extract information, but they differ on their priors 
on a. Since, agents update their beliefs as new information arrives, heterogeneity 
is not a permanent feature, it only last while agents learn the true value of a.
This fact have remarkable implications, bu t complicates considerably the 
empirical implementation of model. Firstly, the degree of aggregate persistence 
would decrease as agents learn, since the dispersion on the values of an  would 
decrease, therefore, the coefficients of equation (6.11) would be time varying. Al­
though the available sample used in the empirical analysis is relatively short, no 
strong evidence of time varying param eters was found. Secondly, the speed of the 
reduction on the degree of persistence would depend on the dispersion of the initial 
distribution of priors on a: if initial dispersion is high, the reduction on the persis­
tence would be slower. Finally, central banks th a t adopt a credible inflation target 
regime for conducting m onetary policy, can help not only to reduce the mean value 
of dollarisation but also its persistence by reducing the dispersion on the priors tha t 
individuals have on a.
fit+ i =  A* (1 — &>t) +  otit f i t  +  w, (6.17)
x it ~  a i tx it- 1 H 1" a it (6.18)
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6.5 Concluding Remarks
In countries with high dollarisation ratios, participation in the dollar deposit market 
has become massive. Financial deregulation, liberalization, innovation and infor­
mal currency markets have allowed a very heterogenous group of agents -  from a 
large firm th a t uses state-of-art portfolio management techniques to  an uninformed 
individuals who base their portfolio decisions simply on their own experience and 
limited information -  to  participate in the same market. This paper shows th a t such 
an heterogeneity turns out to  be enough to  generate persistence in dollarisation ra­
tios upon aggregation. Empirical evidence from three Latin American countries and 
Poland supports this claim.
The presence of heterogeneity in individual dollarisation decisions has in­
teresting policy implications. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) conclude sensibly th a t a 
necessary and sufficient condition for dedollarisation is higher exchange rate flexibil­
ity. In our setup this condition is not sufficient (though we reckon it is necessary), as 
there may exist a mass of individuals th a t do not respond at all to such a volatility. 
This makes a case for a more active policy on improving the communication skills 
of the central bank, in order to  better convey its policy of more flexible exchange 
rates and possibly its commitment to price stability to  a broader set of agents, 
specially to  those regarded as uninformed. In this way the policymaker would be 
contributing to reduce individual heterogeneity and thus aggregate persistence.
This policy implication is particularly relevant for developing economies 
with an inflation targeting regime or for those evaluating moving towards this 
regime, as it heavily relies upon transparency and communication strategies. Our 
analysis suggests th a t the benefits of the such a policy regime in reducing dollarisa­
tion may be condemned to be limited, unless the central bank effectively commu­
nicates the implications and benefits of such a regime to  the less informed segment 
of participants in the dollar market.
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A APPENDIXES OF CHAPTER 3
A .l Dynamic Equilibrium
The equations that determine the dynamic equilibrium of the economy are the following:
1. A ggregate D em and
1  +  i t
- = P E t
et =
2. A ggregate Supply
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A .2 T h e  S te a d y -S ta te
We define an steady-state as an equilibrium where both economies have zero inflation, 
II =  II* =  1 and where technology shocks at the home and the foreign economy take their 
unconditional means, A = A{z) =  A* =  1. In this equilibrium, the steady-state analog 
equations of (A.8 ) and (A.9) axe given by
— = w (A.17)
w = Y ^+v (A.18)
From the previous two equations it follows immediately that
Yh  = ( 1 -  $ )* k  (A.19)
similarly for the case of the foreign economy,
Y5 =  ( l - $ * ) r b  (A.20)
Where ( 1  — 4>) =  Since the degree of monopolistic competition is the same in both
economies, 4> =  4>* and Yh  =  FjJ- Combining the steady-state analogs of equations
(A.3),(A.4) and (A.5), we obtain
T  = p  =  1 (A.2 1 )
finally, from the steady-state analogs of equations (A.4) and (A.5), we have that,
c  =  Yh  = ( 1 - $ ) ^ J  (A.2 2 )
Q =  1
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The Flexible Price Equilibrium
We analyse the flexible price equilibrium using the log-linear approximation of equations 
(A.l) to (A.16). The approximation is taken around the deterministic steady-state defined 
previously. The flexible price equilibrium is an equilibrium where all firms set prices every 
period observing all shocks in the economy. Under these conditions the log-linear version 
of equation (A.8 ), after aggregating across firms, becomes
0 = wt + at (z) (A.23)
combining equation (A.23) with the log-linear version of equation (A.9) we obtain 
the output level under flexible prices,
VH,t = ~<H (A.24)
Similarly, from the log-linear approximation of equation (A.l) we obtain the natural
interest rate as follows
r t =  E t {vH,t+1 -  Vh,i) (A.25)
On the other hand, the natural real exchange rate level can be obtained by from the
log-linear approximation of equation (A.5)
Qt = (1 -  7) (yH,t ~ Vt) = ~  (1 “  7) (at ~ a*t)
The Aggregate Supply Curve
In order to obtain the domestic aggregate price level, we take the log-linear approximation 
of equation (A.7), thus we have,
Ph,t
n
-  [ Ph,t(z)d(z) 
rt J
Furthermore, from equation (A.8 ) Ph,t(z ) ^  defined as follows,
m  + Ph,t +  at(z) if 2  € 0  
Ph,t(z ) = Et- 1  (wt +  Ph,t + at(z)) if 2  G E
k E t - 1  (wt + dh,t + at (z) +  et) otherwise
The by aggregating Ph,t(z ) across firms we have,
Ph,t = J  [wt + Ph,t +  <k(z)] d(z) +
©
J  [Et - 1  (wt +  dhjt +  at(z) +  et)] d (z) 
J  [Et- i ( w t + phit + at (z))]d(z)
(A.26)
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190
/Using the fact that,
/ « , (  z)d(z) = Oat (A.29)
©
at(z)d(z) = ( 1 - 0 )  at (A.30)
[0,n]\©
We find that,
Ph,t =  0 ( w t +  Ph,t +  at) +
(1 — 0) s (E t-1 (wt  +  Ph,t +  at +  et) — et) (A.31)
+  (1 — 0) (1 — s) E t~i (wt  +  Ph,t +  at)
Rearranging properly we further obtain that,
Ph,t = 0 (wt + at) + (1 — 0) (E t-i (wt + at)) (A.32)
+  ( 1  — 0) s (Et- 1  (et) — et) +  0ph,t +  (1 — 0) Et-iPh,t 
Using this equation, we can show that,i?t-i (wt + a*) =  0, thus, we have,
m  = - a t +  ^  g ^  (Ph,t ~ Et- 1 (ph,t)) ~ ^  q ^ s (et ~ Et - 1 (et)) (A.33)
Since real wages axe given by
wt = (1 + v) yhit +  va}t (A.34)
the aggregate supply equation, which relates domestic prices with the output gap and 
inflation expectations errors, and exchange rate expectations errors, would be given by,
q
Ph,t = E t - 1  (phtt) +  (1 + v) - +  s (et -  E t - 1  (et)) (A.35)
Where, xt = yt — Vt and y™ = at. Using a simple transformation, equation (A.35), we
obtain the Phillips curve in this economy,
0
7Thit = Et-iTTh,t +  (1 + y) ^  _  p Xt +  8 (Aet -  Et- 1 (Aet)) (A.36)
Aggregate Demand
The aggregate demand block is given by the following set of equations,
YH,t = EtYn,t+ 1  -  (it ~ Et7TH,t+i) (A.37)
VH,t = lU  +  ct (A.38)
qt = ct -  y^ (A.39)
Combining equations (A.25) and (A.37) we obtain the dynamics of the output gap in this
model economy,
x t = Etx t + 1  -  (it ~ Et7rHit+i -  t?)
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Derivation of Aggregate Productivity
In order to derive equation (3.16) from the main text, lets use the definition of domestic 
prices, equation (3.51) of the main text, and the definition of optimal price under the 
flexible price allocation, equation (3.40), as follows,
Ph j =
n
dz
n-  f  (pWtAz t)1' 
n J
dz
i1 —e
=  liWt
n
y * ? d z
i
1 —e
1
1—e
(A.40)
thus, by simplifying the previous expression , allow us to write the domestic aggregate 
price level as a mark-up over nominal marginal,
Phj = fiWtAt
where, At represent the aggregate productivity shock, defined as follows,
(A.41)
A ,=
n
y < ? d z (A.42)
this last equation corresponds to equation (3.16) in the main text
A .3 T h e  C en tra l B a n k  L oss F u n ctio n
In what follows we derive the micro-founded central bank’s loss function by using a second- 
order Taylor approximation of the representative agent’s utility function, equation (A.43), 
around the economy’s deterministic steady-state,
h}+v
U = \aCt - r r —  (A.43)
1 +  V
We use a generic form of the previous utility function to have a general result, thus we 
approximate,
u  = U(Ct) -  V{ht)
Where total labour depends on output, productivity and the relative price distortion, as 
follows,
ht = YtA tA t (AAA)
and we know from section 5 that at the first best allocation it must hold that,
vY  = C( 1 -  7 ) (A.45)
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The second order expansion of the utility generated by consumption is given by, :
u (Ct ) = u  + ucC (c t + \ c i \ +  \u ccC 2C? + o (||e ||3)  (A.46)
collecting terms appropriately we have that:
u (Ct) = ucC  f d t  + i  (1 -  <t) d A  + t.i.p  +  o ( l ie f )  (A.47)
For our particular case where, a =  1 . equation (A.47) becomes,
u (Ct) = ucC dt +  t.i.p +  o (||e||3^
Next we take a second order expansion of v(ht), we use equation (A.44) to define the 
aggregate level of labour in terms of output,productivity shocks and price dispersion,thus 
a second order approximation for the disutility of labor effort is given by,
v(ht) =  v hY  ( a ( + y, + i  ( l  + ^ - )  Y?  + ( l  +  ^ " )  **A‘)  (A -48>
+ t.i.p  + o (||£||3)
Notice that since A t is of order o ^||e:||2  ^ all terms involving second order terms of A t are 
dropped out from equation (A.48) , thus, we have,
u(ct)-v(ht) = uccc t -  (i -  7) »cC ( a ,  + yt + i  (1 + u) y? + (1 + «) ytA()
-\-t.i.p + o (||e||3) (A.49)
imposing the restriction on the coefficient of risk aversion, a =  1 , we have:
=  u c (  5 t - ( l - 7 ) J t - ^ ( ( l - 7 ) ( l + ^ 2 ^ 
y - ( 1  - 7 ) At -  ( 1  - i ) ( l  + v)Y tAt J
+t.i.p + o (||e||3)  (A.50)
Let’s define the following parameters:
uyy = ~  (1 -  7) (1 +  v) (A.51)
uyA = (1 -  7) (1 + v) (A.52)
=  (1 -  7) (A.53)
Moreover, since:
c t =  ( i - 7) ? t +  7y(*
193
We can now write the utility function of the representative agent as follows:
XL (Ct) v(ht)   XLqY  ^ ^ UyyYj. U^Af Uy^YtAt^
+t.i.p + o (||£ ||3) (A.54)
Rewriting appropriately the quadratic terms we have:
\ u yvY? + uAYtAt =  i  (1 -  7) ((1 +  v) (9 t2 -  2YtAt + A ?)) (A.55)
since we have eliminated all the distortions of the steady-state equilibrium, the quadratic 
terms of the approximated loss function of the central bank can be written as follows:
\ uyyY? +  UAYtAt = i  ( 1  -  7 ) ( 1  +  v) x \
u (Ct) -  v(ht) = ucY  ( 1  -  7 ) ( 1  +  v) x \ -  ( 1  -  7 ) A ^ j  +  t.i.p + o (||«r||3) (A.56)
Now we have to find the second-order approximation of A*,
(A.57)
In order to simplify notation, let’s denote by Rp(z) = Pp’^ f  and by Ra(z) = 7 ^-, then 
A t can be written as follows,
n
A t = i j R p(z)~£ Ra(z)dz (A.58)
A, = 1 + £ /  [-erp( z )+ r a(z)]dz 
0
n
+ “ /  [e2 (r ,(*))* + (r.(*))!
0
n
^ J  rp(z)ra(z)dz
dz
n
(A.59)
From the definition of the aggregate domestic price level and aggregate productivity we 
have,
fRp(z)
.0
l - e SRa(z)
.0
1—£ dz (A.60)
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A log-quadratic approximation of the previous equations around their corresponding de­
terministic steady-state give us,
° =  £ n dz  0  =  h f r a(z) + ^ T ^ r l(z ) dz (A.61)
Using the previous equations to eliminate rp(z) and ra(z) from equation (A.59 ) we obtain,
dz (A.62)
n
A t =  i  +  2[~ J  ( e ( l  ~ £ ) ) ( rp ( z ) ) 2 - { ! - £ )  r l ( z )
o
n
+  2 ~ /  £2 (^ W )2 +  fraW)2 dz
0
n
~ £~ J  rp(z)ra(z)dz 
o
Simplifying the previous condition we further obtain,
n
A t =  [e (rP(z))2 +  e  ( r a ( ^ ) ) 2] dz
o
n
~ £ n j rp(z )r“(z )dz  
o
Which, can be easily expressed as,
n
A t =  ^ /  [rp (z )  -  ra(z)]2dz
Since, Ph,t(z ) and ph,t have second order effects on A* we only need a first order approxi­
mation of Ph,t{z )> which from the previous section is given by,
{ Pi,t(z )
E t- i p i tt(z) ~  (Ph,t ~  Et-iPh, t)
E t- i p u (z) -  (phtt -  E t- i p h,t) + (et -  E t -1  (et))
where, we denote by p \ $ the relative optimal price under flexible prices,
Pi,t(z ) =  wt +  at +  ra(z)
Since, Et~\(wt +  at) = 0, we have that,
E t- i p i yt(z) =  E t -1  (ra(z))
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let’s denote by, pt = wt + at, thus we have that, 
rp{z) = <
Pt +  ra{z)
E t - 1  (ra(z)) -  (ph,t ~ Et- ip h,t) 
k E t - 1  (ra(z)) -  (phjt -  Et- ip h,t) +  {et ~ E t - 1 (e*))
Therefore, we have that,
r i , t ( z ) =  Pt
rp( z ) - r a{z) = { r2 ,t{z) = -  (ra(z) -  E t - 1  (ra(;z))) -  {ph,t -  E t- ip h,t)
r3,t{z) = -  (ra{z) -  Et- i  (ra{z))) -  (ph>t -  E t-iPh,t) +  (et -  E t - 1 (et))
Furthermore, we have that,
nJ  [rp{z) -  ra{z)]2 dz = J  rh t{z)2dz 
o 0
+  [  r2,t {z)2dz +  [  r3 ,t (z)
JrO,nl\EC7© J  E
dz
[0 , ]
In order to save notation, lets define by Xt = Xt — Et~iXt, then we have
(1 - 0 ) ,, (1 - 0 )
Pt =
therefore,
 — J — Ph,t —  set
Pt = ^ — Q—  j  +  s et -  2spKtet 
Aggregating we have,
nj  lrv{z) -  ra( z ) f  dz = Mt + Ft + Gt 
0
Where, Mt contains the quadratic terms that come from aggregate variables,
Mt = 0p2t (A.63)
Next we consider the quadratic terms specific to each group of firms,
Ft = (1 -  6 ) ( 1  -  s) [ra(z ) 2 +  f h)t] +  2  ^ ra{z)dzSj  ph,t (A.64)
And finally,
Gt = [  ra{z)2dz +  ( 1  -  0 ) s (p | t +  ef -  2 phytet) (A.65)
J[0,n]\EUe
+2 {Ph, t -et) \ f  ra(z)d z\  (A.6 6 )
\J[o,n)\Eue J
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Adding up, equations (A.63), (A.64) and (A.65) we obtain,
n
J  [rp(z) -  ra(z) ] 2 dz = e f t + {  1  -  0) (pl t)
0
+ ( l - 0 )sef +  J  ra(z)2dz
2  f  ra(z)ph>tdz - 2 ( 1  -  0 ) s (phjt) et -  2  f  
Jt, Je
Further simplifying, we obtain,
n 2 
J  [rP(z) ~ ra(z) ] 2 dz = ^  ^  [fhjt +  s2 e? -  2 spMet] +
o
C1 “  0 )Ph,t +  C1 “  ° ) s^t +  [  ra(z)2dz
J[0,n]\e
+  2  /  ra(z)dzphit - 2 ( 1 - 9 )  sph}tet - 2 s
«/[0,n]\© ./:
Simplifying the previous expression we obtain,
i A ( I 1 - 0) } #  -u 
2 ? A( _  ( — T ~  ) Ph’t +
[  ?al
y[0,n]\©
- 2 s  ^  e ^  Ph,tet +  ^ ^  r (z )2d z  ) +
2  1 /  r a(z )d z  I -  2 s ( /  r a( z ) d ( z )  ) e* 
W[0,n]\© J \ J e
Using the following properties of large numbers we have that,
J  at (z)d (z)  =  6 at
©
[0,n]\©
therefore, it follows that,
J  at (z )d (z )  =  ( 1  -  6 ) a t
/  r a(z )d z  1 =  ( 1  -  6 ) a t -  (1  -  6 ) at =  0
r[o,n]\e J
ra (z )e tdz
r a(z )e tdz
197
Consequently, we obtain the following expression for the distortion generated by the 
relative price dispersion,
Plugging in the relative price dispersion equation into the welfare function derived pre­
viously, we obtain the following quadratic welfare function for this economy with price 
dollarisation,
u (Ct) -  v(ht) = ucY  ( 1  -  7 ) ( 1  +  v) x \ -  +  t.i.p +  o (|M |3) (A.67)
Thus the loss function of the central bank, presented in the main text as equation (3.61) 
can be written as,
00
W  =  - n E a J 2 P ‘L t
t = 0
Lt = A ^ x 2t + t +  y e t 2 -  sphfit ~  a eafit^t +  t.i.p + o (||e ||3)
where,
n  = ucY  ( l - 7 ) £I i / l  K a = £-e
A =  i1 +  v) IJ^ We =  ( /s  ra(z)d (2 ))
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A .4 Monetary Policy Under Commitment
T he central bank choose the path for the dom estic inflation, the output gap and the  
exchange rate to minimize the following lost function
oo
min W  =  - Q E o J ^ f t L t
t=o
Lt = A ^ x 2t -I- +  y e t2 -  sphttet -  Aeaetas^ +  t.i.p  +  o (||£||3)
subject to  the constraint of the Phillips curve and the dynamics of the nominal exchange 
rate, equations (A .6 8 ) and (A .69), presented next,
p hj  =  KXt +  set  (A.6 8 )
et =  Ph,t +  x t +  7}t (A.69)
where, k  =  ( 1  +  is) denotes the slope of the Phillips curve, and rjt represents a shock  
to  the real exchange rate that summarizes the effect of the following structural shocks on 
the nominal exchange rate,
m = -  K  -  «?)
This shock can be also We solve for the optim al m onetary policy under com m itm ent by
m axim izing the following Lagrangian function, which after applying the law of iterative
expectations, can be written as follows,
oo
£o(E{ + W * h , t  + F ^ - e t 2-
t=o
ftsTThjet -  AeafretCbsj
+t'i,t(3t (nh,t -  Kh,t - K X t - s  (et -  et )) +
+*'2,t/3< (et ~  Kh,t - X t - r i t ) } }
where, L\tt and t 2 ,t are the Lagrange multipliers of the Phillips curve and of the  
equation that constraints the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate. T he first order 
conditions are given by the following three equations,
Ax t -  KLi>t -  1 2 ,t =  0 (A .70)
*h,t ~  se t -  L2 ,t =  0 (A .71)
Aeet STTfi^ t Aea&8,t “I" *-2 ,t =  0 (A .72)
T hese conditions hold at each t, w ith t y  1 . T hey also hold at tim e 0, given the initial
conditions,
*4,-1 =  *-2,-1
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The optimal plan is a set of policy functions for x t , 7ih,t, et , ^i,f5and that satisfy 
conditions, (A.6 8 ), (A.69),
(A.70),(A.71),and (A.72), given the initial conditions and the processes for the 
exogenous variables, aS:t , and 7ft. To find the allocation under optimal policy we combine 
equations (A.71) and (A.72) to eliminate, t2 ,t as follows,
Since from the Phillips curve we have that, Et-\X t =  0, thus we can write equation (A.75) 
as follows,
et = Vh,t + x t + r)t (A.77)
using the previous equation and the Phillips curve we can eliminate the output gap,thus 
we have, a second condition that relates exchange rate and domestic prices,
using, equation (A.73) and equation (A.79) we can find the rational equilibrium of prices,
(Ae S) ej Aea,a s,t "P (1 s) — 0  
the remaining equations that define the economy axe given by,
(A.73)
A Xt  -  K L l j  -  7Th,t +  set =  0 
et = Vh,t + x t + rit
— '^2't "P SGf
(A.74)
(A.75)
(A.76)
(k + s)et = (l + K) TTh,t + (A.78)
combining equations (A.73) and (A.78) we solve for the exchange rate and level of domestic 
prices,
et =  zD\r}t +  zu2as>t (A.79)
where,
[{l+$ («+«)+(Ae—«)]
Ph,t ~  —^ 3 Vt +  ^AO’S,t 
where the parameters, VJ3 and are defined as follows,
_  ____________k ( A e + s ) __________  _  __________ ( « + s ) A eo
(A.80)
^ 3  -  [ ( k + s ) ( i _ s ) + ( i + k ) ( A c _ s )]  ^ 4  -  l ( 1 + s ) ( « _ a ) + ( 1 + * ) ( A e _ fl)j
A .5 E n d o g en o u s  P r ic e  D o lla r isa tio n
D e r iv in g  T h e  P ro fit  F u n ctio n
In this appendix we derive equations (??) and (3.29 ) of section 3.4. The firm’s expected 
discounted profit function under peso invoicing is given by,
n  (z) = E t_! (PH,t(z) -  WtA t(z)) (A.81)
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and the corresponding first-order condition for its optimal price is given by
Et- 1 (P„,t (z) -  »W tAt (z)) P ^ 1] =  0  (A.82)
Using equation (3.24) we eliminate PH,t(z) from equation (A.81), thereby, firm’s expected
profits can be written as follows,
(E t.!  (w tM z
0  (z) =  Qt -  1 )  7---------------------------------- (A.83)
(M*#))
In terms of real wages, it can be alternative expressed as follows,
( f it- i  (wtAt{z) Pfu'))
(I (z) = (M- 1 ) A— ---------  ------ (A.84)
(**-' (^ ))
Following similar steps, we obtain the expected discount profit function under dollar 
invoicing, which is given by the next equation,
( f i t- ,  (W'te(- 1 A«(z)<%,() ) 1_£
* (* ) =  (#.-1 )M “*A------ 7------- 7-----  ’ ’  (A.85)
(fi«_ i ( d - 1) )
To ease the comparison between 4/ (z) and Q (z), we write 4* (z) in terms of Pn,t and e*, 
as follows,
( f i t - i W A t W P ^ V ) ) 1" '
l)M -e 1 - ^ -------7----- , ' '  (A.8 6 )
(fit- 1  (fiff.t et ' ) )
Equation (A.84) correspond to equation (??) , whereas equation (A.85) to equation (3.29), 
in the main text.
Equilibrium Condition for PD
After taking a log-quadratic approximation of equation (3.29) around the corresponding 
expected values of variables that determine (z) we obtain ,
log(fi (z)) -  -  ( e  -  1 )  ( ( £  -  1 )  Et-tphjt +  ^  E t - i P h , t )
-  (s -  1 )  (fit-iW, + fit-iot(z) + lfit_iW? + Ifit-i^W
-  (e -  1)  ((e -  1)  f i ,- i  [(Wt +  at ( z ) )ph,t})
( e - 1 )£ I (£ -  1) £t-lPfc,t + E t-lPh,t I + (z))
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where variables with tilde x t , represent log deviations from expected values, i.e xt = 
log(Xt) — E t~i (log(XO) Similarly, the log-quadratic approximation of ^  (z) around the 
same steady-state is given by
( e - l ) :
log ('I' (z)) 0= log ' t  (z) -  (e -  1) I (e -  1) -Ef-iPv +  Et-ij?ht
~ (£ ~  1 ) I '-Et - \f-t +
-  (e -  1) (E t^ W t + Et-iat(z) + if it- iW ?  +  ^E t-ia t(z)
-  (e -  1 )  ( ( e  -  1 )  E t-1 [(Wt + at{zj) Ph,t])
-  (e -  1) (~ eE t- 1 (\V t +  a,(z) )  e(j -  (e -  1) £.E(_ i [etpfti(])
+ £ [ ( £  — 1) Et-iPh,t + (£" 1)2e  S2 '2  l~l ph,t
+e I ( 1  — e) Et-iet  + (i - E t- ie f  I -  e ( 1  -  e) 2  £ t- i  [eipw ]
Then, log (z) — log Q (z) is given by
log *  (z) -  log n  (z) c z E t - J  (1 ~ £)Eg « - ) -  ( 1  -  £) eBt - 1 (Wt +  o*(z)) et]
Therefore a firm will set prices in dollars when, \tr (2:) — (z) < 0 , which holds, when,
Et-<% -  E t - 1 [ (w t +  at (z)J et] < 0
since we know that,
Wt ~ E t-iW t = at -  Et-iat  +  i  (p^.t ~  Et - 1 (pm)) ~ — g - - s (et -  E t - 1 (et)) 
and that,a;* = x t ~  E t- ix t  A firm will set prices in dollars if and only if
Q  +  s ^ ~(9~ )  Et~Wt ~ Et - 1 [et, (5t(z) -  at)] -  ^ t - i  (P/»,tet) < 0
This last equation corresponds to equation (3.70) in the main text,
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B APPENDIXES OF CHAPTER 4
B .l  The Foreign Economy
Household’s preferences at the foreign economy are given by the following utility function,
lk=0
Ut = Et w  r ™  -  1 l *i+* (B.l)
Where Et represents the expectations operator conditional on information up to period 
£, (3 E (0,1), is the household’s subjective discount factor, a > 0, the coefficient of risk 
aversion and tp > 0, the inverse of the Frish labor supply elasticity, L\  stands for the 
foreign household’s working hours and C\ for their corresponding consumption level of a 
final consumption goods, which is defined as follows,
lnC(* =  ( j \ n C ; ( s ) d ( s ) \  (B.2 )
For simplicity we assume that the foreign economy is a cashless economy. Hence, final 
good’s consumption is not subject to any type of transaction frictions. On the other hand, 
final good producers’s technology in the foreign economy is characterised by the following 
equations,:
Y t  = ((«*)*  +  (1 -  a*)’ ^ ( B . 3 )
= ((i) ■ Iy&t dw ) 4;, = ((t^ O ‘ 14< d(*)),_1 <B-4)
and the corresponding demands for domestic and foreign intermediate goods are given by:
4 4 )  = « ’ ( * r f )  " 4 *  (B-5)
4 »  =  a  -  «*) ( ^ 7 )  ( j f )  " V  (B-6 )
Associated to this technology, the corresponding marginal cost of final goods producers, 
which also represents the price of consumption goods, is given by,
F t  =  (a* ( P i t ) 1- ” +  (1 -  a*) ( P h ) 1~,’) Thi (B.7)
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where
P i t  = ( k ' i  (P*H,t(*))1 - 6  d z  )  “ * P } t  =  ( i f  ( P £ t (* )) " £ d z
1
1 —e
(B .8 )
1-e \  T=7 / ,  ™ /  \  1—£
The set of non-linear equations that describe the behaviour of the foreign econom y is 
given by:
Table B.l: Non Linear equations
1—c
Phillips Curve
« w r ' = ( f )
JV(* =  M m ct*y(* + ^  (7T(*+1)e i v (‘+1 
A * =  y (*+e/3 f a v r 1 D ’t + 1
Euler Equation
1+i.
Marginal Cost
y; vi-i+vm e
Taylor Rule
(1  +  if )  = ( 1  +  i t ) (= £ )* *  ( & y V exp (vt*) 
Marginal Utility
V * —cr
xt ~  At
B.2 The Phillips Curve
Intermediate good producers update their prices randomly. At each updating point they  
choose the price level, P f f t (z ) that maximises the following profit function:
Et
0 0  f  { P °  (z) \  ~X) W)* [Xt+k y p^ t+k ~ mCt+k) (B.9)
To write the firm’s profit function in terms of its contemporaneous relative price, it is 
useful to  denote by ^t+k  the cumulative domestic inflation, ^ t+k =  p H,t • Using this 
auxiliary variable, firm’s demand, conditioned on the optim al price can be written as 
follows,
Y„ , t+k{z)  =  ‘ V & Y h m *  (B -10)
Hence, the firm’s first-order condition to  determine its optim al relative prices is given by,:
Et
OO /  /  p o  (z) \
£  m k ( c r «  ( - j -  (7 3 T )mct+fc J =  0
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From this latter expression, firm’s optimal price as defined as follows:
_  * E t
oo
Z) W )  {Xt+kmct+k^i+kYH,t+k)
.k= 0
Phj  (e - 1 ) ^ ' ooE  m h (A t+k * l ; ekYH,t+k)
,k= 0
(B.12)
A more tractable representation of the firm’s optimal price can be obtained by using 
two auxiliary variables, Nt and Dt, as in ?. This two auxiliary variables represent the 
numerator and denominator of the previous equation, as follows
Nt = pEt
_fc=0
and
D+ = Et Y , m k (a
lk=0
(B.13)
(B.14)
(B.15)
Hence, the intermediate good producers’ optimal price will be given by:
PH,t(z) _  Nt 
PH,t D t
where Nt and Dt can be written recursively as follows,
N t = n h m c tYH,t +  e/37reHjt+ iN t+ i (B.16)
Dt = XtYH,t +  0 / ^ 7 I i / Jt1+  1A +1 ( B . l  7 )
On the other hand, since firms have the same cost structure, all of them choose the same 
optimal price P fjt (z ) every updating point, whereas the remaining firms maintain 
fixed their corresponding prices. This imply that upon aggregation, domestic inflation is 
determined by the following non-linear condition,
(B.18)
Which, can also be written as follows:
e ( W 1 = i -  (i - « )  ( g )
1—e
(B.19)
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B.3 Aggregating Consumption Decisions
In this appendix we derive a close form expression for the marginal utility of income, A* , 
which we use later to show the implications of CS for the dynamic equilibrium of the SOE. 
To achieve this objective, we aggregate the optimal consumption conditions of different 
varieties of final consumption goods, summarised by the following set of equations
Uc, t - ^ h  = P t W t  f 1 +  y )  ( i +  9 («)) for g ^ st (B.20)
Uc,tdl l  = Pt(s)Xt f  1 +  j - }  (f +  T (s)) for * < *( (B.21)
Also, from the equilibrium condition for CS we have that,
1 +  T fo) 1  +  ^ 7  _  f +  H m  99>.
i + s ( s « )  i +  g  i + n  ( ' }
Since final good’s prices are the same in equilibrium, equations (B.20 ) and (B. 2 1  ) can 
be written as:
Uc,t = Pt— Xt ( l  +  v l  (1 +  9 (*)) for S 5= St (B.23)
Ct \  A t j
UC't =  P t— At ( l  +  (1 +  t  (s)) for 8 < St (B.24)
Ct \  a t j
To facilitate aggregation we take logs to equations (B.23) and (B.24) and then integrate 
over s . The resulting condition is,
by,
log UCtt = log (PtAt) + ( 1  - s t) log ( l  +  +  /  log ( 1  + g (s)) ds
st
+st log ( l  +  +  /  log ( 1  +  T (s)) ds
V '  0
We take logs to equation (B.22 ) to obtain an expression for ^  , which is given
log ^1 +  = log ^1 +  -  log (1 +  r  (s*)) +  log (1 + g (st)) (B.25)
Using equation (B.25) we eliminate ^  from the marginal utility of consumption, obtaining
the following expression,
log Uc,t =  log (-FtAt) + log ^ 1  +  +
/ fog (itg(i!ids +  / loS (1+T$))ds +  fog(1 +  S (* ))st 0
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Hence, by taking antilog to the previous equation, the the marginal utility of 
aggregate consumption can be written as follows:
Uc,t =  ftA< (1 +  Tt) (B.26)
where, Tf represents the aggregate distortion generated by transaction costs. This new
variable depends on both the domestic interest rate and the degree of CS, as follows,
(1 +  T() =  (1 + 1) (1 +  T (st)) (B.27)
where
(i +  r p o )  =  exp( J log (1 + gW)  
(1 +P(st) )
ds +
S t
J  lo§ +  lo§ 0 - + 9 M ) )(1 +  r ( s t))
S t
By using the following functional forms for transaction costs,
r  (st) =  exp(^o +  WiSt) -  1 
g (st) = exp (nG + n is t)) -  1 
where, > n i n 0  > , the three components of ( 1  +  T (st)) are given by,
i
/ log ( 1  + g M )( l + g ( s t)) ds = / m  (st -  st) ds =
S t S t
S t
Similarly, we have,
S t
J log (l +  r(s) ) ds( 1  +  r ( s t))
0 st
f  S2
= / {st -  st) ds = - ^ l y
lo g ( l+ g ( s t)) = n0 +  n is t
Therefore, we have that
(B.28)
(B.29)
(B.30)
(B.31)
B .4  T h e  N on L inear Econom y
The home economy is fully characterised by the following set of non-linear difference 
equations:
N on  linear equations
1—e
Phillips Curve
($ )■
Nt= ti \ tmctYt+e0(IlH,t+iY N t +1 
Dt= A t^ + e / j f n ^ + o '- 1 Dt+i 
Euler Equation
T=R7=  @E t ( ^ f n i r )
Aggregate Demand
y<= ( f ) " ’?( ( l - 7)Ct + 7Q?^*) 
Risk Sharing
Qt=
Marginal Cost
 TtY f
‘ XtQtAl+v 
Demand for money
0
Peso transaction costs 
g (st ) =  exp (nQ +  n is t)) -  1
Terms of Trade
( ^ ) ’, ' 1 =  ( i - 7 ) + 7 r (1- ’;
CPI inflation 
(  n, V ~ ’) (1 -7)+7T,1- ”
\ nw,t /  l .l- j)+ lT t- l
Taylor Rule
(! +  «,} - I  (= ?*)*• ( f t ) * -
Marginal Utility of Consumption
Ct- ° = \ t ( 1  +  T ()
Transaction cost distortion
1 +  T t=  ( l  +  ( 1  +  T (st))
CS distortion 
1 +  T (st) =exp 2 + n D- ( ^ i - n i ) f )  
Dollar transaction cost
r  (st ) =  exp(^0 +  ^ is t) -  1
CS condition 
l±r(£t)—l±k
i + a ( s t ) ~  l+ t? ____________________
Next we reduce the previous system by combining some of its equations. First, 
we use the marginal utility of consumption to eliminate, A* from three equations, the 
Euler equation, the marginal cost and the risk sharing condition, the resulting conditions 
are given by the following equations,
1 + k PEt
MCf.
- l 1 +  T f'Ct+ 1
Ct J  1 +  T*+i Ut+ 1  
TtY?Ct (1 +  Tt)
Qt-
QtAl+v 
C«(l +  T t) 
Y *
(B.33)
(B.34)
(B.35)
Next, we impose 77 =  1 , hence, the terms of trade and CPI inflation equations become,
Qt =  T?-> (B.36)
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n ‘ =  n "  ‘ ( T ^ [ )  (S-37)
Domestic aggregate demand can be further simplified by using equation (B.35) as follows,
Yt = ( w )  (1 + j Y t)C t (B.38)
From the previous equation we eliminate the real exchange rate by using (B.36), thus 
domestic output would depend only on terms of trade, domestic consumption and the 
transaction friction distortion, as follows,
y ,= 7 7 ( l + 7 T ,)C ( (B.39)
On th other hand, by plugging in equation (B.39) and (B.37) into equation (B.33), we 
obtain the dynamic IS , equation (4.63) of the main text,
1 _  oF ( ( Yt+ i\  1 1 +  T f 1 + 7 X4 + 1  1 \  rp
T T r ^ - f T T r r n ^ J  ( a 4 0 )
Next, we use equation (B.39) and (B.36) to eliminate, Ct and Qt and Tt from equation 
(B.34), we obtain the following condition for the marginal costs,
which corresponds to equation (4.61) of the main text. Notice that, At measures price 
dispersion generated by price stickiness,
A t = £ ( m y edz
from equation (B.34), we can further obtain consumption in terms of the real exchange 
rate as follows
r  QtYj'
‘ (1 + Tt)
and by plugging in the consumption level obtained in the previous equation into equation 
(B.39), we obtain terms of trade as function of domestic and foreign output and the 
transaction distortion.
=  Yt (1 +  T t) ( .
Yt (1 +  7 T«) ( ' }
Notice that when, Tt =  0, terms of trade are determined only by relative levels of output 
as in standard S.O.E models. We use equations (B.42) and (B.39) to derive an expression
that determines the level of consumption in terms of domestic and foreign output and the
transaction distortion.
c ,  -  y ! ^  K - ) ’  ( j - j L j - ) ' ' ’  J j - i j y  (B.43)
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Finally, using the definition of At we obtain,
A t - + + + § ) ' " ’  16441
We plug in this expression in equations that define the Phillips curve to obtain equations 
(4.58) and (4.59) of the main text.
B.5 The Log Linear System of Equations
Combining the log linear approximated equations (4.58), (4.59) and (4.60) of section 3, 
we obtain,
7rH,t = (3EtTrH,t+i +  Amct (B.45)
where, A =  The corresponding log linear approximation of equation (4.61) is
given by,
mct = (1 + <f>) {yt -  at) +  (1 -  7 ) fivt (B.46)
by plugging in combining equation (B.46) into equation (B.45) we obtain the following 
linear representation of the Phillips curve,
irH,t =  pE tTrH>t+i + K (y t~  (h) +  A (1 -  7 ) tivt (B.47)
On the other hand, the dynamic aggregate demand condition in its log linear form is 
obtained from equation (4.63),
it = EtAyt+i +  TrH,t+i +  (1 -  nr^Avt+i (B.48)
The Dynamics of the Flexible Price Allocation
When prices are fully flexible marginal costs are constant, therefore, up to a log linear
approximation, me” =  0. Imposing this condition in equation (B.46), we obtain the
following definition for the natural level of output,
ynt =<h -  (B-49)
1 +  0
This equation corresponds to equation (4.65) in section 3.1. Similarly, using equation 
(B.48) we derive the natural interest rate,
Tt = EtAy ?+1 +  (1 -  7 )$Aut+i (B.50)
210
Notice that both the natural level of output and the natural interest rate depend on the 
distortions generated by transactions frictions. Hence, the flexible price allocation is not 
efficient. To achieve the efficient allocation we assume similarly to Woodford (2003) that 
the Central bank has additional policy instruments that it can use to offset the impact of 
transaction frictions on the economy’s flexible price allocation. In particular we assume 
that the central bank pays interests on domestic money holdings, i™ and that it taxes 
foreign currency holdings, r™ . Under these assumptions, vt and s will be given by,
vt = u) ((1 -  s) (it - i ? )  + s (it +  Ttm ) )  (B.51)
a = +-------------------x ^  (B.52)
(*  1 -  ni)
By setting, it — i™, i — im and r m = jj (2 — exp (no — ^o)) — 1? it holds that, s = 0, and 
consequently that, Vt. When these conditions hold, transaction frictions do not affect the 
dynamic equilibrium under flexible prices, thus, the level of output become efficient,
Vt = at
This latter equation corresponds to equation (4.69) in section 3.2. By defining 
the efficient output gap, as xt = yt — at, and by using equations (B.47) and (B.51), we 
obtain equation (4.71) of section 3.3 . Similarly, by subtracting equations (B.48) and 
(B.50) we obtain equation (4.70) of section 3.3.
B .6  The Central bank Loss Function
To obtain the welfare based central bank’s objective function we approximate up to 
second-order the domestic household’s utility function, Ut
Ut = Et Y ,f> k \U{Ct+k ) - V { L t+k))
Lfc=0
(B.53)
This approximation is taken around a deterministic steady-state where there exist a pos­
itive but small level of CS. By choosing this particular steady-state we make explicit the 
effects of transaction costs and CS on household’s welfare. Before approximating the 
utility function, however, it is useful to write it in terms of domestic output. In doing so 
we use equations (B.54) and (B.55), which link consumption and labour to domestic and 
foreign output and two additional terms associated to transaction costs and relative price 
distortions, Y* and At, as follows,
Ct = Yt1~'1 (Yt* y G (  T () (B.54)
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U  =  ^  (B.55)
where,
o m - ( n k ) ‘"’ ( ( I T T s ) ’  <Bse)
and Tf is defined by equations (4.16), (4.17) and (4.9). Similarly, At measures the dis­
tortions that relative price dispersion generate on labour usage. This latter variable is
defined as follows,
a - f ( 3 r ! r *  < B K |
Under the assumption of log utility and using equations (B.54) and (B.56), U(Ct) 
can be written as follows,
U(Ct) =  (1 -  7 ) ln ( lt )  +  7  In 17 -  (1 -  7 )  ln ( l +  7 * 4 )  -  7  In (1 +  T t) (B.58)
whereas its log-quadratic approximation is given by,
U(Ct) =  (1 -  7 ) 3 / 4  +  i v t  -  (1 -  i ) ° r  +  1 2 ^ V*)  +  °  0 T^ ’ e ^ )  ^B ' 5 9 ^
where vt =  In err =  /i+ yrj ’ and =  ( (1- 7 K1+7 T) )  • The Previous equation
implies that both the level and the volatility o f transaction frictions affect negatively  
household’s welfare. Furthermore, by noticing that UcC =  1, equation (B.59) can be 
written more com pactly as follows,
u ( c t) =  ( 1  - 7 )  (yt -  2~( r ^ r ) (Vt +  ^ 2 )  +  ^ - p  +  ° ( l l T >e ll3 )  ( B -6 0 )
where, v =  . Next, we write vt in terms of the domestic and the foreign interest rate
and the degree of CS, as follows
vt =  ln ( l +  it) +  ln( ^ Y ^ )  (R61)
Since only second-order terms of vt affect welfare it is sufficient to  consider a first-order
approxim ation of vt to  obtain an accurate measure of welfare associated to  transaction
frictions. T he log-linear approximation of vt  is given by,
vt = it — s (it -  i*t ) +  o (||T , e||2)  (B.62)
simplifying this expression we obtain,
vt = ( 1  -  s)it + si* +  o (||T , £II2) (B.63)
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Alternative, we can write equation (B.59) in terms of the domestic and foreign interest 
rate by eliminated those terms in equation (B.60) that are independent of policy, as follows
U(Ct) = ( 1  - 7 ) {yt - c r T(l -  s)Xvit)
- (1  — 7)(1 -  s)ar s)it +  ( 1  -  crT) siti*t
+t.i.p +  o ^||Y, e||3^
On the other hand, the second-order approximation of v{Lt) is given by,
v(L t) =  v ( A t ^ )  = v + VA(&t ~  1) +  vy (Yt -  Y) + vA (At -  1) At
+  2 \^yy — ^AA — ■*‘)2 v a a  {At — 1)'
+VyA {Yt -  Y ) {At - 1 )  +  vyA {Yt -  Y) {At -  1)
+ v/±,a {At — 1) {At — 1) +  o ^||£||3^
Where At  can be written in terms of domestic inflation as follows,
+
A t — O A t - i U t f j  + (1 — 0)
and its second-order approximation is given by:
~ 6 e n 2
A t = 0A t- 1 + — - l ±  +
(B.64)
(B.65)
(B.6 6 )
Under the assumption that the initial relative price distortion is small, this is A_i is of 
order o ^||e||3  ^ , At  would be of order o ^||e||2^ , thereby cross terms of At can be eliminated 
from equation (B.64). Hence, this latter equation can be written as follows,
(B.67)
(B.6 8 )
v {Lt) — v +  At +  vyY  +  - Y t j  +  VAAt +
i  [vyyY2??] + VyAY Y tAt + t.i.p + o (||<r||3) 
Furthermore, since at the steady-state it holds that ,
(1 -  i ) u cC =  V yY  
the total period t  utility flow is given by ,
u {Ct) -  v{ht) = - v yY ( 1  -  s)cr? ( Avit +  ( ) ( 1  -  s)i2 +  ( 1  -  cr?) sitit
-V yY  ( ^ ((1 +  <P)) Yt2 +  =!%At +  ^ Y t A tv„Y
+t.i.p +  o (||e||3^
(B.69)
(B.70)
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By defining the following new set of parameters:
U y y  =  (1 +  i p )  (B.71)
uyA = ^  (B.72)
vy
(B.73)
V yY
The utility function of the representative agent up to a second-order can be written as 
follows:
u (Ct) -  v(ht) = - v yY  ( 1  -  s) ar  ( ^ v k  +  (1 -  s)i\ +  (1 -  ar ) uski*^
- v yY  -I- liA^t +  uyAYtA t)  -I- t.i.p +  o (iHI3) (B.74)
By iterating forward equation (B.65) we obtain:
t=oo f. t=oo 2
(B.75)
Using this latter equation to eliminate A*, we obtain the following equation,
t—oo / - 2 \
- v y Y  Y ,  0 ‘ ( +  2  “vjA? +  u * ~ 2  + ) (B-76)
t = 0  '  '
-V yY w a r  (1 -  s) ^  f t  { ^ v k  +  ^  2°~T^ w (l -  s)«? +  (1 -  c r ^ u s k i i ' j
Where,
uyy = (1 +  (p) (B.77)
uA =  1 (B.78)
UyA =  -  (1 +  y>) (B.79)
we have that:
_  9e _  6 e _  e fTy orVv
=  (1 -  9) (1 -  00) =  (1 -  6 ) (1 -  06) = A 1 J
Completing the quadratic form on output and productivity, we have that, :
+  UyAYtAt =  i  ( ( 1  +  ¥>) (y(2 -  2 YtAt +  )  (B.81)
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by defining the output gap, as: Xt =  Yt — Y f,  where Y f  represent the efficient level of 
output, the welfare based lost function for a central bank in an economy with currency 
substitution is given by:
+  (R 82)
> t=oo
- - r -V h Y c TW ( 1  -  s) ^ 2  f t  [2^vk  +  ( 1  -  err) w(l -  s)it +  2  ( 1  -  <jT) usiti*t ]
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C APPENDIXES OF CHAPTER 5
C .l The Steady-State
The steady-state is determined by the following set of equations,
(e -  1) P (z ) -£P £X  ( - ^ W  -  P (z ) \  +  7 zP{z) =  0 (C.l)
Y  = h (C.2)
p = p {z? - 'd {z ) (C.3)
f  6 lh(i)di 
Jo
h =  /  { (C.4)
W  f 1 W l
T  = I  ~ p di (C5)
7* = 7zP {z)-£Pt X  (C.6)
W'—  = V  (C.7)
Using equation (C.6) to simplify equation (C.l) , we obtain the following condition for 
the optimal price level,
e W - { e -  1) P{z) +  t zP(z) = 0 (C.8)
from this equation we obtain,
p °(z ) = ------£ _ -W  (C.9)
£ - l - n / z
To guarantee that P*(z) is a maximum, it must hold that (P*(;2;)) < 0-
Taking a derivative respect to P  (z ) of equation (C.l) we obtain the following second order 
condition for the optimal price,
d U(z \  =  (e -  l)  eP (z )-‘- 1P sX  -  e (1 +  e) W P (z)~‘~2 PeX  < 0 
d P ( z f  v ’ '  ’ '  ’ w
simplifying the previous condition, we obtain,
d2 l I ^ 2 =  (e -  1) -  (1 + e) W P (z)~ l < 0 
d P ( z f  K 1 ' ’ w
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after plugging in the optimal price, given by equation (C.9), we obtain the fol­
lowing upper bound for j z ,
0 ^  _  (l +  e H e - l - 7 * )  < o
dP (z) 2 £
By simplifying the previous condition, this upper bound is determined by,
~  ( e - 1 )  ,
l z <  ( l  +  e) <
Additionally we assume that the government uses a subsidy specific to each 
industry to eliminate the monopolistic distortion, hence, the equilibrium at the steady- 
state become efficient.
p°(z )  ---------------------=  W
£  — 1 -  7 *
Therefore,
Also, from the aggregate demand condition,
X  = Y -  7
We normalize, Y  = C  =  1, then X  = 1 — 7  and Cl =  6 l — 7 *
C .2  Proof of Propositions
Proof. P ro p o sitio n  5.2.1 The optimal degree of financial dollarisation of agent i, if, is 
given by the following condition,
7* \  ( E t € t + 1) , (  ( .  l l W  E t P t + i € t + i
»t+ 1
+ ^ -  ( j f  ‘ Et ((& «(*) -  R h )  €*+1 )<*(*)
The budget constraint of a typical household is given by,
Pt+1
where,
i f 1 P t+ i{ z )  N
7t+i =  /  - 5  l z d\z )J 0 ■‘ t'fl
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We take a second order approximation of the previous two equations around the deter­
ministic steady-state
y  _ y  _  M L r f f  ^ ( P t + i - P )  M \ _ i f  (.P t + i - P )
t+ 1 ^  P  p  p  P  p
f Pt + 1 -  P
p  V P fJo
P(z)7 * rPt+1( z ) - P ( z )
+ J.
1 P ( z H  
1 p (zH
P
Pt+1 ~ P
+ So P  Zd(-Zh  P  I ,/n P- L
L P(z)
1 p ( * H d(z)
d{z)
P t + i - P
Pt+1 ( z ) - P ( z )  1 \Pt+l - P
«*(*) +  O (||$(,<reys)p(z )  j L p
—X.We denote by ^ — , hence the previous condition can be written as follows,
( i  -  ®5+1 =  *7*6+1 ~ Pt+i ~ rfZt+iPt+i + $+  i (C.10)
~ Jo PpC*Z ^ t+1^  ~ ^ + i ) ^ )  ~  ^ iP t+1
+Pt+1 f 0 ~p Qt zPt+i(z)d(z) +  °  ( l l6 , < ^ l l 3 )
On the other hand, the utility function up to second order approximation is given by,
EtU  (C?+1 -  7t+i) =  [n‘ (**t+i -  y x j ^ ) ]  +  O (||6,<7£||3)
Then, the optimal portfolio allocation can be obtained by maximizing the previous utility 
function respecto to r f , hence we have the following first order condition,
9U (X}+1) 
drf =  E* “'■It Cfi  ^ , Xt+ldrf =  0
From equation (C.10), we can easily obtain that,
d^t+i (6 +i _  6 + iP m )
hence,
dxi
drj
t+ 1  tpx t+ 1
drf
6 +i
(1_&)
( ! - & )
(*7*6+1 “  Pt+i ~  fo (Pt+i(z) -  pt+i) d(z))
+o
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hence, we obtain,
dx\+l ^  ( r f i t+1 -  Pt+iit+i -  fo ~ p c^  (pt+i(z) -  Pt+1) 6+i<2W)
d r , i ~t+1 ( i - ^ y
+ 0  ( ||6 , 0 -«II*) 
(6 + 1  ~  6 +iP t+ i)o =
(l _ &)
( ^ 6 + 1  - P t + i6 + i  -  fo &+1(2 ) ” &+1 ) 6 + i d (* ) )
^  /  iT 2
(1_&)
Simplifying the previous expression we obtain,
0  =  ( ^ t 6 + i  _  -E tf t+ iP t+ i)  -
<*i (v 'E t^+ i  -  Etpt+ib+i -  - p g r Et i(pt+i{z) -  pt+i) 6 +1 ) <*(*) 
hence, the optimal portfolio decision is given by,
^  _  7^  C^t6+i -  Et£t+iPt+i)
l M rii I jp t l
Z i  ( f -  r • f 1 p ^ 7*
Alternatively we can write the previous expression as follows,
+TT7T (EtP t+i€ t+i  +  [  P ^ z E t ( { p t + i { z )  -  p t+1) £t+i) d(z)
bt£,t+lai \  J0 ^
i i -i 7*\ (Et&+i) , (  ( , Y  \ \  EtPt+iZt+i
□
Proof. P ro p o sitio n  5.2.2A particular firm will choose to set prices in a foreign currency 
if and only if the following conditions holds,
Cov (£t+ixt+i) ~  2  {VarZt+i +  2Et€t+i (E£t+ 1  -  -EtPH-i))]
~ lz  [eCov (6 +iPt+i) +  Cov£t+iwt+i]
(Var£t+ 1  +  2Et£t+i {E£t+ 1  — Etpt+i))\^uuqt+i wt+l ~
0  < -7z
+  ( <■- ! ) (  Cov£ i i   ---------:--------------~y ----- -------------J
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Proof. Thus, the profit function of this typical firm can be written as follows,
'P‘MYEtN-t+i iz ) = Et (Pt(z) -  Wt+1 )
Pt+iJ
(C.ll)
the corresponding second order quadratic Taylor expansion of the previous equation is 
given by,
EtYlt+i (z) = (P (z ) -  W)P(z)~£P £X E t p t+ 1  +  |p?+i] +  ®t+i +  \ x t+i +  ext+1pt+i 
—W P(z)~£P £X E t ^spt+iwt+i +  wt+ixt+i +  wt+i +  \ wt+ij + 
P (z)l~£P £X E t ( ( 1 - e ) P t t o  +
P (z)l - £P £X E t ((1 -  e) Pt (z) (ept+i +  xt+i))
- ^ P ( z ) - £P £X ^  - e Pt (z) +  - y P tW 5 +
^ P ( z ) - £P £X P tsPt (z) (wt+ 1 +  ept+ 1  +  ®t+1) 
7zP(z) ^ ( z )  +  -  lzW E t
□
Lets now compare the value of expected profits when the firm sets price in dollars. 
The steady-state is the same, the only difference is that we replace, pt{z) by Pt{z) and 
Thus a second order approximation of the profits function under dollar price setting
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is given by,
Etu ;+1 {z) = (P(z) -  W)(P(z) eP £X ) Et ^  \pt+1 +  - p2t+l\ +  X t+1 +  - X 2t + 1  +  £xt+ipt+i
—W P(z)~£P £X E t ^£pt+iwt+i +  wt+ixt+i +  wt+i +  +
P (z)1~£P £X E t ( (1 — er)
1 — £
P (z)l- €P tX E t (1 -  e) P;(z) (ept+i + x t+1)
—W P(z)~cP eX E t —£ —£*?(*) + - ^ V ( * ) 2
W P(z) €P EX E tePt(z) (wt+i + ept+i + x t+i)
P{z)l~€P cX E t  I (1 -  e) f(+i + l - £ , 2o St+ 1
P (z ) 1 t P sX E t (1 -  e) £t+i (ept+i + Xt+i)
-W P { z )~ eP*XEt —£ +
W P(z) £P eX E t£^t+i (wt+i +  £Pt+ 1  +  x t+i)
7ZP  {z) Et +  i? t2+1 + Pt(z) + i i ? ( z ) 2)  -  7zWEtWt+1
then, we have
EtYlt+i iz ) E tUt+i (z ) > 0 
The previous condition can be written as follows,
6 +i + 1 ~ ^ 2 r>P{z)l- £P £X E t ({  1 - e )
- W P ( z ) - £P £X E t - £
P (z)1~£P £X E t ^(1 -  e)
+P{z)l - £P £X E t (1 -  e) (Pt*(z) -  Pt (z)) ( £ P t + 1 +  x t+i)
+ (1 -  e) 6+i (ept+i + ®t+i)J
6 +i +  ~2~&+i — ^6+1 (wt+i +  £Pt+1 + xt+1) +
p;{z) -  Pt (z) +  L r £  (P,*(zf -  P?(z))
—W P(z)~eP eX E t —e pt’ (z) -  p m  + - y  (p ; (z ) 2 -  p?{z))
+ W P (z )-£P cX E te (P;{z) -  P,(z)) (u)t+i +  ept+i + x t+1)
7 ,P  (z) Et ( ( t + 1 +  i & i  +  /? (* ) ~ Pt{*) +  \  {P ;(z?  -  * ?(* ))) > 0
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Rearranging the previous expression in a more convenient way, we have,
0 < [(1 -  e) P (z)1- £P CX  + eWP(z)~£P £X  + l z P  (z)] E & + 1  +
[(1 -  e) P (z)1~cPeX  + Et (6+i (ept+i +  x t+1)) +
[(1 -  e) P ( z f ~ £P £X  + eW P(z)~£P £X] Etg +1 +
[(1 -  e) P (z)1~£P £X  +  7 zP(z)\  +  eW PW -'peXEttt+niH +i
((1 -  e) P (z)1~£P£X  +  +  7zP  (z)) (P,*(z) -  P,(z))
+ ((1 -  c) P (z)1~£P £X  + eW P(z)~£P £X  + 7zP  (z)) Et (Pt'(z) -  Pt (z)) (epm  +  x t+1)
eW P(z)~£P £X E t (Pt*(z) -  P,(z)) u>m
- |  [(1 -  e) P (z)1~£P £X  +  eW P(z)~£P £X] (P(*(z)2 -  P 2(z))
[(1 -  e) P(z)1- £P £X  + 7,P  (z)] (i y ( z)2 ~ P«2(z))
Prom the first order condition of the firm, we have that,
(1 -  e) P (z)1_£P £X  +  eW P (z)-‘jP'X = - 7 zP(z)
and also, we know that, up to log-linear approximation, Pt(z) = Pt(z) — £*6 + 1  thus the 
previous condition becomes.
0  < -~/zP(z)Et£t+i (ept+i +  *t+i)
+  [(1 +  e) P (z)7 z +  (1 -  e) P (z)1~£P£X]
+ eW P (z)-£P£X E t(,t+iWt+i 
+'yzP(z)Et€t+i (eEtpt+i +  Etx t+i) +
[(1 +  e) P(z)-yz + (1 -  e) P (z)l~£P £X] (P> ^  ~ p2(z»  
—eW P(z)~£PeXEt£t+iEtWt+i 
Further simplifying the previous condition we obtain,
0 < - 7 zP(z) [eCov Kt+iPt+i) +  Cov (£t+ix t+i)]
+ [(e +  1) P(z)lz  +  (1 -  e) P (z)1~£P £X] ^ ± i  
+ eW P (z)-eP £XC<wSt+iWt+ 1
+  [(£ + 1) P (z )7z +  ( 1  -  e) P (z)1~£P £X ] £ 1 6 + 1  (£ 6 + 1  -  E tpt+1 )
Thus, when 7 2 =  0, the firms choose to set prices in dollars only if the correlation 
between the nominal exchange rate and real wages is high enough,
n  <- ^ Var£t+1 +  2 i?t£t+i {E£t+1 — Etpt+1)Cov£t+iwt+i > ---------------------- -----------------------
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In the general case we have that,
0 < [ -7 zP(z)P(z)~£P£X] [eCov (£t+iPt+i) +  Cov (£*+107+1)]
+ |  [7zP ( z ) P ( z ) -* P cX ]  (F arfy+ i +  2£ tf (+i (£ £ m  -  E tPt+1)) +
(1 -  e) P(z)1~£P£X V^ a r t^+1 +  2^ t+1 ( ^ + 1 ~ EtPt+1))
2
+eW P(z)-eP sXCovtt+iwt+i 
.Therefore, we can further simplify the previous expression,
0 < [~izP{z)\ [eCov (ft+iPt+i) +  Cov (&+127+1)] +  
lpzP{z) (Var£t+1 +  2Et€t+i {E£t+1 — EtPt+1))
-  (e -  1) P(~) ^ a r t^+1 ~  EtPt+i))
2
+eP(z)Cov^t+iWt+i
since,
P(z) = ( e - l - y z) W
we have that,
0 < [-7 zP(z)\ [eCov Kt+ipt+i) +  Cov (£*+107+1)]
+ |  llzP{z)\ (VarZt+i +  2Et£t+i {E£t+1 -  EtPt+i))
-  (e -  1) p ( - )  ( y ar€t+1 +  2E t£t+1 {E£t+1 ~  -5 'tPt+i))
2
+CW £*+iu;*+iP(z) (e -  1 -  %)
We can further eliminate, P(z), hence we obtain,
0 < [~7z] [eCov (£*+ip*+i) +  Cov (£*+107+1)]
+  2 ^  ( ^ a r £t+i +  2P*£*+i (E£t+1 — Etpt+i))
_  ( ^ Qr&+1 +  2P*£*+i ~  -^tPt+i))
2
+C,ou£*+iw*+i (e — 1 — 7Z) 
then we can further simplify
0 < —7z [eCov (£*+ip*+i) +  Cov (£*+107+1)]
+ 7^2 ( V ar€t+1 +  2P*£*+i (P£*+i — Etpt+i))
_  ^  ^  {Var£t+1 +  2P*£*+i (P£t+ i ~ Etpt+1))
2 
+CW£*+iU7+i (e — 1 — 7*)
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C.3 The Dynamics of the Economy
Aggregate Demand
In order to obtain the aggregate demand of the economy we add the linear approximated 
budget constraint, across agents This strategy allows to characterize the dynamics of 
the aggregate demand only up to first order of approximation. However, since we use 
the dynamics equilibrium of the economy to obtain the second moments of endogenous 
variables, a first order approximation is sufficient to deliver accurate measures of second 
moments up to second order approximation. For agent i the first order approximated 
budget constraint is given by,
‘  F s f * '  ‘  F s f * ‘
- /  ^ T  (ft+ iM  - P m M * )  + o (||«t,a £||2) (C.1 2 )I1 c') 0
we define aggregate demand by , xt+i =  fg xj+1di, then, we obtain,
f 1 rf f 1 1
xt+i = /  7  ~  / t  ~ \ dlPt+iJo ( i - £ )  Jo ( l - $ )
-  /  7 ' : g  f  ( f e t lW  - f i + 1 ) <*(»)* +  0  ( f e , a £||2)(C.13)
0 v1 c ' )  0
Lets denote by aggregate degree of financial dollarisation by 77 = fg — and
1- c*
by Xp = fo ~J~ZTdi and by =  Jo fo *(*) ~ d(z )dh therefore,
c% c*
aggregate demand can be written as:
Xt+i — vZt+i ~  ApPt+i ~ <Pt+l +  O ||2^  (C.14)
Aggregate Supply
We obtain the aggregate supply by combining the optimal price setting decision of indi­
vidual firms and the optimality condition at the labour market. From the optimal price 
setting
r) M  =  /  K^EtWt+i -  kzx (eEtPt+i  +  E t x t + i ) , if 2  € T , .
t+ \  £t+i ~ Et£t+i +  KwEtWt+i ~ {eEtPt+i +  EtXt+i) otherwise
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where, kzw = , <  = (£- i - ^ ( i +g)) and T represent the set of firms
which choose to set prices in domestic currency with mass 1 — v. Also, from the optimality 
condition of labor demand we have that,
wt+i  =  Pt+1 (C.16)
By using the previous condition to eliminate real wages from the optimality 
condition for price setting we obtain,
n , , M  =  /  EtPt+1 ~  KZE ‘X*+1< i f  2  £  T  (C 1 7-1
\  6 + 1  -  Ettt+1 + EtPt+1 ~ K^EtXt+i, otherwise
then the aggregate price level can be determined by aggregating the individual 
price decisions, as follows,
rv  rv
Pt+i  =  (6 + 1  -  # t 6 + i +  EtPt+ 1  -  K*Etxt+ i) dz +  J ' (EtPt+ 1  ~ Kz E tx t+i)  dz (C.18)
therefore, we obtain,
Pt+i ~ Etpt+i =  v  (6 + 1  -  ^ i 6 +i) -  FEtx t+i (C.19)
where,
0 (e — 1 — j z ( 1  +  e))
r  = i  -=- — -------------- rrdz
Dynamics Equilibrium
The dynamics equilibrium of this economy is given by the path of the endogenous variables
P t+ i — EtPt+i and Xt+i — Et in terms of (6 + 1  — ^ t 6 +i)- To solve this system we start
by taking conditional expectations to the aggregate supply equation, then we obtain, 
EtXt+i = 0 , we use this condition into the aggregate demand equation, then we obtain,
EtXt+i = fjEt^t+i ~ ^pEtPt+i ~ Et<pt (C.2 0 )
which in turn implies that,
0  =  rjEt£t+i ~ ^pEtPt+i — Ettpt (C.2 1 )
since Etpt+i(z) = Etpt+1 , we have that Et<pt = 0, therefore, we obtain that,
EtPt+i = - p ^ 6 +i (C.2 2 )Ap
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Using the latter condition, we can write the aggregate demand equation in the 
following form,
% + 1 — Etxt+i =  rj (£t+i -  Et£t+i) ~  ^p (Pt+i ~ E tpt+i) -  <pt+i (C.23)
We use the aggregate supply and the previous condition to solve for the dynamics 
equilibrium of this economy,
Pt+i — Etpt+1 =  v (£t+i — (C.24)
and
x t+\ -  Etx t+1 =  (77 -  Apv) (Ct+i -  Et£t+1 ) -  <Pt (C.25)
Second Moments of Endogenous Variables
Using the previous conditions it is easy to show that,
Cov(pt+u£t+i) = vVar(£t+i) (C.26)
Cov(xt+uit+i) = (r) ~ \ v )  Var(£t+1 ) -  cov(£t+u <Pt+1 ) (C.27)
Prom the definition of (pt we have that,
ow(&+i, (fit) = ~ J  j — 1~ —y J  Pp c i ZE  (Pt+i(z ) ~ Pt+1 ) ( & + 1  “  E &+i) d(z)di
(C.28)
Prom the definition of pt+i{z), we are able to simplify the previous expression as
follows,
cov{tt+uVt) = ~  f  7 —— y  f  Pp}-7r d(z)diCov{pt+u^ +l)
Jo ( 1 - ^ ) - /o
■ Jo ( T y |)  Jr ^ d^ diVar^  <C-29)
Since, at the steady-state, P (z ) =  P,the previous condition can be written as, 
cov(£t+Uipt) =  -  [      [  l'zd(z)diCov(pt+i,(it+l)
JO ( l - i - j o Z o  
-  [  7 ----- 1- V -  [  1 iA z ) d i V a r ^ t+1) (C.30)
Jo ( i - i A & J t
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Lets define by A0  =  f f  ^  f f  7 l2d(z)di, and by \ vv  ~  £  f?  7 lzd(z)di,
c i c i
then we have,
covKt+i, (ft) = - * 4>Cov(pt+i,€t+i) -  \ vvVar{£t+i) (C.31)
therefore,
Cov(xt+i,£t+i) = ~ (<*p K )  v) Var{£t+i) (C.32)
we further simplify notation by defining, A =  (Xp — A  ^— A^), then we have,
Cov(xt+1 , fm ) = (7/ -  Aw) V ar(ft+i) (C.33)
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D APPENDIXES OF CHAPTER 6
D .l  Aggregation
The derivations herein follow Lewbel (1994) closely. To alleviate the notation we drop 
the i subscript in this appendix.
Equations (6.11) and (6.12)
Consider equation (6.10),
x t = axt- i  +  c +  ut (D.l)
where Ut = bSt. Note that c and ut are individual specific and hence depend on a. Since 
by assumption St is a sequence of serially uncorrelated shocks, so is u*.
Let Ea be the expectation operator across individuals, Ea[z] =  f  zd.F(a), such 
that Xt = Ea[xt], C = Ea[c] and Ut = Ea[ut]. Aggregation of (D.l) renders
Xt = Ea[axt-i] + C + Ut (D.2 )
Define a random variable a s, a scalar A s = Ea[as] and a recursion a s+i =  (a^ — A s)a
with initial condition a i =  a. Note that for s > 1 the above recursion implies that
a s = a3 — o>s~-*Ar. After taking Ea expectations we get equation (6 .1 2 ) in the main
text, where m s = Ea[as] is the 5 -th moment of the distribution of a. Note also that
B a , s] =  A sX t—s H- F a[(o!s Ag^Xt—sl
= A sX t-s  H" -^a[(Q!s — As)arr^_(s+i)] Ea[(o;s As)c] -|- Ea[(cxs As)itt_s]
=  A sX t-s  +  Ea[ota+ixt-{a+i)\ +  cov(as, c) A  cov(Q!s, ut-s) (D.3)
where cov(as, c) is the cross-sectional covariance of a s and c which is time-invariant. On 
the other side, cov(as, u t-s) is the cross-sectional covariance of os and u t-s which is time 
dependent, but as this dependency comes from St, it is serially uncorrelated.
Equation (D.3) shows a recursion between Ea[asx t -S] and Ea[as+i r t_(s+1)]. Af­
ter solving it,
o o  oo oo
Ea[axt- 1] =  A3X t- j  +  ^ 2  cov(a J’c) +  X I cov(a i ’ ^ -J ')  (D-4)
j= i j= i j= i
Let Vt = Y l<j L i coviaj i ut-j)  and V  = Etyt], where E  is the expectation operator over 
time. Define also C = C + Y ljL i cov(aj, c) +  V  and Ut = Ut + Vt — V. Then, after plugging 
(D.4) into (D.2 ) we get equation (6 .1 1 ) in the main text, Xt = Yl'jLi Aj x t~j + C + Ut, 
where Ut is serially uncorrelated. 34 The underlying assumptions behind the aggregate 
equation (6.11) are thus, that M  and Vt are both finite or the sequences (cov(aj, c)}°^x 
and {cov(aj, are absolute summable.
34 Pesaran (2003) shows that it is heteroscedastic, though.
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Equation (6.14)
Consider now equation (D.l) in first differences
A x t =  a A x t- i  + ut -  ut - 1  (D.5)
so that after aggregation, A Xt = Ea[aAxt~i] + U t~ Ut-1 - Following the same procedure 
leading to equation (D.4),
oo
Ea[aAxt-i] = Y  A jA X t- j  + Vt -  Vt- i  (D.6 )
3= 1
so that A Xt  can be written as
oo  oo
A X t = Y  A jA X t- j  +  (Ut +  Vt) -  +  Vt_i) =  Y  A jA X t-r  +  t/,f (D.7)
j = 1 j = 1
which corresponds to the first-difference version or (6.11). The new aggregate error U] is 
serially correlated and the coefficients are the same as those in (6 .1 1 ).
Equation (6.13)
All the results derived above go through straightforwardly when St = Rt +  St where Et is 
iid. Coefficients a and b and the noise £* axe individual specific whereas Rt is an aggregate 
figure, so Xt = Ea[axt-1] +  Ea[b]Rt +  Ea[bet]• Equation (D.4) is now
oo  oo  oo  oo
Ea[axt- 1] =  A3X t-3 +  cov(aj, c) +  ^  cov(aj, b)Rt +  cov(aj,bEt) (D.8 )
j =l j =l j =l j =l
Call B0 = E a[b], Bj = cov(oj, 6 ), Ut =  Y^jLo^t-j  where Wt = Y'jLi cov(oj, bet). Fur­
ther mechanical manipulation leads to (6.13). The aggregate disturbance Ut is serially 
correlated.
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D.2 A Brief N ote on Fractional Integration
Consider the univariate dynamic model
*(L)(1 -  L)dX t =  B{L)m (D.9)
where L  is the lag operator, rjt ~  iid(0, a^) and d is the differencing parameter. When 
d =  0, X t  is stationary and follows an ARMA process, $(L )X t = @(L)r)t . When d = 1 , 
Xt  has a unit root and hence follows an ARIMA process, $>(L)AXt =  Q(L)rjt. More 
generally, when d takes non-integer values, Xt is said to be a fractionally integrated 
ARMA (ARFIMA) process. When d € (0,0.5], the autocovariance function of Xt  declines 
hyperbolically to zero, making Xt  a stationary long-memory process. For d > 0.5, Xt  is 
non-stationary (has infinite variance).
Granger (1980) has shown that under particular assumptions about F(a) -  the 
distribution of individual autoregressive coefficients -  the aggregation of AR(1 ) processes 
like (6.10) leads to (D.9) . 35 In our empirical application, we simply imposed d = 1 and 
proceeded. If d < 1 truly, then we would have over-differentiated the data, with possible 
negative effects in our statistical inference.
Table D1 displays estimates of d and tests Ho : d = 0 and Ho : d = 1 . We did not 
find enough evidence to reject Hq ’ d =  1 whereas Hq : d = 0 is systematically rejected.
Table D l. Estimated Fractional Integration Parameter in Dollarization 
Ratios
d
H 0 :
t- stat
a =  0
p -value
H o : d = l  — 
t- stat p-value
M exico 0.825 2.376 0.0491 0.505 0.6294
Peru 0.932 3.883 0.0037 0.282 0.7843
Poland 0.955 4.605 0.0025 0.219 0.8333
Uruguay 0.788 2.485 0.0378 0.667 0.5236
The estimation method is that of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (known as GPH). The asymptotic 
standard error of d is 7t2/6  which is used to compute the ^-statistics and p-values. Both tests 
(Ho : d =  0 and H0 : d =  1) are two-tailed. See Baillie (1996) for a review of ARFIMA modelling 
and for critics to the GPH estimator.
35 See also Baillie (1996) and Zaffaroni (2004).
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D.3 The Distribution of Endowments and Abilities
Our results were derived under the assumption that agents are homogenous in their en­
dowments. In particular, we restricted the analysis to the case where each agent has an 
endowment of size one. Here, we show that our results hold for a more general case, one 
in which agents have different size of endowments, but where the distribution of abilities 
(a) across agents is correlated with that of the endowments. We regard this correlation 
as plausible in reality.
Consider equation (6.10). For the sake of argument, set /x =  0 so C{ =  0, define 
€it =  biSit and assume that aggregate income is equal to one and that there are two 
agents in the economy: one with ability oi and income ni and the other with ability <22 
and income 712 =  1 — ni. Then,
( 1  CLiLi)Xit =
for i = 1 ,2(D. 10) After generating a common lag polynomial for both process we have
that
(1 aj-^)(l OiiU^Xit =  (1
for i =  1,2 and i 7  ^ j(D .ll)T he aggregate level of dollar deposits, which coincides 
with the aggregate dollarization ratio, is X t = n\Xit +  n2x 2t. Aggregate the equations in 
(D.3) to get
(1 -  aiL)(l  -  a2L )X t = n i( l  -  a2L)£u +  n2( 1 -  aiL)£2t (D-12)
Define £** =  n^it  for i — 1,2. Then, (D.12) boils down to
Xt = {a\ +  a2 )X t~i +  a ia 2 Xf_ 2  4- i n  — o>2i i t - i  +  £2* — ^ i ^ - i  (D.13)
We have that if St is an iid sequence, the aggregate dollarization ratio follows an 
ARMA(2,1) process. This simple example can be generalizad to the case of N  AR(1 ) 
process (hence N  ability or endowment levels); in such a case the aggregate dollarization 
ratio follows an ARMA(A*, N* — 1 ) process, where N* < N. We can increase the number 
of agents involved by simply replicating the individual behaviour for a given ability a an 
arbitrary number of times. Therefore, the aggregation results derived in appendix D .l go 
through under the assumption that the distribution of endowments is correlated to that 
of the abilities to process information. When N  —> 0 0 , we get the limiting case exposed 
in appendix D.2. These derivations apply straightforwardly to the alternative case where 
Su is not iid .
231
